Tifvmo the nfualor S'tnfo fnan 7aionrl ;.w. thi bwrn.- tion of the first regular United States Army is told here by the Chief of the OrganizationalHistory and Honors Branch of the Office of the Chief of Mili- tary History. Dr. Mahon, a graduate of Swarthmore College, is a captain in the Army Reserve and asso- XI-Jtn -PmASi,1it4--, A CLUtCre tAL'1U,/ UJ 4Vltlldly lualdlo.i4-ir PENNSYLVANIA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REGULAR ARMY By JOHN K. MAHON* ROFESSIONAL historians have seldom touched the history .of the United States Army. As a result, this rich field has been the exclusive province of retired officers. These, seeing American history as one long error in military policy, have usually belabored Congress without bothering to inquire into the conditions which made that body, at any given time, behave as it did.' The present study is, in part, an attempt to re-examine one of Congress' most ridiculed actions concerning the military. It is focused on two years, 1783 and 1784, when the last elements of the Continental Army were on their way out of existence, and when the first American military peace establishment developed. It points out why that particular establishment, and not some other, came into being, and describes one or two of its least known uses. The post-Revolutionary force, with which we will deal, is the first in the Regular Army having continuity into the present.2 (It is now the Third Infantry Regiment.) Pennsylvania's relation- ship to its beginnings will become apparent as we progress. It is one of the wonders of our history that most of the Conti- *Paper read at the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Historical Asso- ciation, Lancaster, October 24, 1953. 1 The best example is Emory Upton, Military Policy of the United States (Wash., 1907). 'There is one company, Battery D, 5th Field Artillery, which has an official lineage beginning with the Revolution, but its claim to this origin does not rest on the grounds that a body of men from the Continental Army actually remained in service after 1785. 33 34 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY nentals-who were owed a year's wages-being furloughed on June 13, 1783, trudged off home without pay and without even written promises to pay. Thus harmlessly did the Revolutionary army fade away for all time as a force in politics and in war.3 Even after the June exodus there were still more than 1,000 Con- tinentals remaining in service. They were organized into units, and these were the logical corps upon which to found a military peace establishment, if there was to be one. Certain factors, however, disqualified them. To begin with, the Confederation had no means to pay them their year's wages; so there was always a fear that they might mutiny. The fear was realized when on June 19 a small body of Pennsylvania recruits had demonstrated against the Congress in Philadelphia. This small mutiny did not truly represent the spirit of the Continentals but, when lumped with others that had occurred since 1781, and when considered by minds full of an urgent fear of standing armies, it hurt the chances of the extant outfits to be retained.4 Another unfavorable characteristic the remaining Continentals displayed was their high cost. A majority of them had been raised in Massachusetts and New Hampshire under uncommon conditions. Massachusetts men, for example, drew $8 1/3 instead of the usual continental rate of $4 1/4 a month.5 The state paid the difference. Whoever paid, it was almost certain that such high-priced soldiers would be replaced by cheaper ones when the time came. By far the strongest disqualifying factor was their entangle- ment in the tension between Massachusetts and New York over the land along the shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario. The immediate irritant was a knowledge that some troops would soon have to take over the British forts at Oswego and Niagara in disputed territory. The only Continental command available was com- posed of men from Massachusetts, men whom the New Yorkers would not, under any circumstance, permit to enter those garrisons G 'Merrill Jensen, The New Nation, 1781-I789 (N. Y., 1950), 82. 'John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History . (N. Y., 1889), 113. "Capt. John Doughty to Maj. Nicholas Fish, 14 July 1785, MS., transcripts of certain papers of Nicholas Fish, Ofc., Chief of Military History, Wash., D. C.; Rept. of Comm., 6 Apr. 1784, Journals of the Continental Congress, XXVI, 202 (hereafter referred to as JCC). 'James Monroe to Gov. of Va., 11 June 1784, Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, 8 vols. (Wash., 1921-1936), VII, 552. This letter gives a good account of the Mass.