ACQUIRING AMERICA: THE DIPLOMATIC BATTLE FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1914-1917 Presented to The Division of History The University of Sheffield Fulfilment of the requirements for PhD by Justin Quinn Olmstead January 2013 Table of Contents Introduction 1: Pre-War Diplomacy 29 A Latent Animosity: German-American Relations 33 Britain and the U.S.: The Intimacy of Attraction and Repulsion 38 Rapprochement a la Kaiser Wilhelm 11 45 The Set Up 52 Advancing British Interests 55 Conclusion 59 2: The United States and Britain's Blockade 63 Neutrality and the Declaration of London 65 The Order in Council of 20 August 1914 73 Freedom of the Seas 83 Conclusion 92 3: The Diplomacy of U-Boat Warfare 94 The Chancellor's Challenge 96 The Chancellor's Decision 99 The President's Protest 111 The Belligerent's Responses 116 First Contact: The Impact of U-Boat Warfare 119 Conclusion 134 4: Diplomatic Acquisition via Mexico 137 Entering the Fray 140 Punitive Measures 145 Zimmerman's Gamble 155 Conclusion 159 5: The Peace Option 163 Posturing for Peace: 1914-1915 169 The House-Grey Memorandum 183 The German Peace Offer of 1916 193 Conclusion 197 6: Conclusion 200 Bibliography 227 Introduction Shortly after war was declared in August 1914 the undisputed leaders of each alliance, Great Britain and Gennany, found they were unable to win the war outright and began searching for further means to secure victory; the fonnation of a blockade, the use of submarines, attacking the flanks (Allied attacks in the Balkans and Baltic), Gennan Zeppelin bombardment of British coastal towns, and the diplomatic search for additional allies in an attempt to break the stalemate that had ensued soon after fighting had commenced. Gennany, having spent decades working with the Ottoman Turks, convinced them to join the Central Powers and in October 1915 they did, declaring war on the Entente powers. Italy, having withdrawn from the Central Powers and declaring its neutrality, was persuaded by France and Great Britain into joining the Entente in April 1915. Still, no breakthrough occurred and the eyes of both Britain and Gennany fell on the United States, as the strongest remaining neutral, to provide the crucial support to break the deadlock. The U.S. had established its place among the great nations of the world when it defeated the aging Spanish Empire in 1898. Together with an ever-growing economy, America had established itself as an international player just behind Britain and Gennany.1 As one of the strongest nations still maintaining its neutrality when Europe's mighty annies clashed in August 1914, the United States was seen as the missing piece to ensure victory by both Britain and Gennany. Because the belligerent nations viewed the United States as a major factor in detennining the outcome of the war a new theatre of the war opened - a battle between the belligerents for American support. The United States, with its newly acquired status as a world power, was the strongest of the neutral powers. Despite the confidence of Europe's military and th I lA.S. Grenville, A History ofthe World in the 20 Century (Cambridge, 1980), p. S. 1 political leaders that the war would be short, the Foreign Offices of both Great Britain and Germany understood that they had to take into account America's response to actions taken by all of the participants in the war in Europe. It is the contention of this dissertation that from early in the war, Great Britain and Germany did not view America as a sideshow of the First World War. To these two countries the United States became an important potential feature in their respective arsenals almost immediately. The diplomacy surrounding America's entry into the First World War has been studied from various angles with several historians focusing on German blunders, the apparent ineptitude of Germany's diplomacy, and the perceived success of Britain's diplomacy.2 In the nearly one hundred years since the end of the war, scholars have written innumerable articles and books concerning every aspect of the war. Just as tactics change over time, so does the emphasis of historical thought. An approach that for fifty years has shaped the discussion of Anglo-American-German relations during the First World War is Ernest May's The World War and American Isolation, 1914- 1917. 3 May's work traces the policies of Britain's Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, Germany's Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, and America's Woodrow Wilson as they attempted to maintain America's traditional neutrality. He concluded that despite Bethmann Hollweg's efforts to harness his country's desire for unrestricted submarine warfare, it was Grey who successfully persuaded Wilson of the righteousness of his country's cause - it was Grey's success that led to the president's eagerness to tolerate Britain's violations of neutral rights and created and maintained a pro-Allied bias in America despite the blockade. May takes the position that Wilson's policy of watchful 2 Examples include: Ross Gregory, The Origins ofAmerican Intervention in the First World War (New York, 1971); Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram (New York, 1958); Reinhard R. Doerries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count BernstorfJ and German-American Relations, 1908-1917 (Chapel Hill, 1989). 