SCEPTICISM VERSUS DOGMATISM: AN INTERNAL ANALYSIS OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS' AGAINST MATHEMATICIANS, BOOK VII. by MARGHERITA OBERTI Dottore in Filosofia, University of Turin (Italy), July 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF ' THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Dept. of -Classics) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 19 78 (c) Margherita Oberti, 1978 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements f an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree tha the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Ql^^l^ The University of British Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date ABSTRACT Scepticism, as depicted by Sextus Empiricus, presents itself as a philosophy whose ultimate justification rests on the conviction that truth is unattainable and that consequently the only chance left to man is that of suspending judgement (epoche). From epoche derives that state of mental quietitude (ataraxia) which alone allows man to lead a happy life. Thus, Scepticism is inevitably a polemic against all those philosophers who assert truth to be apprehensible and to whom Sextus refers by the term "Dogmatists". This study of Book VII of Against Mathematicians seeks to analyze the epistemological premises of Sextus' Scepticism as well as the Sextian arguments directed against the Dogmatists, and particularly those against the Stoics.- Truth is unattainable because no such a thing as a criterion of truth exists. This is Sextus' conclusion to his criticism of the Dogmatists' doctrines. Although Sextus' Scepticism is shaped against the back• ground of the doctrines he intends to combat, I intend to isolate his methodology as well as the the theoretical aspects of his philosophy from the polemical ones. Chapter II outlines Sextus' philosophical background as well as his sceptical terminology. Chapter III examines Sextus' methodology and explains why the criticism of the criterion of truth provides him with the necessary theoretical justification for his Scepticism. Sextus1 attack against the Dogmatists is preceded by a lengthy and fairly accurate account of his opponents' views. These views and particularly the Stoic doctrine of phantasia kataleptike are examined in Chapters IV and V. In Chapters VI to VIII, I examine Sextus' response to the Dogmatists. In Chapter VI I argue that Sextus1 criticism of man as criterion, and of the definition of man, are biased by his failure to understand some Dogmatic terms such as "universal concept" and "essence". Chapter VII investigates Sextus' criticism of senses and intellect as criteria of truth, and it is maintained that the arguments used by Sextus to deny the possibility of self-apprehension establish an epistemological principle whose value is dogmatically confined by Sextus to the particular instance he criticizes. Had Sextus been consistent in his use of such a principle, he ought to have declared himself a nihilist rather than a Sceptic. Chapter VIII deals with Sextus' criticism of the notion of phantasia and particularly with his attack against the Stoic doctrine of phantasia kataleptike as criterion of truth. Special attention is paid to the accusation of circular reasoning made by Sextus against the Stoic criterion and in the discussion in Chapter IX. There I argue that Sextus and with him most students of ancient philosophy, misrepresent the meaning of the Stoic doctrine because they identify the term to hyparchon (a key element in the Stoic definition of phantasia kataleptike) with the real (external) object. I oppose this view and offer a tentative re-interpretation of the Stoic criterion, which, if correct, may both free the Stoics from the Sextian accusation of circular reasoning and, at the same time, avoid some of the philological and philosophical difficulties involved in the Sextian and standard interpretation of the Stoic definition of phantasia kataleptike. iv. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I: Sextus Empiricus' life and works 1) Sextus' life 11 2) Sextus' works.... 17 3) General character of Sextus' works 18 CHAPTER II: Scepticism and Dogmatism: an introduction 1) The sceptical method and its relation to the medical schools 24 2) Nature and limits of the sceptical inquiry 28 3) Some remarks on sceptic terminology.... 32 4) Sceptic definition of Dogmatism 34 CHAPTER III: General purpose and methodology of Sextus' work 1) Sextus1 tripartition of philosophy and the priority given to undermining dogmatic logic 45 2) General characteristics of Stoic logic. 50 3) Sextus as historian of ancient logic... 52 4) How the critique of dogmatic logic is developed in P.H. and M. respectively.. 55 5) The criterion of truth. Some preliminary remarks 5 8 6) Truth and the true 6 4 v. Page CHAPTER IV: The criterion of truth and the Stoic doctrine of phantasia (M. VII, 227-248). 1) The Academic school and the criterion of truth. 