-N. Y. troubles. Also PENNSYLVANIA AND BEGINNINGS OF REGULAR ARMY 35 Be it remembered that in May, 1783, British troops still oc- cupied, not only Oswego and Niagara, but all the western posts from which England had for decades controlled the fur trade. They also lingered in New York town. Americans, however, believed that as soon as there was official peace, the redcoats would depart. In order to be prepared, the Continental legislators-at the rare times when delegates from nine states could be assembled-faced the need, long before ratification, to provide garrisons for the western forts. This brought them to consider a military peace establishment. A sympathetic committee, headed by Alexander Hamilton, went to work. Of the five members, one, James Wilson, was from Penn- sylvania. This group made a report on September 10, 1783. There should be, the report said, four regiments of infantry, one of artillery, and a corps of engineers. This meant a peace establish- ment of nearly three thousand, which was a heavy expense for an insolvent confederation and, according to some delegates, a dan- gerous menace to liberty. The record is silent as to whether or not the five practical committeemen expected their recommendation to be adopted; but, in the light of what was enacted later, it certainly had no chance. Be that as it may, there was a warm debate on the proposal in October (the details of which are lost), but not a company resulted.7 Added to the need to garrison the western posts was another vital factor pressing toward some sort of army. This was the rela- tionship with the Indians northwest of the Ohio River. Western exigencies, however, did not weigh heavily with some of the states. David Howell, for example, said that Rhode Island was not willing to build a chain of forts to defend western Virginia on land which ought to belong to the United States anyway, or to protect New York in the fur trade. These economic opinions were buttressed by constitutional objections to a national army in peacetime. Here was the well-rooted fear of a standing army re-expressed. If Con- gress had the power to raise five hundred in time of peace, it could raise five thousand as well; then, with such a force, begin to bully the states." The delegates from Massachusetts endorsed see Hugh Williamson to James Duane, 8 June 1784, page 546, and JCC, XXVII, 499-538. 'Their proposals given in detail, ibid., XXV, 722. 8 David Howell to Thomas C. Hazard, 26 Aug. 1783, Burnett, op. cit., VIII, 824. 36 PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY these views, and added to them a codicil: that the militias of the several states were the only military establishment necessary.9 New York offered her own interpretation of what was consti- tutional and suitable. Although not willing for Massachusetts Continentals to garrison Oswego and Niagara, that principality saw an easy solution. Congress need only set the size of the contingent for that duty, and New York would raise it. There was no doubt, the delegates said, that their sovereign had the right under the Articles of Confederation to provide those garrisons. Congress' only duty in the matter was to say how many New York soldiers were to be raised.10 There was precedent for the action New York requested. On October 3, 1783, Congress had given Virginia permission to keep two ships of war and twenty-five soldiers in peacetime.". The difference was that Virginia's little array offended no one, whereas Massachusetts stood to be injured if New York placed a corps in the disputed area. For her part, the Bay State was perfectly willing to have the Continental troops at West Point move into Oswego and Niagara. This would not only put Massachusetts men into the forts, but would also relieve the state of paying half the soldier's wages.12 The middle and southern states, for their part, refused to lighten this expense unless the Bay State would, in return, agree to vote for some sort of peace establish- ment.'3 A dangerous temper hung about the preparations to take the *fortsover from the British. New York hinted that she would raise troops whether Congress authorized them or not. Ephraim Paine, a delegate to the Continental Congress, wrote to Governor Clinton, "High time for our State to tak [sic] the same measures as though it was Sorounded [sic] with open and avowed Enemies." He re- quested Clinton to say whether or not delegates should protract the debates until New York had had time to move her own troops into the forts.' 4 With such feeling at work, it was obvious that the 'As an example see motion made by Gerry and Dana of Mass., 25 May 1784, JCC, XXVI, 433. 1Ibid., XXVII, 380. "11Ibid., XXV, 640.