No. 20-826 In the Supreme Court of the United States ———— MIKE BROWN, Acting Warden Petitioner, v. ERVINE DAVENPORT, Respondent. ———— On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ———— BRIEF FOR THE STATES OF ARKANSAS, ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARIZONA, GEORGIA, INDIANA, IOWA, KANSAS, KENTUCKY, LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, OHIO, OKLAHOMA, PENNSYLVANIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TENNESSEE, TEXAS, AND UTAH AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER ———— LESLIE RUTLEDGE Arkansas Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ARKANSAS NICHOLAS J. BRONNI ATTORNEY GENERAL Solicitor General 323 Center Street Counsel of Record Suite 200 VINCENT M. WAGNER Little Rock, AR 72201 Deputy Solicitor General (501) 682-6302 ASHER L. STEINBERG nicholas.bronni@ Assistant Solicitor General arkansasag.gov Counsel for Amici Curiae [Additional Counsel Listed after Signature Page] WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................ iii INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ...................... 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................... 1 ARGUMENT ........................................................ 3 I. Finding prejudice under Brecht does not ensure that a state court’s harmlessness determination is unreasonable under AEDPA because Brecht allows courts to consult a broader universe of materials. 3 A. Brecht and AEDPA/Chapman look to different sets of legal materials. ......... 5 B. The differences in applicable legal materials can lead to different results. ................................................. 7 1. Extraneous evidence. ..................... 8 2. Presumptions of prejudice. ............ 12 3. New arguments. ............................. 14 II. Reasonable disagreements can be large as well as small, so finding prejudice under Brecht does not ensure that a state court’s harmlessness determination under Chapman is unreasonable. ............ 16 III. Determining whether a state court’s harmlessness determination is unrea- sonable requires actually considering the state court’s rationale. .............................. 22 (i) ii TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued Page IV. If the Court has any doubt about whether the Sixth Circuit’s rule is correct, the Court should reject its rule. ...................... 25 CONCLUSION .................................................... 28 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page(s) Ayala v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 2014) ..................... 27 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) ..................................passim Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1 (2011) (per curiam) ........... 18, 19, 20 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ....................................passim Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) ................................... 6 Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257 (2015) ................................... 3, 4, 5 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) ............................. 12, 13, 14 Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) ................................... 6, 9 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) ............................... 16, 23, 24 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) ................. 10, 11, 12, 21, 25 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) ................................... 18 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) ................................... 8, 21 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) ..................................... 23 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued Page(s) Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58 (2013) (per curiam) ................... 6, 9 Mays v. Hines, 141 S. Ct. 1145 (2021) (per curiam) ......... 24 Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351 (2013) ................................... 11 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) ................................... 27 O’Neal v. McAnich, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) ................................... 4, 20 Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam) ............... 24 Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011) ................................... 13 Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010) ................................... 19 Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1999) ..................... 12, 14 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) ................................... 24 Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 2005) ............... 9, 12, 14 Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555 (2018) (per curiam) ......... 6, 15 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) ................................... 8 v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued Page(s) United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) ..................................... 21 White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (2014) ................................... 6, 12 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) ................................... 24 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ..................................passim STATUTES 28 U.S.C. 2254 .............................................. 6 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1) ..................................... 7 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) .......................................... 6 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) ..................................... 5, 6 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2)...................................... 7 OTHER AUTHORITIES Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (1969) .. 23, 24 INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE Amici are the States of Arkansas, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. As States, each defends habeas petitions in federal court and has an interest in ensuring that state-court judgments are accorded appropriate defer- ence under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The decision below, uniquely in lower-court habeas jurisprudence, holds that federal courts may refuse to deferentially review state-court decisions on a particular issue, harmless error, so long as on de novo review, a federal court finds prejudice under a more demanding standard than the one state courts are required to apply. Amici States do not believe de novo review of prejudice, even under a higher standard than that applicable in state court, suffices to ensure States the deference their courts’ decisions are owed. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Below, the Sixth Circuit held that if a habeas court has grave doubt about whether an error caused preju- dice under Brecht, it’s necessarily unreasonable under AEDPA for a state court to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. For multiple reasons, that is wrong. But even if the Court is inclined to think it is right, it should reverse the Sixth Circuit and require courts to demonstrate that AEDPA has been satisfied before granting relief. I. The Sixth Circuit’s rule rests on the proposition that a state court’s assessment of prejudice can only differ so much from a habeas court’s before it becomes 2 unreasonable under AEDPA. If Brecht and AEDPA review of state-court decisions applied the same law, that argument would have surface appeal—though nothing more. But in reality, Brecht analysis is informed by a large body of law that federal courts can’t consider when addressing reasonableness under AEDPA. And those materials can determine out- comes, whether by instructing courts on what evidence of prejudice they can consider, or providing presump- tions and rules of thumb for assessing the likely effects of certain errors. So however broad reasonable legal disagreements can be in the abstract, substantial reasonable disagreements here are entirely possible. II. Even if courts only considered this Court’s holdings when applying Brecht, finding grave doubt about prejudice de novo would not mean a state court’s harmlessness determination was necessarily unrea- sonable. The Sixth Circuit’s rule presumes that the gap between grave doubt and no reasonable doubt is simply too great a gap for reasonable disagreement to bridge. But no rule of law or logic says that reasonable minds can only differ by small margins. This Court’s precedent on sufficiency-of-the-evidence review shows just the opposite; a court can have grave doubts about a defendant’s guilt, yet conclude a reasonable jury could find it beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable disagreements of this magnitude are possible because a reviewing court will not always be certain its own view is correct; the weaker its confidence in its own view, the wider range of differing views it will deem reasonable. And prejudice determinations, in particu- lar, are an area where it is especially difficult to make confident judgments. III. Even confident prejudice determinations under Brecht do not ensure a state court’s harmlessness 3 determination is unreasonable. Rather, the only way to really determine whether a state court’s reasoning is reasonable is to actually review it. Even if a court feels certain grave doubt about prejudice is warranted, that certainty may be unearned. Until a court has demonstrated that reasonable jurists could not accept the state court’s reasoning for finding harmlessness, it cannot be certain its own assessment of prejudice is correct. IV. Even if the Court is inclined to conclude that finding prejudice under Brecht means that findings of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt are unrea- sonable, the Court should still require lower courts to review state-court harmlessness determinations under AEDPA before granting relief. If the Sixth Circuit is correct, requiring lower courts to apply AEDPA