Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption from Ring-Learning-With-Errors

Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption from Ring-Learning-With-Errors

Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption from Ring-Learning-with-Errors Christian Mouchet, Juan Troncoso-Pastoriza, Jean-Philippe Bossuat and Jean-Pierre Hubaux Laboratory for Data Security, EPFL [email protected] Abstract—We propose and evaluate a secure-multiparty- beneficial and well-regulated, yet they legally require a certain computation (MPC) solution in the semi-honest model with level of data-protection [4, 8]. dishonest majority that is based on multiparty homomorphic In the settings where no honest majority of parties can be encryption (MHE). To support our solution, we introduce a mul- tiparty version of the Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren homomorphic guaranteed, most of the currently implemented MPC systems cryptosystem and implement it in an open-source library. MHE- are based on secret-sharing [10] of the input data according based MPC solutions have several advantages: Their transcript is to some linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS), and on interac- public, their offline phase is compact, and their circuit-evaluation tive circuit evaluation protocols [11]. These approaches have procedure is non-interactive. By exploiting these properties, two practical limitations: (i) standard protocols require many the communication complexity of MPC tasks is reduced from quadratic to linear in the number of parties, thus enabling rounds of communication over private channels between the secure computation among potentially thousands of parties and parties, which makes them inadequate for low-end devices and in a broad variety of computing paradigms, from the traditional unreliable networks. (ii) current approaches require a per-party peer-to-peer setting to cloud-outsourcing and smart-contract communication that increases linearly in the circuit size (that technologies. MHE-based approaches can also outperform the increases at least linearly in the number of parties). Hence, state-of-the-art solutions, even for a small number of parties. We demonstrate this for three circuits: private input selection this quadratic factor quickly becomes a bottleneck for large with application to private-information retrieval, component-wise numbers of parties. vector multiplication with application to private-set intersection, Homomorphic encryption (HE) techniques are well-known and Beaver multiplication triples generation. For the first circuit, for reducing the communication complexity of MPC [12, 13], privately selecting one input among eight thousand parties’ (of especially in their various threshold and multi-key variants that 32 KB each) requires only 1.31 MB of communication per party and completes in 61.7 seconds. For the second circuit with eight we generally refer to as multiparty-HE (MHE). However, in parties, our approach is 8.6 times faster and requires 39.3 times spite of several such schemes proposed by the cryptographic less communication than the current methods. For the third community, the most widely known being the MHE scheme of circuit and ten parties, our approach generates 20 times more Asharov et al. [14], no concrete MPC solution implementing a triples per second while requiring 136 times less communication generic MHE-based MPC protocol has been built yet. Instead, per-triple than an approach based on oblivious transfer. We implemented our scheme in the Lattigo library and open-sourced the use of HE in MPC is mostly confined to the offline the code at github.com/ldsec/lattigo. pre-computations of protocols based on linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSS) [15]. We argue that homomorphic encryption I. INTRODUCTION has reached the required level of usability to play a larger Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) protocols enable a role in the online phase of MPC protocols and to enable new group of parties to securely compute joint functions over applications. their private inputs while enforcing specific security guarantees We propose, implement, and evaluate a new instance of throughout the computation. The exact definition of security the MHE-based MPC protocol in the passive-adversary with depends on how the adversary is modeled, but the most dishonest-majority model. We make the following contribu- common requirement, input privacy, informally states that tions: parties should not obtain more information about other parties’ • We propose a novel multiparty extension of the BFV inputs than that which can be deduced from the output of the homomorphic encryption scheme (Section IV). We follow computation. Combining this strong security guarantee with the blueprint of Asharov et al. [14] and adapt it to the ring- a general functionality makes the study of MPC techniques learning-with-errors (RLWE) assumptions and to the BFV highly relevant. This last decade has seen this established scheme. We also introduce novel single-round protocols for theoretical field evolve into an applied one, notably due bridging between the MHE- and LSSS-based approaches to its potential for securing data-sharing scenarios in the and for bootstrapping a BFV ciphertext in multiparty set- financial [1, 2], biomedical [3, 4] and law-enforcement [5, 6] tings. sectors, as well as for protecting digital assets [7]. The use of • We instantiate our MHE scheme into a generic MPC proto- passively-secure MPC techniques in such scenarios has been col (Section V) and show that this approach has several demonstrated to be effective and practical [3, 8, 9], notably advantages over their LSSS-based counterparts: Notably, in the medical sector where data collaborations are mutually its per-party communication complexity is only linear in 1 the circuit’s inputs and outputs, and its execution does not encryption scheme to designate these constructions in a general require private party-to-party communication channels. way (we provide a definition in Section III-A). • We demonstrate the efficiency of the latter instantiation for The idea of reducing the volume of interaction in MPC by three example MPC circuits (Section VI). We implemented using threshold homomorphic-encryption can be traced back to and open-sourced our scheme in the Lattigo library [16]. a work by Franklin and Haber [12], later improved by Cramer With these contributions, our work bridges the gap between et al. [13]. At that time, the lack of homomorphic schemes that the existing theoretical work on MHE-based MPC and its preserve two distinct algebraic operations ruled out complete application as privacy-enhancing technologies. non-interactivity at the evaluation phase, thus rendering these approaches less attractive than approach (a). Recently, task- II. RELATED WORK specific instances that use multiparty additive-homomorphic We classify N-party dishonest-majority MPC approaches encryption have been successful in supporting use-cases in in two categories: (a) Linear secret-sharing at data level (for distributed machine learning [25, 26], thus highlighting the short: LSSS-based), which is predominantly implemented in potential that a generic and usable fully homomorphic encryp- generic MPC solutions [7, 11], consists in applying secret- tion (FHE) [27] solution could have. This is the idea behind sharing [10] to the input data. (b) Multiparty encryption the line of work by Asharov et al. [14] and López-Alt et al. schemes (for short: MHE-based), use a homomorphic scheme [28]. These contributions propose various multiparty schemes to encrypt and exchange the input data, that can then be in which the secret-key is additively shared among the parties, computed on non-interactively with encrypted arithmetic. and they analyze the theoretical MPC solution these schemes LSSS-based MPC (a). Most of the available generic MPC enable. Although of great interest, this line of work did not find solutions, such as Sharemind [17] and SPDZ [15, 18, 19], as much echo in applications as approach (a) has. One possible apply secret-sharing to the input data. The evaluation of reason was the lack of available and efficient implementations arithmetic circuits is generally enabled by the homomorphism of Learning with Errors [29] (LWE) -based homomorphic of the LSSS, or by interactive protocols (when no such schemes, in terms of which these schemes were presented. homomorphism is available); the most widely implemented Today, multiple ongoing efforts aim at standardizing homo- protocol is Beaver’s triple-based protocol [20]. The strength morphic encryption [30] and at making its implementations of approach (a) is to enable evaluation through only simple available to a broader public. This new generation of schemes and efficient primitives in terms of which the circuit can be is based mostly on the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) decomposed by code-to-protocol compilers, thus strengthening problem [31] and has brought HE from being practical to being usability. However, this approach imposes two practical con- efficient. straints: First, the interactive protocols at each multiplication We argue that MHE-based approaches are now efficient and gate require all parties to be online and active during the whole flexible enough to support more than the offline phase of computation and to exchange messages with their peers at a LSSS-based approaches. Therefore, we bring the theoretical high frequency that is determined by the round complexity work on multiparty schemes [14] to RLWE cryptography and of the circuit. Second, the triple-based multiplication protocol to an open-source implementation, and evaluate it as an MPC requires a prior distribution of one-time triples; this can be solution. performed in a pre-computing phase, either by a

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