University of Texas at El Paso DigitalCommons@UTEP Open Access Theses & Dissertations 2011-01-01 Tom Regan and the Problem of Conflicting Rights Jeanine Campsall University of Texas at El Paso, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Campsall, Jeanine, "Tom Regan and the Problem of Conflicting Rights" (2011). Open Access Theses & Dissertations. 2247. https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd/2247 This is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UTEP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UTEP. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TOM REGAN AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS JEANINE CAMPSALL Department of Philosophy APPROVED: John Symons, Ph.D., Chair Steve Best, Ph.D. Bruce Louden, Ph.D. Benjamin C. Flores, Ph.D. Acting Dean of the Graduate School Copyright © by Jeanine Campsall 2011 Dedication Dedicated in loving memory to my dog Molly. TOM REGAN AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS by JEANINE CAMPSALL, B.A., B.Sc. THESIS Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at El Paso in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Philosophy THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO August 2011 Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to all those who helped me through the process of writing this thesis. Foremost, to my thesis advisor John Symons, for all of the time and effort he has put forth on my behalf. I am extremely grateful for his knowledge, guidance and encouragement. I would also like to sincerely thank the other members of my thesis committee – Steve Best and Bruce Louden, for their thoughtful feedback and suggestions, as well as Peter Robinson for taking the time to read and comment on my thesis. I am also very grateful for the love and support of my family – both the Campsalls and the Shavers, and my friends and pets. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the huge influence that animals (pets and otherwise) have had on my interest in moral philosophy and my writing on this topic. v Table of Contents Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... iii Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... v Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Introduction to The Case for Animal Rights ................................................................. 6 1.1 Mental Lives Of Animals.............................................................................................. 6 1.2 Welfare of Animals .......................................................................................................... 7 1.3.1 Inherent Value ............................................................................................................ 11 1.3.2 Inherent Value Criticism ............................................................................................ 14 1.3.3 Ultimate Value ........................................................................................................... 16 1.3.4 Line-Drawing Criticism ............................................................................................ 20 Chapter 2: Basic Rights and Duties .............................................................................................. 25 2.1 Rights Background......................................................................................................... 25 2.2 Basic Rights as Valid Claims ........................................................................................ 29 2.3.1 Duties of Assistance ................................................................................................... 32 2.3.2 Duties of Assistance Criticism ................................................................................... 33 2.4 Implications of the Animal Rights View ...................................................................... 36 Chapter 3: Conflicts of Rights ...................................................................................................... 40 3.1 Conflicts of Rights Introduction ................................................................................... 40 3.2 Some Problems of Moderate Deontological Views: ..................................................... 40 3.3 Introduction to Regan's Principles for Overriding Rights ............................................. 46 3.4.1 The Miniride Principle ....................................................................................... 48 3.4.2 Criticisms of the Miniride Principle ......................................................................... 48 3.5.1 The Worse-Off Principle ............................................................................................ 56 3.5.2 Criticisms of the Worse-off Principle ........................................................................ 57 3.6.1 Side-Effects and Special Considerations ................................................................... 59 3.6.2 Special Considerations Criticisms ............................................................................. 61 Chapter 4: The Lifeboat Problem ................................................................................................. 64 4.1 Introduction to the Lifeboat Case ................................................................................. 64 4.3.1 The Harm of Death Criticism .................................................................................... 69 vi 4.3.2 Why We Should Reject Regan's Solution to the Lifeboat Case ................................. 75 4.4.1 Introduction to the Moral Dilemmas Debate .............................................................. 78 4.5.1 Brink's Characterization of Prima Facie and All-Things-Considered Obligations ..... 88 4.5.2 Brink's Recipe for Dilemmas ...................................................................................... 89 4.6 More Arguments against the Possibility of Dilemmas .................................................. 91 4.7 Solution to the Moral Dilemmas Problem .................................................................... 94 4.8 Alternative Solution to the Lifeboat Problem .............................................................. 99 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 102 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 108 Curriculum Vita .......................................................................................................................... 111 vii Introduction In The Case for Animal Rights, first published in 1983, Tom Regan offers a deontological approach to dealing with the problem of the moral status of animals. This is in contrast to Peter Singer's famous utilitarian account in his book Animal Liberation from 1975. While Singer's is the most well- known utilitarian account of animal liberation, Regan's position is the most the most well-known rights- based account. Regan claims that the morally significant characteristic uniting humans with many non- human animals is that they are “subjects-of-a-life” with inherent value.1 All individuals with inherent value, Regan argues, have a right not be treated as mere means; they have basic rights that ought to be respected by moral agents.2 Simply establishing the basic rights of individuals does not provide us with adequate information to know our moral obligations in every situation. Some moral situations do not involve rights –this implies that a complete moral theory cannot be entirely rights based, and that we have duties aside from those associated with rights. Simply referring to rights also does not help in situations when rights conflict. An important task for theories involving moral rights thus involves determining whether it would ever be acceptable to override rights, and if so, in which situations, and according to which principles. Regan's theory has been criticized for various reasons, and one aspect that has been extensively debated is his analysis of cases where rights may be overridden. The role rights play in moral theories relates directly to the way that rights conflicts are resolved. There are those who argue that if rights are to play any meaningful role, they must be thought to be absolute; however, this view runs into practical problems as it does not further our ability to resolve conflicts between rights. Rights function as a way to provide protection for individuals, but many agree that an individual's right may be overridden in certain circumstances: when other rights, or other non- 1 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), 264. 2 Ibid., 327. 1 rights considerations conflict with it. When rights are not in conflict, moral decisions are simple – the morally obligatory action is to respect rights. Ideally, we would never have to override a right and it would be possible for all rights to be absolute, but since