71 2) 'Evokfyfci* as criterion of truth 80 3) The Stoic doctrine of phantasia in general (M. VII, 227-61) 84 4) A clarification of the meaning of the term TO ^yepovLkov 89 5) Different kinds of phantasiai 94 CHAPTER V: Sextus' account of the Stoic doctrine of phantasia kataleptike' (M. VII, 248-262) . 1) Definition of phantasia kataleptike.... 104 2) Phantasia kataleptike must satisfy four conditions 106 3) Phantasia kataleptike and the uniqueness of phenomena 114 4) Z^y<°*T<i6£.6i5 and (CcJT^A^ ifi 123 CHAPTER VI: Man as the criterion "by whom" (M. VII, 263-342) 1) Preliminary notes 134 2) Man, being inconceivable, is inapprehensible 142 3) Man, being incapable of knowing himself, is inapprehensible 151 4) No man, as an individual, can claim to be the criterion of truth 159 vi. Page CHAPTER VII: Senses and intellect as criteria "by means of which" (M. VII, 343-369). 1) Preliminary notes 164 2) The inadequacy of the senses as criteria 169 3) The inadequacy of the intellect as criterion 171 4) The inadequacy of the combination of senses and intellect 177 5) Conclusion to Sextus' criticism of the criterion "by whom" and of the criterion "by means of which" 182 CHAPTER VIII: Phantasia as criterion "according to which" (M. VII, 369-440). 1) Criticism of the concept of phantasia in general 193 2) Neither all phantasiai are true nor are they all false 200 3) Criticism of phantasia kataleptike as criterion of truth. 207 CHAPTER IX: The argument of circular reasoning (M. VII, 326-330). 1) The status quaestionis 218 2) Philological aspect of the problem 224 3) Philosophical aspect of the problem 233 4) Conclusion 249 BIBLIOGRAPHY 25 8 vii. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The assistance and criticism contributed by Professor Robert Todd of the Department of Classics of the University of British Columbia is noted here with gratitude. His valuable help over a number of years made possible the eventual completion of a long and difficult piece of research. A word of gratitude must go to the faculty members who had the patience to review this work, Professors Podlecki of the Department of Classics and Dybikowski of Philosophy, and to those members of my family who assisted as they could: my husband, by reviewing the final draft, and my three children, quietly born along the way, by keeping their cries to a minimum in order not to disturb the philosophical conceptions of their mother. viii. ABBREVIATIONS Sextus Empiricus, Against Mathematicians Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonian Sketches Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. H. von Arnim. INTRODUCTION The name of Sextus Empiricus recurs frequently in studies of ancient philosophy, and particularly in those dealing with the post-Aristotelian thought. There is general agreement on the value and importance of his works as a precious and often unique source of information on Hellenistic philosophy. This is particularly true of Stoicism, a philosophical movement which spans a period of about six centuries and which was the most relevant and influential school of the Hellenistic period, but primary evidence for which is so scarce as to make the study of secondary reports, such as Sextus', a mandatory step in the analysis of its philosophy. Yet, in addition to the primary importance of Sextus' opus as a source of much of our information on post- Aristotelian philosophy, Sextus has a place of his own in the history of ancient philosophy as the last major figure of Scepticism, one who gathered, criticized and elaborated a considerable body of his predecessors' doctrines. This fact creates a peculiar situation in dealing with this Sceptic philosopher, whose importance as an authentic thinker seems to have been overshadowed by the doxographic value of his writings. 1. At the same time, Sextus' own philosophical stand is the source of much suspicion as far as the reliability of his historical information is concerned,with the result that Sextus' position has turned out to be most unfortunate: on the one hand his place in the history of ancient Scepticism has not earned enough attention, but on the other hand his account of earlier doctrines is regarded as inevitably biased by his Sceptical creed.x In this sense, Sextus' philosophical orientation does not allow us to look at the wealth of his philosophical material with the confidence one might put in Diogenes Laertius, just to cite an example, whose philosophical neutrality seems to guarantee the objectivity of a purely doxographical work, although that very objectivity is often lacking in depth and accuracy. A study of Sextus' sceptical method seems, therefore, justified, since it would serve the twofold purpose of throwing some light on a philosopher who has not himself been closely studied as well as of giving an evaluation of his polemic against the Dogmatists, and particularly the Stoics, a polemic which provides us with much valuable information about ancient philosophers.