Policy Briefing Asia Briefing N°102 Bishkek/Brussels, 27 April 2010 Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses This briefing explains and analyses the events of the past I. OVERVIEW five years, in an effort to provide context and background to the uprising. Bakiyev came to power in the so-called A swift, violent rebellion swept into the Kyrgyz capital Tulip Revolution of March 2005, which ousted President Bishkek in early April 2010, sparked by anger at painful Askar Akayev, whom opposition leaders accused of nepo- utility price increases and the corruption that was the de- tism, corruption and growing authoritarianism. Once in fining characteristic of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s office, Bakiyev quickly abandoned most semblances of rule. In less than two days the president had fled. Some democracy, creating a narrow-based political structure 85 people were killed and the centre of the capital was run by his own family and for their profit. A combination looted. The thirteen-member provisional government now of ruthlessness and incompetence led to the regime’s faces a daunting series of challenges. Bakiyev leaves be- downfall. Almost exactly five years after his victory, Baki- hind a bankrupt state hollowed out by corruption and crime. yev was charged with the same abuses as Akayev had been, Economic failure and collapsing infrastructure have gen- by many of the same people with whom he had staged the erated deep public resentment. If the provisional govern- 2005 “revolution”. ment moves fast to assert its power, the risks of major long-term violence are containable: there are no signs of Despite the much-discussed theory that Moscow instigated extensive support for Bakiyev or of a North-South split. or stage-managed the uprising, the evidence at this point The speed with which the Bakiyev administration col- does not support this view. For its part, the U.S., in its lapsed is a salutary reminder of the risks of overemphasis- concern to maintain the Manas air base as a major hub for ing Western security concerns in framing policy towards the war in Afghanistan, was unwilling to counter the Baki- the region. yev regime’s increasingly abusive behaviour. So far the provisional government’s perfomance has not The fundamental lessons that can be drawn from the events been promising. Its members have largely failed to pre- of April 2010 are clear. First, the authoritarian model of sent themselves as a cohesive or coherent administration, government has not worked in Kyrgyzstan, and is unlikely or to be transparent about their activities at a time of great in the long run to work in the rest of Central Asia. Its su- anxiety and uncertainty. They have displayed a lack of perficial stability is attractive to Western leaders who are common ideology or strategy, and show signs of internal looking for a safe environment to pursue commercial or discord. Unless they quickly address these problems, they security interests, such as the current effort to prosecute risk a rapid erosion of their authority. the war in Afghanistan. But the deep-seated and invisible instabilities of authoritarian regimes remove all predict- Though their declared aim is to stabilise the country in ability. A well-defended government, seemingly without preparation for parliamentary and presidential elections a coherent challenge from its political opponents and apa- six months from now, the provisional government has to thetic populace, can be swept away in a day. By blocking do much more. They must prepare people for the multiple all social safety valves – the media, public dissent, politi- crises – in the energy sector, for example – that could cal discourse and the right to legal redress – the Bakiyev flare up at any time due to the neglect and pillaging of the regime created a semblance of calm. But it was unable to country’s infrastructure. They have to take urgent meas- control the underground currents of anger at the regime’s ures to ensure that organised crime or the narcotics trade rapacity. The closure of all other channels of change made do not again infiltrate political life. They need to begin a violent response just about the only option for an angry talking to devout Muslims – an increasingly alienated part population. of society who seem to have been largely bystanders in the April 2010 revolt. They will also need to convince Second, the causes of the uprising – state theft and re- donors that they can absorb aid. This is no small task, pression, a total lack of interest by rulers in their people – given the top-down corruption of the system of govern- are common to all of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbours. The col- ment they have inherited. They will, finally, have to move lapse of the Bakiyev regime is a case study of the risks rapidly to reassure the public that they are willing and facing authoritarianism in Central Asia. What happened able to work for the country’s good, not just their