Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power T.V. PAUL T.V. Paul is James McGill Professor of International Relations at McGill University, Canada. During 2002-03 he taught at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA and was also a senior visiting scholar at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is the author of Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (McGill-Queen’s, 2000), and co-author with Baldev Raj Nayar of India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (Cambridge University Press, 2002).1 n a recent report to the U.S. Congress, the Central Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has accepted many prin- Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that during the ciples of the international nuclear and missile nonprolif- Iperiod July-December 2001, Chinese entities contin- eration regimes. ued to supply nuclear and missile materials to Pakistan. Over the years, largely in response to U.S. economic According to the report, Chinese entities have been the and technological sanctions or the threat of such sanc- principal suppliers for Pakistan’s serial production of solid- tions, China has made several unilateral and bilateral com- propellant short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) such as mitments that it would abide by the provisions of these the Shaheen-1 and Haider-1. Moreover, the report con- regimes. Most recently, in October 2002 China issued a tends that successful development of the Shaheen-2 me- set of comprehensive new export control regulations cov- dium range ballistic missile (MRBM) will also require ering missile technology, chemical weapons precursors and continued Chinese assistance. The report also suggests technology, and biological agents. These regulations were that China has continued to interpret its nonprolifera- issued just prior to the visit of Chinese President Jiang tion commitments narrowly with regard to supplying Zemin to the United States.3 Despite these assurances, nuclear and missile-related materials to its key allies in China has remained both a cause of, and a contributor to, the developing world, especially Pakistan.2 Although the nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia. Since the report does not accuse the Chinese government of direct late 1990s, evidence suggests that China has limited some involvement in the transfers, a strong argument can be such transfers, but it has found loopholes in the regimes made that in a political system such as that of China, such that it has joined that have enabled it to continue its pro- sensitive transfers cannot take place on a sustained basis liferation links with Pakistan, especially in the missile without the prior knowledge of the central government. technology area. What motivates China in this issue area? This Chinese behavior has special significance because This article argues that Beijing’s motivations in trans- China has joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of ferring nuclear and missile materials and technology to The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 1 Pakistan derive largely from Chinese concerns about the China, and less and less what China itself could do to re- regional balance of power and are part of a Chinese effort form or transform the existing world order.…” The to pursue a strategy of containment in its enduring rivalry change in China’s position on international organizations with India. Although bureaucratic politics and commer- coincided with “the dramatic rise of China’s international cial interests may have some influence on Chinese policy, standing in the hegemonic world order and its sui generis in a centralized political system like China, they cannot status as a ‘poor global power’ can be explained by the plausibly account for the consistent pattern of nuclear and change in China’s national role conception from a revo- missile supplies to Pakistan. lutionary system-transforming actor to a neo-realist sys- A more convincing explanation is that China wants tem-maintaining status quo actor.”4 In the to limit India’s power capabilities to South Asia and nonproliferation area, some such behavioral changes have thereby constrain New Delhi’s aspirations to become a been the result of U.S. pressures. However, the tension major power in Asia. India’s emergence as a peer-com- between China’s role as a great power that needs to sup- petitor in Asia would upset China’s predominant position port those norms that favor great power dominance of the in the region. However, if acute conflict and an intense international system and China’s regional interest in bal- arms race between India and Pakistan persist, India would ancing a rising power, India, explains the current contra- continue to be bracketed with its smaller regional rival dictions in Chinese nonproliferation policy in South Asia. Pakistan and not with China. The continuing contradic- tions in Chinese nonproliferation policy are caused by the CHINA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS tension that exists between China’s regional interests in IN SOUTH ASIA South Asia and its global power aspirations. China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy, especially As China emerges as a stakeholder great power, its with respect to South Asia, contains several elements. nonproliferation policy has become more attuned to First, China is both a cause of, and a contributor to, nuclear maintaining its status, which means supporting outwardly and missile proliferation in the region. Yet, China appears the norms prohibiting nuclear acquisition by new states. to give the impression that as a nuclear weapon state and Yet, regional and global balance of power considerations permanent member of the UN Security Council (P-5), simultaneously pull on Chinese policy in this regard, as China has a responsibility to limit proliferation in South evident in persistent Chinese support for the Pakistani Asia. nuclear and missile programs. In the future, China may Second, Beijing uses nonproliferation objectives to limit these supplies to Pakistan in order to prevent the maximize its national interests, which include retaining emergence of a U.S.-Indian military alliance. However, if China as the sole and predominant recognized nuclear the relationship between the United States and India weapon state in Asia, especially in East Asia. For that rea- evolves into a military alliance aimed against China, it is son, China is reluctant to see any other states in East Asia equally likely that China will court Pakistan more in- acquiring nuclear arms. In this regard, China seems to tensely. Balance of power considerations will again be the make a distinction between strategically vital regions and key source of such possible policy changes. less vital regions. South Asia and the Middle East are less The evolution of China’s nonproliferation policy has vital to China than is East Asia. China has been uncom- coincided with the change in China’s status in the inter- fortable with North Korean nuclear aspirations, and national system from a challenger to a quasi-status quo Beijing shares the desire of the United States and Japan great power actor. Contemporary China has accepted that the Korean peninsula remain non-nuclear. In particu- many norms of international governance as its status as a lar, China does not want Japan to exploit North Korean great power has been acknowledged by other major pow- nuclearization as a pretext to acquire nuclear weapons or ers, especially the United States. The progression in Chi- adopt a policy of large-scale militarization.5 But China is nese policy reflects its acceptance of some of the elements unwilling to impose economic sanctions on North Korea, of the international order that gives legitimacy to China’s which could trigger a flood of refugees onto its territory. status as a great power and as a preponderant power in China also seems reluctant to abandon the sovereignty Asia. Sinologists have noticed the gradual progression of principle and coerce North Korea. China would, however, China in the 1980s as both a “system-maintaining” and provide nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan if that “system-exploiting” great power as it began to ask “more meant its regional rival India could be balanced and con- and more what international organizations could do for The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 2 tained, although China would formally recognize neither dence to suggest that China cares too much whether the India nor Pakistan as nuclear powers. world is organized according to some universal hierarchi- Third, over time China has come to see nonprolif- cal order as long as its own order in the immediate neigh- eration as an avenue to confirm its great power status and borhood is maintained. Apparently, the Chinese gain recognition from other great powers, especially the government makes more noises than takes concrete ac- United States. This explains China’s 1992 accession to tions to right the inequality that exists in the world.”8 the NPT, its 1996 signature of the Comprehensive Test Becoming a full-fledged global power in the 21st cen- Ban Treaty (CTBT)), 1997 ratification of the Chemical tury remains a core national objective of China. Chinese Weapons Convention (CWC) (April 1997); its joining policymakers justify their goal of global power status as the Zangger Committee in October 1997, Primier Li Peng’s necessary to “prevent the historical humiliations suffered issuance of nuclear export control regulations in Septem- at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism.”9 In- ber 1997, assurances to the United States in November terestingly, Chinese writings on major power relations in 2000 not to help develop ballistic missiles that can be used Asia rarely mention India as a rising power of much sig- to deliver nuclear weapons, and the October 2002 com- nificance. For instance, Xue Mouhong, a former ambassa- prehensive export control regulations—covering missile dor and vice president of the Society of Asian-African technology (which nearly matched the MTCR regula- Studies, argues that the international system is led by one tions), chemical weapons precursors and technology, and superpower (the United States) and four other powers: biological agents.