The Nature of Aesthetic Experiences Fabian Dorsch University College London MPhil Philosophy March 2000 Abstract This dissertation provides a theory of the nature of aesthetic experiences on the basis of a theory of aes- thetic values. It results in the formulation of the following necessary conditions for an experience to be aesthetic: (i) it must consist of a (complex) representation of an object and an accompanying feeling; (ii) the representation must instantiate an intrinsic value; and (iii) the feeling must be the recognition of that value and bestow it on the object. Since representations are of intrinsic value for different reasons, there are different kinds of aesthetic experiences (such as sensual or meta-cognitive ones). By means of certain conceptual links, it is possible to extend this account to other aesthetic entities thus enabling the formulation of a general theory of the aesthetic in non-aesthetic terms. In particular, aes- thetic values are identical with subjective dispositions to elicit aesthetic experiences under normal condi- tions. Accordingly, I endorse anti-realism about aesthetic values: their existence, nature and exemplifica- tion are mind-dependent, while their ascriptions to objects have genuine truth-values. I back up this ac- count by arguing against the alternative positions that either take aesthetic values to be objective or deny the truth-aptness of their attributions. Furthermore, I put forward a relativist variant of anti-realism according to which ascriptions of differ- ent (and seemingly incompatible) aesthetic values to a particular object are all correct, given that the aes- thetic experiences involved are made under normal conditions and concern the same aesthetically non- evaluative features of that object. For there is no specifically aesthetic norm (e.g., a specification of “ideal critics”) by means of which one of the faultless aesthetic experiences can be picked out as the only appro- priate one. That aesthetic values nevertheless show a normative dimension is ensured by their conformity to a general account of values as capacities to satisfy, or dissatisfy, rational desires. 2 Table of contents Abstract...................................................................................................................................................... 2 Table of contents........................................................................................................................................ 3 1. Introduction..............................................................................................................................................5 The nature of experiences.......................................................................................................................... 5 The aesthetic nature of experiences and values......................................................................................... 6 Aesthetic values and aesthetic properties...................................................................................................8 2. Realism and Irrealism............................................................................................................................11 Realism.....................................................................................................................................................11 Contra realism.......................................................................................................................................... 11 Pro realism............................................................................................................................................... 15 Irrealism................................................................................................................................................... 16 Contra irrealism....................................................................................................................................... 17 3. Anti-realism............................................................................................................................................ 18 Response-dependence.............................................................................................................................. 18 Base-dependence and the principle of direct acquaintance..................................................................... 19 The representational element................................................................................................................... 22 The evaluative element............................................................................................................................ 24 Intrinsic nature and disinterestedness...................................................................................................... 26 Taste and aesthetic sensitivity..................................................................................................................30 Normal conditions and manifestation conditions.................................................................................... 31 4. A theory of values................................................................................................................................... 34 Desires......................................................................................................................................................34 Evaluative degree and broad kind............................................................................................................35 Rational normativity................................................................................................................................ 36 Moral normativity.................................................................................................................................... 38 Aesthetic normativity...............................................................................................................................41 3 5. Anti-realism and disagreement............................................................................................................. 43 Seeming disagreement and genuine disagreement...................................................................................43 The problems from seeming disagreement and genuine disagreement................................................... 46 Monism.................................................................................................................................................... 46 Contra monism.........................................................................................................................................47 Pluralism.................................................................................................................................................. 49 Contra pluralism.......................................................................................................................................50 Relativism................................................................................................................................................ 52 6. Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................. 54 Intrinsic desires........................................................................................................................................ 54 Kinds of aesthetic experience.................................................................................................................. 55 7. References............................................................................................................................................... 58 4 1. Introduction The main objective of this dissertation is to provide a theory of the nature of aesthetic experiences (or re- sponses). Any account of aesthetic experiences has to address at least the following two questions: what it means for an entity to be an experience; and what it means for an experience to be aesthetic. While the answer to the first question does not require an extensive discussion, the answer to the second will in fact occupy the whole extent of this dissertation. The nature of experiences Experiences are of such importance for us, since it is mainly by means of them that we can become aware of more comprehensive aspects of the nature of objects (e.g., the whole pattern of colours and shapes of a large painting). For experiences are identical with complexes of representational mental episodes, each of which must have the same referent and that fall into the same “temporal span of attention”. Episodes are those mental phenomena that are phenomenally conscious over a certain duration of time: they are con- stitutive parts of our stream of phenomenal consciousness, show a specific phenomenal character (i.e., what it is like to be in them) and are possible subjects for our attention and introspection. Examples of episodes are judgements, perceptions, imaginations, feelings or sensations. They are contrasted with the only other kind of mental states: namely mental dispositions. These become phenomenally conscious only if they are manifested by means of a corresponding episode. Mental dispositions are such states as beliefs, desires, emotions and states of knowledge. That episodes are representational (i.e., intentional) means: they have a content,