Searching for theory X: A quality-only approach to the problem of future generations. Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Merten, Gail. Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 03/10/2021 19:40:16 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186375 INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. 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Ann Arbor, MI 48106 SEARCHING FOR THEORY X: A QUALITY-ONLY APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF FUTURE GENERATIONS by Gail Merten Copyright ~ Gail Merten 1993 A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In The Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1 9 9 3 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2 GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by-=G=a~i~l~M~e~r~t~e~n~ _________________________ entitled Searching for Theory X: A Quality-Only Approach to the Problem of Future Generations and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of ~D~o~c~tuo~r~o~f~puh~,~'l~o~Suo~p~h~y~ ____________________ Date I /oJ..:!.../19...? Date i ( /(/ /21/q S Dater I Date Date Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. CA-_.\_h'2f (~ M ~~~ Dissertation Director Date Holly Smith 3 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder. SIGNED: ~ ~11~ 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the members of my committee - Holly Smith, Tom Christiano, and Ron Milo - for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank my friends Jonelle DePetro and Carol Diem for the times they helped me on this dissertation and the many more times they found something better for us to do. 5 Dedicated to the two most important people in my life: Carol Diem, who was enormously helpful with every aspect of this dissertation, and Tim Rode, who was absolutely no help at all. 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . • • • 8 ABSTRACT • • • 9 INTRODUCTION 12 PART I VIEWS THAT PLACE VALUE ON THE CREATION OF HAPPY BEINGS .................... 23 Chapter 1 There Is No Value in the Existence of Happy Beings ............. 24 Section A There Is No Value in the Creation of Happy Beings ........... 24 Section B There Is No Disvalue in the Destruction of Happy Beings . 31 Chapter 2 Argument Against the Total View . 39 Section A Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion . 39 Section B Rebuttal of Sikora's Argument That the Repugnant Conclusion Is Not Repugnant . 48 Chapter 3 Argument Against Compromise Views . 60 Section A Parfit's Attempt to Formulate a Plausible Compromise View . 62 Section B Ng's Attempt to Formulate a Plausible Compromise View . 71 Section C There Is No Reason to Seek a Compromise View . 81 PART II VIEWS THAT PLACE NO VALUE ON THE CREATION OF HAPPY BEINGS ............. 91 Chapter 4 Argument Against an Entirely Person- Affecting View .......... 93 Section A Parfit's Same Number Quality Claim 93 Section B One Can Consistently Accept the Same Number Quality Claim and Reject the Total View ............ 104 Chapter 5 Argument for a Quality-Only View ... 117 Section A Objections to the Average View 118 Section B Parfit's Counterexample to Singer's Principle . 123 Section C The Average View Should Be Supplemented with a Person-Affecting Restriction . 134 Section D A Principle Regarding When It is Permissible or Obligatory to Bring About a Larger Population of Happy Beings .............. 144 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Chapter 6 Objections to the Modified Average View 161 Section A It Conflicts with the Same Number Quality Claim in Certain Cases .. 161 Section B It Seems to Disallow Some Cases of Mere Addition . 181 PART III A VIEW THAT PLACES NO VALUE ON THE CREATION OF HAPPY BEINGS CONJOINED WITH THE BELIEF THAT THERE IS DISVALUE IN THE CREATION OF UNHAPPY BEINGS .................. 199 Chapter 7 Argument for Accepting the Asymmetry . 201 Section A The Total View Is Correct with Respect to Miserable Beings . 201 Section B There Is Nothing Inconsistent About Accepting the Asymmetry . 207 Section C It Is Sometimes Permissible or Even Obligatory to Bring Miserable Beings Into Existence .......... 211 Section D Final Statement of View . 215 Chapter 8 The Value of Happiness to a Happy Person Can Offset the Disvalue of Unhappiness to an Unhappy Person ...... 218 Section A The Alternative View Cannot Be Proven False ........ 219 Section B It Is Not Inconsistent with My View to Accept the Belief Under Consideration . 221 Section C Happy Periods Can Offset Unhappy Periods in an Individual's Life 228 Section D The Chance of a Happy Life Can Offset the Chance of an Unhappy Life . 232 CONCLUSION . 245 REFERENCES . 248 8 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURE 1 The Repugnant Conclusion . 41 FIGURE 2 Parfit's A*, B* Counterexample . 126 9 ABSTRACT Various ways of extending utilitarianism to questions concerning future generations have been proposed. These alternatives fall into four classes: a) views that are entirely person-affecting - i.e., that hold that an action can only be right or wrong if it affects the utility of particular persons; b) the view that the total quantity of utility is all that matters; c) views that hold that the quality of the lives that are lived is all that matters; and d) views that hold that both the quality of lives lived and the total quantity of utility that is experienced have some independent value. As noted by Derek Parfit, person­ affecting views are problematic because, for example, if following a policy of depletion with respect to natural resources would result in the existence of different individuals by the time the negative effects of such a policy would come about than would exist if a policy of conservation were followed, then there would be no moral reason to conserve resources. More abstractly, on a person-affecting view (that does not claim that a person is affected by being brought into existence) there is no moral reason to bring about a world of one thousand beings that each live at a level of 100 utils. instead of bringing about a world of one different being that lives at a level 10 of 3 utils. The view that only the total quantity of happiness matters is problematic because, among other things, it leads to what Parfit calls the Repugnant Conclusion - viz. the view that a state of affairs in which every being's life is only just barely worth living is better than a state of affairs in which ten billion extremely happy beings exist so long as there are so many of these barely happy beings that the total utility in that state of affairs is greater. Views that put some independent value on both quantity and quality are problematic because no rationale can be given for holding that quantity has some independent value but is not the only thing that has value. This dissertation suggests that a quality-only approach should be taken. It is argued that there is no value in the creation of happy people but that there is value in the creation of a more happy person as opposed to a (possibly different) less happy person.