AI & Soc (2016) 31:171–190 DOI 10.1007/s00146-015-0620-9 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Simulation, self-extinction, and philosophy in the service of human civilization Jeffrey White1 Received: 16 February 2015 / Accepted: 25 September 2015 / Published online: 30 October 2015 Ó Springer-Verlag London 2015 Abstract Nick Bostrom’s recently patched ‘‘simulation realistic simulations to get past self-extinction-level threats argument’’ (Bostrom in Philos Q 53:243–255, 2003; Bos- is projected. In the end, Bostrom’s basic argument for the trom and Kulczycki in Analysis 71:54–61, 2011) purports conviction that we exist now in a simulation is reaffirmed. to demonstrate the probability that we ‘‘live’’ now in an ‘‘ancestor simulation’’—that is as a simulation of a period Keywords Simulation Á Model Á Cognitive social prior to that in which a civilization more advanced than our science Á Democracy Á Brain in a vat Á Skepticism Á own—‘‘post-human’’—becomes able to simulate such a Global coordination problem state of affairs as ours. As such simulations under consid- eration resemble ‘‘brains in vats’’ (BIVs) and may appear open to similar objections, the paper begins by reviewing 1 Introduction objections to BIV-type proposals, specifically those due a presumed mad envatter. In counter example, we explore We must declare war on war, so the outcome will be the motivating rationale behind current work in the peace upon peace. development of psychologically realistic social simula- -Obama (2014) tions. Further concerns about rendering human cognition in Fathers, provoke not your children to anger. a computational medium are confronted through review of -Fetyukovich1 current dynamic systems models of cognitive agency. In these models, aspects of the human condition are repro- Current events have my head spinning. I wake daily to read duced that may in other forms be considered incomputable, on the affairs of the world, only to wonder if it is all a i.e., political voice, predictive planning, and consciousness. dream. But for the suffering, from wedding parties bombed The paper then argues that simulations afford a unique to civil activists singled out for government assassination, potential to secure a post-human future, and may be nec- evidence invites speculation that our globe might well be essary for a pre-post-human civilization like our own to part of a particularly violent and extraordinarily realistic achieve and to maintain a post-human situation. Long-s- video game, the product of a team of evil demons for their tanding philosophical interest in tools of this nature for exclusive enjoyment at the expense of anyone with Aristotle’s ‘‘statesman’’ and more recently for E.O. Wilson compassion and an eye to a flourishing future in which in the 1990s is observed. Self-extinction-level threats from such existential threats are finally resolved. At least, in State and individual levels of organization are compared, imagining it so, perceived reality is easier to accept. and a likely dependence on large-scale psychologically As fanciful as this may seem, Nick Bostrom’s recently patched ‘‘simulation argument’’ (Bostrom 2003; Bostrom and Kulczycki 2011) purports to demonstrate the proba- & Jeffrey White bility that we exist now in a simulation of similar [email protected] 1 Humanities and Social Sciences, Korean Advanced Institute 1 The straight-talking counselor from The Brothers Karamazov as of Science and Technology (KAIST), Daejeon, South Korea translated in Dostoyevsky and McDuff (2003, pp. 949–950). 123 172 AI & Soc (2016) 31:171–190 complexity, an ‘‘ancestor simulation’’ of a period prior to worry about our knowledge of the external world’’ and that in which a civilization more advanced than our own— axiological skepticism ‘‘is the concern that no genuine ‘‘post-human’’—becomes able to simulate such a state of value could attach’’ to a simulated existence (Cogburn and affairs as ours—‘‘human.’’ By this argument, one (or more) Silcox 2014, p. 563). Together, these forms of skepticism of the following propositions is (are) true: seem to encourage an attitude that simulated life is—on the probability conferred by Bostrom’s simulation argument— (1) The human species is very likely to go extinct not real, and this may encourage the sentiment that suf- before reaching a post-human stage. fering is—so long as it is not my own—inconsequential. (2) The fraction of post-human civilizations that are Indeed, the very word ‘‘simulation’’ carries the sense that interested in running a significant number of ancestor everything exists only as an ‘‘if’’ and is accompanied by the simulations is extremely small. feeling ‘‘as-if’’ life mattered, ‘‘as-if’’ justice mattered, and (3) We are almost certainly living in a computer so on and nothing more. We are ‘‘as-if’’ transported into the simulation (Bostrom and Kulczycki 2011, p. 54). Brothers Karamazov, confronted by a maddening—and Proposition 1 expresses confidence in humanity’s potential murderous—moral nihilism. Bostrom himself understands to destroy itself, as ‘‘we are likely to go extinct as a result