own en- in Kyrgyzstan in terms of corruption and repression is richment. already taking place in several other countries. What hap- Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°102, 27 April 2010 Page 2 pened in Bishkek in April 2010 could happen in most of inaccurately named the Tulip Revolution – a reflection of its neighbours. It could indeed be much worse. the effort by Western politicians and journalists to discern a wave of liberal democratic revolutions from angry pro- Central Asia’s leaders will probably ignore this warning, tests in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. In Bishkek, but at their peril. The international community needs, in power passed to a loose and friable coalition of strong- its interest and that of long-term stability, to change its minded individuals and their mostly small political parties.5 approach of public silence leavened by the discreet word Many of its members re-emerged in April 2010, to lead in the ear of the autocrat. It can start by conducting its re- the final protests that overthrew their erstwhile ally. lations with undemocratic regimes in an explicit, open way, where issues of social justice and development are In 2005 the victorious coalition quickly splintered and given parity with the more classic concerns of security or Kurmanbek Bakiyev emerged as the key figure.6 Perhaps trade – or at least expressed sufficiently in word and deed the least charismatic of that year’s “revolutionaries”, that the people know their conditions are part of the bilat- Bakiyev demonstrated a quiet tenacity, increasingly cou- eral equation. Authoritarian and unresponsive regimes are pled as the years went on with ruthlessness. His first not only embarrassing allies, but unreliable ones. A sud- years were chaotic, as his former allies challenged him on den push to try to create democracy in a few years from the streets of the capital and in late 2006 came close to zero is too ambitious. Speaking truth to regional powers overthrowing him. Defusing the protests by putting down would be a good start. the demonstrations and co-opting some of their leaders, he consolidated his position. The media was increasingly limited and harassed, and the regime quickly developed a II. THE RISE OF A ONE-FAMILY STATE reputation for corruption. The president’s sons and brothers took over many of the The history of the Bakiyev regime1 is one of a quest to business interests of the Akayev family. One developed a reshape a free-wheeling system of state corruption2 and reputation for “raiding” promising companies.7 U.S. and authoritarianism in a way that maximised political control Western officials, meanwhile, strongly suspected that top and financial gain. As President Bakiyev settled into office members of the new elite, mostly connected to the police in 2005, his political system became increasingly synony- or security structures, were playing a major role in pro- mous not only with him, but with his family, and espe- tecting narcotics shipments that passed through Kyrgyzstan cially his younger son, Maxim, described by an adviser to on their way from Afghanistan to markets in Europe, Rus- the presidential administration as a “pathologically” ac- sia and China. One of the president’s brothers, Marat,8 quisitive young man who “dreams of wealth and power”.3 reportedly supervised the judicial system, both in terms of the appointment of judges and the outcome of court cases. A. EARLY DAYS The street demonstrations that swept President Askar Akayev4 from office in late March 2005 were quickly and were identical to those made against Bakiyev in 2010 – nepo- tism, corruption, growing authoritarianism. 5 For futher information on this period, see in particular Crisis 1 For more information see Crisis Group Asia Report N°97, Group Report, Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, op. cit. Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, 4 May 2005; Asia Report 6 Some stayed on in high positions, or moved between govern- N°109, Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, 16 December 2005; Asia ment and opposition. For example, Almaz Atambayev – a Briefing N°55, Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, 9 November 2006; leader of the 2005 “revolution”, opposition presidential candi- Asia Briefing N°79, Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm, 14 August date in 2009, and senior member of the 2010 provisional gov- 2008. For a detailed examination of specific problems, see Asia ernment – was at varying times both a minister and prime min- Report N°118, Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, 16 Au- ister under President Bakiyev. gust 2006; Asia Report N°150, Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of 7 Raid in this context means forcing owners to sell their busi- Judicial Reform, 10 April 2008; and Asia Report N°176, ness at below value prices, or face investigation by the tax po- Women and Radicalistion in Kyrgyzstan, 3 September 2009.