GUINEA-BISSAU: IN NEED OF A STATE Africa Report N°142 – 2 July 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. PORTUGUESE GUINEA................................................................................................. 2 A. COLONIALISM ON THE CHEAP .......................................................................................................2 1. Forced labour and evasion......................................................................................................2 2. The doctrine of indigénat .......................................................................................................3 B. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: FOUNDATION OF POST-COLONIAL POWER ........................................5 1. The PAIGC’s binational and political/military strategy.........................................................5 2. Party-state in the liberated areas.............................................................................................6 III. ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL PATRONAGE, 1974-1980 .............................. 7 A. PERSONALISED POWER SHARING ..................................................................................................7 B. CAPE VERDEAN DOMINATION: THE REASONS BEHIND THE FIRST COUP D’ETAT ..........................8 IV. THE FIRST REIGN OF NINO VIEIRA ...................................................................... 10 A. THE ARMY AT THE HEART OF POWER .........................................................................................10 B. MOVING TOWARDS DEMOCRACY – FAILED RENEWAL ...............................................................11 C. THE ARMED CONFLICT: 7 JUNE 1998 – 7 MAY 1999...................................................................12 1. Regional intervention, a catalyst of war ...............................................................................13 2. The departure of Nino Vieira................................................................................................13 V. THE POLITICAL HANDOVER: A DOUBLE FAILURE......................................... 14 A. KUMBA YALA IN POWER: THE REVENGE OF THE BALANTA? ......................................................14 B. BUDGETARY CRISIS AND CHRONIC INSTABILITY.........................................................................15 C. THE RETURN OF NINO VIEIRA: THE MILITARY HIERARCHY IN POWER........................................16 VI. NEW MOMENTUM?..................................................................................................... 18 A. THE STABILITY PACT..................................................................................................................18 B. RISK OF A NEW POLITICAL CRISIS...............................................................................................18 C. DIFFICULT ARMY REFORM .........................................................................................................20 D. CRIMINALISATION OF THE STATE................................................................................................21 E. COORDINATION OF FINANCIAL AID.............................................................................................23 VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 24 APPENDICES A. MAP OF GUINEA-BISSAU ..................................................................................................................25 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .....................................................................................27 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA .........................................................................27 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.................................................................................................29 Africa Report N°142 2 July 2008 GUINEA-BISSAU: IN NEED OF A STATE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Guinea-Bissau needs a state. Its political and administra- Nino Vieira’s elected successor, Kumba Yala, also relied tive structures are insufficient to guarantee control of heavily on the army, until it overthrew him in 2003. its territory, assure minimum public services or counter- Vieira’s return secured the army’s political power. balance the army’s political dominance. This core Presently, the movement towards greater reform and weakness has been at the root of recurrent political democracy, driven by the Stability Pact and promoted crises, coups d’état and the proliferation of criminal by the government of Martinho Ndafa Cabi, faces the networks. However, despite making little progress in same military resistance and is hampered by the con- 35 years of independence, Guinea-Bissau now appears tinued absence of functioning political and adminis- to have gained new momentum thanks to the signing trative institutions. of a stability pact by the three most important political parties in March 2007. Nevertheless, there is real risk The creation of a democratic state is increasingly of it becoming a narco-state and a political and admin- urgent as the risk of criminalisation is growing. Cocaine istrative no-man’s-land, attractive to trafficking and trafficking from Latin America has increased tremen- terrorist networks in the Maghreb. The international dously in recent years, and the country has become a community should urgently support the government’s pivotal transit point in the route to European markets. efforts to consolidate democracy, reform the security Hundreds of kilograms of the drug are estimated to sector and construct viable state structures. pass through each week. Revenue from the illicit trade has already corrupted military leaders and political In Portuguese Guinea the colonial power never built the personalities, threatening the democratic process. political, administrative or bureaucratic systems capable of establishing the foundations from which a true post- Fundamental changes to the way in which the country colonial state could emerge. Salazar’s Portugal refused is run are required. Above all, army reform is needed to grant independence, forcing Guinea-Bissau to fight most urgently to free the political system from mili- for self-rule – the only country in the region to gain tary interference. The stakes are considerable both for independence through armed force. No leader since the country and the West African region, already touched 1974 has tried to establish the necessary structures for by repeated political crises (Guinea) and drawn-out a functioning democratic state. Consequently, the country’s peace-consolidation processes (Sierra Leone, Liberia). infrastructure, bureaucracy, administration, political institutions and human- and social-development indi- The international community has taken tentative steps cators remain largely unaltered since the first years of to lend its assistance. A program of reforms address- independence. ing major security sector and public administration challenges was adopted in 2007 and, at the request of The first coup d’état, after six years of independence, the prime minister, the country was added to the agenda was a direct result of nepotism and a client-based of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). power structure created by the one-party state. This However, for these steps to have tangible results for remained the model of reference for future leaders. the people of Guinea-Bissau, foreign partners must The first, Bernardo Joao (“Nino”) Vieira, kept power galvanise their efforts and seize this real opportunity for almost twenty years by incorporating the army into for success. his survival strategy. After his fall and subsequent civil war (1998-1999), the transition to democratic Dakar/Brussels, 2 July 2008 rule finally broke down due to the army’s influence. Africa Report N°142 2 July 2008 GUINEA-BISSAU: IN NEED OF A STATE I. INTRODUCTION just above Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone, and below Niger and Mali, all countries in the sub-region. Guinea- Bissau’s position reflects the country’s inability to Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony, was the move beyond its post-conflict situation following the only country in West Africa to use force to obtain war of independence in the 1970s and the civil war of belated independence in 1974. Embryonic institutions 1998-1999. created during the struggle against the coloniser were ill-adapted to the post-colonial period. This small This background report explains the challenges facing country with only 1.3 million inhabitants, the least Guinea-Bissau. It is the first in a series of reports which populated nation in the sub-region with the exception will focus on the national and international policies of the Cape Verde islands, remained without a real state. needed to take the country out of its incessant cycle of political crises and become a point of stability in the In the last 30 years Guinea-Bissau has changed very region. little. Poverty is endemic and its human development indicators are at the bottom of the African league table. Civilian power is suffocated by personal animosity and the role of the armed forces in politics. In the resulting chronic political instability there has thus far been no glimpse of an end to the country’s almost permanent state of crisis. The failings of