this implication, but reasons that ‘‘properly understood … of the development of some powerful but dangerous the truth of (3) should have no tendency to make us ‘go technology’’ (Bostrom 2003, pp. 251–252). Accepting 1, crazy’’’ (Bostrom 2003, p. 255). What we have taken for however, also implies that some human civilizations may good should remain taken for good, and life should con- not go extinct or extinguish themselves. They become tinue as it has, simulated or not. ‘‘post-human,’’ representing a situation in which ‘‘hu- My suspicions are that Bostrom does not take our sim- mankind has acquired most of the technological capabil- ulated condition seriously enough. The following paper ities that one can currently show to be consistent with argues that the Bostrom-scale simulations under consider- physical laws and with material and energy constraints’’ ation may prove a necessity rather than a luxury for a (Bostrom 2003, p. 245). From within such a situation, it civilization with post-human aspirations. The next step in follows easily that realistic simulations of ‘‘ancestor’’ low- the fugue confronts objections deriving from similarities tech level 1 worlds such as our own are a matter of course. between simulations and brains in vats (BIVs). The third Post-human civilizations interested will create limitless and fourth steps build the complimentary case for psy- simulations, and as their simulations might also create chologically realistic simulations in the near term, while simulations, the ratio of simulated to natural worlds spun the fifth confronts a different form of skepticism with a out accordingly confirms near certainty in the third review of promising work in neurorobotics. Finally, the proposition, that this world, ours, is simulated. second half of the paper argues that the second of Bos- A ‘‘patch’’ offered in 2011 (Bostrom and Kulczycki trom’s three propositions should be modified on grounds 2011) aims to correct for concerns that too few simulating that pre-post-human civilizations like our own, ‘‘human,’’ populations survive proposition 1, and become 2, relative probably require the ongoing development of large-scale those surviving without such simulations. The concession psychologically realistic social simulations in order to that the patch offers is simply to accept the original con- achieve and then to maintain a post-human status, thereby clusion so long as simulating post-human worlds are not affirming his conclusion. unduly outnumbered by non-simulating worlds, in which case the simple probability delivers either ambiguous or opposite results. And with this, the reasoning driving 2 Skepticism and reality Bostrom’s simulation argument is quite clear—though there may be few civilizations which achieve a capacity to …the scientific spirit does not require us to blind produce simulations of the complexity in terms of which ourselves to the practical consequences which hang we find ourselves today, some which do achieve that upon the solution to not a few scientific problems. capacity will exercise it, and in exercising it will create -Rashdall (1914, p. 199) many more simulated ancestor worlds like our own than could ever have existed otherwise. So, given the proba- bility that simulated ancestor worlds far exceed natural How does it happen that a whole generation of sci- alternatives, we must accept proposition number 3. entific experts is blind to obvious facts? This is a contentious result for the skepticism that it -Dyson (2015) seems to represent, skepticism that may be analyzed into two types, epistemic and axiological (Cogburn and Silcox Confronted with the proposition that we exist as simula- 2014). Epistemic skepticism ‘‘is the traditional sort of tions, one may respond in a number of ways. One may 123 AI & Soc (2016) 31:171–190 173 object to Bostrom’s characterization of the nature of the that I have two hands’’ for example ‘‘remains undefeated’’ simulated condition, for example. He writes that ‘‘it would (Huemer 2000, p. 411). In the end, it is up to the skeptic to suffice for the generation of subjective experiences that the address this challenge from direct realism. My two hands computational processes of a human brain are structurally and what I make with them are much clearer and more replicated in suitably fine-grained detail, such as on the distinct than is any simulation; thus, the simulationist is level of individual synapses’’ (Bostrom 2003, p. 244).2 This either deluded, or wrong. characterization is close enough to envatted brain arche- But, what if the simulationist weakens the argument, in types to suffer similar faults, perhaps ending any further some way? Anticipating such a move, Davies (1997) has discussion about any simulated condition before it gets recalled Graeme Forbes’ (1985) contention that ‘‘the started. skeptic can evade Putnam’s argument and achieve all she To this end, Putnam (1982) famously argued for the has ever wanted by switching to the hypothesis that I am necessary falsity of the proposition that we are brains in ‘relevantly like a brain in a vat’’’ (as quoted in Davies vats (BIVs).