3 Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 (Cambridge, 1963). 2 waiting coupled with Grey's diplomacy, along with Bethmann's loss of control in Germany led to a build-up of pressure among the three governments, finally leading to the end of American isolation. More recent examples of multinational scholarship are David Stevenson's The First World War and International Politics and Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy, and Niall Ferguson's The Pity ofWar.4 The common view of scholars such as David Stevenson and Niall Ferguson, and consequently the view of many readers of history, is that the First World War was a European affair that America was drawn into by the German use of unrestricted submarine warfare.5 The idea has long been that after years of German submarines violating international law with immoral attacks on neutral merchant ships and their innocent crews, Germany's 1917 decision to allow its submarine force to indiscriminately sink merchant shipping is what finally drove the United States to break its neutrality. This idea is closely followed by German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman's decision to offer an alliance with America's troublesome southern neighbour Mexico. The telegram proposing this German-Mexican alliance - intercepted by the British and passed on to the American government - is often seen as being the ultimate act of aggression by Germany towards the United States, and therefore also a cause of U.S. entry to the First World War. This view ignores the work of diplomats, intelligence 4 David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1988); David Stevenson, The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York, 2004); Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York, 1999). S Authors who argue that it was Germany's use of submarines that led to Wilson's decision to involve the United States in the European conflict include: John A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson (London, 2002); Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson. World War I, and America's Strategy for Peace and Security (Kent, 2009); Kendrick A. Clements, Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman (Chicago, 1987); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice ofLiberal Internationalism during World War I (Wilmington, 1991); J.M. Winter, The Experience of World War I (London, 1988); Kendrick A. Clements, 'Woodrow Wilson and World War J', Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 (2004), pp. 62-82; Edward H. Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance ofPower (Bloomington, 1955). 3 officers, politicians, and in some cases even the decisions of German and British military leadership in their attempts to acquire America. This thesis contends that the historian seeking a greater understanding of First World War diplomacy, and diplomacy in general, must look beyond the four years of war to understand why diplomats and politicians made some of the decisions that they did. The diplomatic policies Britain and Germany pursued to attempt to acquire American assistance during its period of neutrality followed the same patterns as those that had been formulated in previous decades. First World War diplomacy, I argue, is an extension of long established British and German diplomatic policy towards the United States, and that continuity of diplomacy played a determining role in the American entry into the war. Woodrow Wilson's initial desire to remain neutral is not in question, nor is his desire to mediate a peace; nor for that matter is the fact that belligerents were able to manipulate Wilson, his closest confidant and unofficial chief diplomat, Colonel Edward M. House, and the rest of his cabinet. What this thesis is concerned with is how British and German diplomats were able to essentially dismiss his calls for both countries to adhere to U.S. policies, how German diplomats were able to maintain American neutrality for almost three years, and how after calling on his countrymen to remain neutral for almost three years he decided to enter the First World War as an associate power of the Allies. Sources In order to pursue an in-depth analysis of the mid-level diplomacy used during this time period it is important to carefully examine British, German, and American sources. Despite a large number of German documents being destroyed during the 4 Second World War, all three countries have a wealth of information available for inspection. When dealing with British diplomacy towards the United States during the period of neutrality the National Archives in Kew contains the most complete collection of materials regarding diplomatic action toward the United States.