JULY 2014 . VOL 7. ISSUE 7 hundreds of prisoners. The jailbreaks Switzerland possesses an adequate legal appeared well-planned, suggesting that Swiss Foreign Fighters framework to mitigate this threat. the operational planners had access to Active in Syria insider information. The assault group A Small, Underdeveloped Scene was divided into several teams, each By Daniel Glaus and Lorenzo Vidino Throughout the 1990s, small networks with their specialized task. It is possible of mostly North African militants used that the IMU participated in the attacks, switzerland has traditionally Swiss territory to raise funds, spread performing one or several specialized experienced little domestic jihadist propaganda and provide other support functions. Due to the large participation activity. Unlike other Western European activities to organizations operating of local fighters, however, it is unlikely countries, no successful terrorist outside of Europe.3 The largely laissez- that they played an overall planning or attack of jihadist inspiration has been faire attitude of Swiss authorities coordinating role. perpetrated on its territory and there (an approach, it should be noted, not is no publicly available information dissimilar to that of most European Conclusion indicating that concrete plans for an countries at the time) and convenient It does not appear that the IMU has attack in Switzerland were ever made.1 geographic position at the heart of become an essential strategic asset to Less than a dozen individuals have been Europe made the country an ideal the TTP. The IMU continues to have a tried for terrorism-related crimes, all of permanent or temporary location for small footprint outside its sanctuaries in them involving non-violent activities of jihadists. FATA, and they are dependent on local material support and propaganda. The networks to operate. The IMU continues number of Swiss residents who have The attacks of September 11, 2001, to be a fragmented organization, traveled abroad to join jihadist groups is changed the Swiss government’s operating as a loose network of also estimated to be significantly lower approach toward jihadist networks. criminals, urban terrorist cells and than in other European countries. While still correctly assessing that religiously motivated insurgents. While Switzerland was not a likely target for the IMU has some strategic value to the Yet Swiss authorities are not attacks and did not have a large jihadist TTP, it would be wrong to view the IMU complacent, and they argue that presence, authorities began to monitor as a potent threat to Pakistani national “Switzerland is not an island.”2 jihadist activities in the country more security. Counterterrorism officials have closely and, in some cases, took action.4 consistently warned that there is Yet throughout the mid-2000s, Swiss The IMU in Pakistan, however, ample evidence suggesting that some authorities experienced difficulties should not be dismissed. The IMU are of the same radicalization trends with successfully bringing terrorism vehemently opposed to negotiations that have long characterized other charges against members of networks with the Pakistani government. They are Western European countries also exist they suspected to be funding various willing to support groups in Pakistan in Switzerland, albeit on a smaller scale. terrorist groups through petty crime.5 who do not follow “mainstream” Recent developments, for example, Given the challenge of bringing charges militancy, such as the TTP or other indicate that a small contingent of Swiss against them for any terrorism-related breakaway factions. In spite of being citizens and residents have traveled to offense, Swiss authorities often opted heavily targeted in recent years, the Syria to join various militant groups. to charge them with regular criminal IMU has the potential to re-emerge in offenses or, more frequently, deported the region after NATO withdraws from This article first provides a general them.6 Afghanistan in 2014. Moreover, the overview of the jihadist scene in Karachi airport attack demonstrated Switzerland. It then analyzes a 3 “DAP Annual Report,” Swiss Service for Analysis and that the IMU has the potential to act as number of known cases of Swiss-based Prevention, 2002, p. 38. a spoiler in future peace processes in individuals who have fought in Syria. 