CHAPTER SIX THE XUANWU MEN INCIDENT OF THE TANG: IMPERIAL RETIREMENT ENTERS THE MAINSTREAM The institution of retired emperorship was developed by the Northern Wei and utilized by the subsequent Northern Dynasties as a means of securing the primogenital succession to the throne. The next step is to investigate the relevance of this understanding of imperial retire- ment to the Tang context. Many members of the Tang ruling elite could trace their ancestry back to non-Han Chinese courtiers serving in the courts of the Northern Dynasties. Tang elite culture looked back to the Period of Disunion for cultural and political precedents. One scholar has referred to Taizong’s reign—the Zhenguan period—as the culmi- nation in the development of the Xianbei inspired monarchies of the Northern Dynasties period.1 This is, perhaps, a somewhat controversial way of stating the issue, but it underlines the importance of the Period of Disunion’s cultural and political heritage. This chapter will discuss the retirement of Tang Gaozu in late 626 in the context of a succession crisis. Gaozu was personally familiar with the concept of the retired emperor. In 617, after seizing Chang’an, which held members of the Sui royal family (Yangdi was in Yangzhou), and prior to proclaiming himself emperor of the Tang dynasty, Gaozu fol- lowed the advice of Pei Ji 裴寂 and recognized Yangdi as retired emperor (taishang huang, without the final term, di). A grandson of Yangdi resid- ing in Chang’an, You 侑, was recognized as emperor. To an extent, desig- nating Sui Yangdi as retired emperor ‘in absentia’ was an exercise in the awarding of a passive honorific. You was a puppet emperor under the influence of Gaozu. In this instance Gaozu was simply using multiple emperors as a legitimating figleaf to cover his seizure of power. Gaozu’s use of the term may also have been designed to keep his options open with the Turks, who were interested in having Gaozu establish a tributary relationship with their kaghan. Gaozu could put the Turks off by hiding 1 Nunome Chōfū 布目潮渢, Zui Tō shi kenkyū 隋唐史研究 (Kyoto: Nakamura Press Co., Ltd., 1968), 312. 168 chapter six behind these multiple Sui emperors. Finally, at this time Sui Yangdi was still alive and in control of key garrison areas of China, including nearby Loyang. The use of the titletaishang huang was also tacit recognition on the part of Gaozu of these respective spheres of influence. Gaozu and his advisers were familiar with the general idea of retired emperorship, and most probably with the specific historical precedents. The approach of this chapter to the relative roles of Gaozu and Taizong in establishing and consolidating the Tang regime is in general accord with what can be termed the revisionist perspective.2 From the revision- ist perspective, Gaozu is portrayed as the key decision-maker from the time of the Taiyuan uprising until the 626 retirement, when he osten- sibly yielded power to Taizong. Gaozu consistently emerges as the key policy-maker while Li Shimin (the future Taizong), his brothers, and key associates may aggressively put forth policy suggestions, no significant action was ever initiated without Gaozu’s explicit approval. Gaozu, like the future Taizong, exhibited two notable qualities as a leader: first, the ability to wait and time his actions in accordance with favorable circum- stances. Second, the ability to delegate authority and be open to policy advice from a wide variety of sources. The leadership qualities which traditional scholars have attributed to the Zhenguan reign period were, in fact, a direct continuation of Gaozu’s leadership style.3 Where the current revisionist perspective falters, however, is in its efforts to explain Gaozu’s apparent passivity with regard to the factional fighting carried on by his three eldest sons, the uterine brothers born of his deceased main consort, Empress Dou. Even more startling was Gaozu’s placid acceptance of the fratricide that occurred at Xuanwu Men, where Li Shimin killed his two uterine brothers and then suc- cessfully demanded recognition from Gaozu as his heir apparent. Had Gaozu become too old and too soft to deal competently with the harsh realities of court politics? Here we will argue that Gaozu encouraged his sons to compete with each other, that he, in fact, set the parameters of the competition and probably expected and desired an outcome similar 2 See Niu Zhigong 牛致功, Li Yuan Jian Tang Shilue 李淵建唐史略 (Xi’an: Shaanxi Renmin chubanshe, 1983); Li Shutong 李樹桐, Tang Shi Kaobian 唐史考辨 (Taibei: Taiwan Zhonghua shuju, 1965); Wang Fuzhi, Du Tongjian Lun (Beijing: Chonghua shuju, 1975 reprt). The entire Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu 大唐創業起居注 (Xuejin Taoyuan edition) is a major source for the revisionist perspective. 3 Li Shutong, in his, Tang Shi Xinlun 唐史新論 (Taibei: Taiwan Zhonghua shuju, 1972), 119–138, strongly emphasizes the continuity in leadership style between the two men. .