Forthcoming in Diego Machuca and Baron Reed, eds., Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016) A Pyrrhonian Interpretation of Hume on Assent Donald L. M. Baxter 1. Introduction How is it possible for Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) to be both withering skeptic and constructive theorist? I recommend an answer like the Pyrrhonian answer to the question how it is possible to suspend all judgment yet engage in active daily life. Sextus Empiricus distinguishes two kinds of assent: one suspended across the board and one involved with daily living. The first—active endorsement—is an act of will based on appreciation of reasons; the second—passive acquiescence—is a causal effect of appearances. I suggest that Hume makes the same distinction, only he extends the sort of assent involved in the Pyrrhonian’s daily life to theoretical matters as well.1 He is a skeptic both in finding no reason to grant the one sort of assent and in being subject to the other. Understanding my suggested Hume interpretation requires understanding the Pyrrhonian distinction in Michael Frede’s way, which I will explain. To bring out the relevant features of Frede’s version, I defend it against the rival version of Myles Burnyeat. Next, I suggest that Hume’s version of the distinction is that between belief as an act “of the cogitative part of our natures” and as an act of the “sensitive” part (Treatise 1 My reading follows Popkin (1966) (on Popkin on the crucial influence of Pyrrhonism on modern philosophy in general, see Maia Neto’s chapter in this volume). See also Baxter (2006; 2008: ch. 1; 2009a; 2009b). Note that Hume does not follow the Pyrrhonians in their centrally important concern with tranquility. For a detailed discussion of Hume’s familiarity with Sextus’s works, see Fosl (1998). 2 [T] 1.4.1.8).2 Hume’s version can be fleshed out in the way I suggest by regarding it, as Dugald Stewart did, to be derived from a lengthy discussion of Ralph Cudworth’s. I then summarize how Treatise 1.4.1, “Scepticism with regard to reason,” shows both that active endorsement is never merited and that passive aquiescence cannot be avoided. Julia Annas hints at an account like the one I give, but does not develop it and ends up reading Hume as a dogmatist (Annas 2000: 276, 279). Instead, I recommend reading Hume as finding no sufficiently good reason for active endorsement of any view while yet yielding passive acquiescence in even some theoretical matters. In theorizing thus concerning the science of man, Hume remains just as much a skeptic as Sextus does in daily life, such as when avoiding precipices or engaging in religious devotions. 2. Pyrrhonian Kinds of Assent The characterization of Pyrrhonism I will give depends heavily on the work of Michael Frede (1997a; 1997b) on kinds of assent. Frede’s interpretation is a minority view; the majority view follows the interpretation of Myles Burnyeat (1997a). It will help in understanding Frede’s difficult view to contrast it with Burnyeat’s. In explaining the key difference between them, as I understand it, I’ll focus on Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Both Frede and Burnyeat take Sextus to have an answer to the traditional challenge to the skeptic, one famously reiterated by Hume in his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (EHU 12.23).3 Here is the challenge: if you are utterly passive, then you will quickly perish, but if you act to preserve your life, then you must believe something, for all action requires some belief. For instance, you would not eat in response to hunger, if you did not believe that eating would relieve your hunger. This 2 I cite Hume’s Treatise by book, part, section, and paragraph. I use the text in Hume (2007). 3 challenge is generally posed by those who assume that the Pyrrhonian eschews any kind of assent. That assumption is attacked in different ways by both Frede and Burnyeat. Their attacks rely on passages from Sextus such as these: When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take ‘belief’ in the sense in which some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances. … Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences; for Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything unclear. (PH I 13)4 But the main point is this: in uttering these phrases they say what is apparent to themselves and report their own feelings without holding opinions, affirming nothing about external objects. (PH I 15) As we said before, we do not overturn anything which leads us, without our willing it, to assent in accordance with a passive appearance. (PH I 19) Remember too that we say we neither posit nor reject anything which is said dogmatically about what is unclear; for we do yield to things which passively move us and lead us necessarily to assent. (PH I 193) 3 I cite Hume’s Enquiry by section and paragraph. I use the text in Hume (2000). 4 I follow the translation by Annas and Barnes in Sextus Empiricus (2000). 4 For his interpretation, Frede distinguishes two kinds of assent. In one way, you do not assent to the view that eating relieves hunger, but in another way you do. Burnyeat does not distinguish two kinds of assent, but rather distinguishes two classes of proposition liable to assent. A rough way to make the distinction is to say that one class consists of propositions beginning with “It appears to me now that …,”5 where this phrase is used in the course of stating that something is appearing to you and describing how it appears. The other class consists of all the other propositions. Thus the Pyrrhonian who acts to relieve his hunger assents to the proposition “It appears to me now that eating relieves hunger” understood in this way, and not to the proposition “Eating relieves hunger.” In making their respective distinctions, both Frede and Burnyeat hold that there are assentings of a sort that is necessary to survival, and assentings of a sort that is not necessary to survival. It is this latter sort of assenting that is at issue in theoretical discussions about unclear matters and that the Pyrrhonian avoids. Thus one can be a Pyrrhonian without perishing. Four considerations incline me against Burnyeat’s view. Appreciating them helps one appreciate the nuances of Frede’s interpretation. It seems to me, first, that assent to “It appears to me now that eating relieves hunger,” used to state that one is being appeared to and to describe how, is not sufficient to motivate eating when one is hungry. It can only motivate eating if it leads to some kind of assent to “Eating relieves hunger.” One is motivated, generally, not by realizing how the world appears to one, but by taking some sort of stand on how the world is. So Burnyeat’s proposal does not solve the problem with survival. Perhaps Burnyeat need not say that assent to “It appears to me now that eating relieves hunger” motivates eating. 5 Or, perhaps better, propositions perspicuously paraphrased by propositions beginning with ‘It appears to 5 Rather, the appearance that prompts that report also directly motivates eating.6 However, for the direct motivation to happen, the content of the appearance must be “Eating relieves hunger.” Being moved by this appearance will be just like the kind of assent necessary for survival that Frede defends. So this defense of Burnyeat would be a concession to his opponent. It seems to me, second, that the Burnyeat interpretation is not forced by the text. True, Sextus says that the skeptics will only say “what is apparent to themselves, and report their own feelings, affirming nothing about external objects.” But I think that often the phrase “It appears that…” is not used to state and describe, but rather is used to qualify one’s assent to the proposition in its scope. If I say, “It appears to me now that eating relieves hunger,” I am assenting to “Eating relieves hunger” with reservations. Perhaps I suspect that I have not established its truth conclusively. Or, more to the point, perhaps I am just reporting the view which is striking me now—that eating relieves hunger—without making any commitments to there being any good reason to hold that view. So, when skeptics say what is apparent to themselves, they need not be unreservedly endorsing that they are appeared to a certain way; they may rather with maximum reservation be venting the view that things are that way (PH I 13, 15).7 Thus there is a natural alternative to Burnyeat’s way of interpreting Sextus’s frequent appeals to how things appear. This alternative is not exactly what Frede terms the “epistemic sense” of ‘appears’, if in that sense ‘it appears to me’ is synonymous with ‘I think’ or ‘I believe’. These locutions can sometimes express assent with reservations, but do not always me now that . .’ 6 I’m grateful to Lionel Shapiro for this suggestion. 6 express that. I am reluctant to use the word ‘belief’ to characterize assent with reservations as I elucidate it. In his earlier paper, Frede suggests that the skeptic has beliefs, though it becomes apparent that Frede is using an elastic sense of ‘belief’ that could include even an impression we don’t object to (Frede 1997a: 10, 21–22).