4 Ibid. Pakistan. The article finds that, as authorities 5 The first such case was the so-called “affaire Saoud,” have long claimed, a comparatively an operation triggered by the discovery that various Anne Stenersen, Ph.D., is a Research small but, by Swiss standards, Swiss phone numbers had been in possession of one of Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research alarmingly large number of citizens the masterminds of the May 12, 2003, bombings in Ri- Establishment (FFI) in Norway. and residents have recently traveled yadh, Saudi Arabia. Swiss authorities subsequently to Syria. These subjects appear to be uncovered a sophisticated document-forging network mostly “homegrown,” with a sizeable led by a Biel-based Yemeni businessman that smuggled percentage of them tracing their roots into Switzerland illegal immigrants including, it was sus- to the Balkans. It is debatable whether pected, terrorists. Yet the terrorism charges against the network largely fell apart in court, and the members of 1 Potentially the only exception could be the plans dis- the network were only convicted for minor illegal immi- cussed by a cluster of Swiss-based North African mili- gration violations. See “Summary of Legal Proceedings,” tants to attack Israeli El Al aircraft at Zurich airport in Dossier SK.2006.15, Federal Criminal Tribunal, Bellin- 2005. The militants reportedly conducted surveillance of zona, 2006. the airport, but it is debatable whether their preliminary 6 That was the case, for example, with a network of activities could be qualified as a plot. North African militants involved in theft to fund the 2 Christiane Imsand, “La Suisse n’Est pas une Ile,” Le Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and Nouvelliste, June 22, 2012. suspected of potentially planning to blow up an El Al 8 JULY 2014 . VOL 7. ISSUE 7 The only exception is the conviction of in which online social networks were groups and recruiters with roots in the Moez Garsallaoui and Malika el-Aroud in their infancy, their sites played a Middle East (Kurdish Ansar al-Islam,13 in 2007.7 Garsallaoui was a Tunisian- crucial role in connecting like-minded Turkish Hizb Allah14), East Africa born member of Hizb al-Tahrir who French-speaking individuals, spawning (al-Shabab) and North Africa have a received asylum in Switzerland in an informal community of militants presence in the country. Clusters of 1997. He met el-Aroud, the widow of that has operational implications homegrown activists sympathizing today, almost 10 years after the pair’s with jihadist or militant Salafist “In May 2014, the Swiss demise.10 ideology are active in Switzerland, often organizing events throughout the intelligence agency publicly By the late 2000s, Swiss authorities country and frequenting online jihadist stated that it believes that began to observe that an increasing forums and social media.15 number of terrorism-related activities up to 15 Swiss residents involved individuals who were either Despite these actions, the number of have gone to Syria to fight, born or at least had grown up in the Swiss-based jihadist sympathizers country, replicating the homegrown and the intensity of their activities although it could only dynamic seen throughout Europe. This are substantially smaller than in confirm five cases.” phenomenon gained the attention of the most Western European countries, Swiss public with the case of Majd N., including those with a comparably a 19-year-old high school student from sized population. The Swiss “mini- Biel who was arrested in May 2012 in scene” is also split along linguistic Abdessatar Dahmane—the al-Qa`ida Kenya and accused of having fought lines, as French- and German-speaking militant who killed Afghan Northern with the al-Qa`ida-linked al-Shabab.11 militants do not seem to frequently Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud interact with one another.16 Rather, two days before the September 11, 2001, The case reinforced the argument each milieu draws inspiration from attacks—in a chat room.8 After getting long made by Swiss authorities that the more developed scenes in France married, the two began running various Switzerland is “not an island,” but and Germany. Swiss-based activists jihadist websites out of an apartment rather experiences radicalization seeking to develop their intellectual near Fribourg.9 Operating in an era dynamics similar to those of or operational involvement, in fact, neighboring countries, just on a often travel to other countries or invite 12 airliner in Zurich. See Sebastian Rotella, “Theft, Fraud significantly lower scale. Structured foreign personalities to Switzerland. in Europe Fund Terrorist Group, Police Say,” Los Angeles The radicalizing elements from the Times, April 1, 2007; Sylvain Besson, “Cellule Terroriste 10 Several individuals who met through the sites created en Suisse: Le Parcours d’un Delinquant Devenu Islamiste by el-Aroud and Garsallaoui have been involved in ter- ence: 1) lack of an “infecting cluster”: Switzerland never Radical,” Le Temps, July 3, 2006; “DAP Annual Report,” rorist activities during the last 10 years. In several cases, hosted an openly jihadist mosque or high profile jihad- Swiss Service for