Additional Statements by Republican Judicial Appointees About Sentencing Policy in the pre-Booker Era United States Supreme Court Anthony M. Kennedy William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens United States Courts of Appeals Morris S. Arnold Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Frank H. Easterbrook Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals John T. Noonan, Jr. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Edward C. Prado Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reena Raggi Second Circuit Court of Appeals Pamela Rymer Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Charles E. Wiggins Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals United States District Courts Louis C. Bechtle Eastern District of Pennsylvania Franklin S. Billings District of Vermont Andrew W. Bogue District of South Dakota Charles L. Brieant Southern District of New York Vincent L. Broderick Southern District of New York James M. Burns District of Oregon John T. Copenhaver Southern District of West Virginia Brian Duff Northern District of Illinois J. Owen Forrester Northern District of Georgia Richard A. Gadbois Central District of California Lee P. Gagliardi Southern District of New York Gerard L. Goettel Southern District of New York Edward F. Harrington District of Massachusetts Stanley S. Harris District of District of Columbia J. Lawrence Irving Southern District of California Richard G. Kopf District of Nebraska Elizabeth Kovachevich Middle District of Florida J. Spencer Letts Central District of California John C. Lifland District of New Jersey 2 Charles C. Lovell District of Montana John S. Martin, Jr. Southern District of New York J. Frederick Motz District of Maryland Edwin L. Nelson Northern District of Alabama Alan H. Nevas District of Connecticut Ralph W. Nimmons, Jr. Middle District of Florida David C. Norton District of South Carolina John S. Rhoades, Sr. Southern District of California William W. Schwarzer Northern District of California Stanley Sporkin District of District of Columbia Franklin Waters Western District of Arkansas Spencer M. Williams Northern District of California Alfred Wolin District of New Jersey Special Courts Nicholas Tsoucalas U.S. Court of International Trade 3 United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy Appointed by Ronald Reagan, 1988 "I think I am in agreement with most judges in the federal system that mandatory minimums are an imprudent, unwise and often unjust mechanism for sentencing. I simply do not see how Congress can be satisfied with the results of mandatory minimums for possession of crack cocaine.”1 “Under the federal mandatory minimum statutes a sentence can be mitigated by a prosecutorial decision not to charge certain counts. There is debate about this, but in my view a transfer of sentencing discretion from a judge to an Assistant U. S. Attorney, often not much older than the defendant, is misguided. Often these attorneys try in good faith to be fair in the exercise of discretion. The policy, nonetheless, gives the decision to an assistant prosecutor not trained in the exercise of discretion and takes discretion from the trial judge. The trial judge is the one actor in the system most experienced with exercising discretion in a transparent, open, and reasoned way. Most of the sentencing discretion should be with the judge, not the prosecutors.2 “The legislative branch has the obligation to determine whether a policy is wise. It is a grave mistake to retain a policy just because a court finds it constitutional. Courts may conclude the legislature is permitted to choose long sentences, but that does not mean long sentences are wise or just. Few misconceptions about government are more mischievous than the idea that a policy is sound simply because a court finds it permissible. A court decision does not excuse the political branches or the public from the responsibility for unjust laws.”3 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Appointed by Richard Nixon, 1971 Appointed Chief Justice by Ronald Reagan, 1986 "Mandatory minimums . are frequently the result of floor amendments to demonstrate emphatically that legislators want to 'get tough on crime.' Just as frequently they do not get involved in any careful consideration of the effect they might have on the sentencing guidelines as a whole. Indeed, it seems to me that one of the best arguments against any more mandatory minimums, and perhaps against some of those that we already have, is that they frustrate the careful calibration of sentences, from one end of the spectrum to the other, which the sentencing guidelines were intended 1 Justice Kennedy Calls Mandatory Federal Sentences Unwise, Often Unfair, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1994, at A15. 2 Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html. 3 Id. 4 to accomplish.”4 Justice John Paul Stevens Appointed by Gerald Ford, 1975 “The consequences of the majority’s construction of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are so bizarre that I cannot believe they were intended by Congress. Neither the ambiguous language of the statute nor its sparse legislative history supports the interpretation reached by the majority today. Indeed, the majority’s construction of the statute will necessarily produce sentences that are so anomalous that they will undermine the very uniformity that Congress sought to achieve when it authorized the Sentencing Guidelines.”5 United States Courts of Appeals Judge Morris S. Arnold Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Appointed by George H.W. Bush, 1992 “You may say that I said that many of our drug laws are scandalously draconian and the sentences are often savage. You may also quote me as saying the war on drugs has done considerable damage to the Fourth Amendment and that something is very wrong indeed when a person gets a longer sentence for marijuana than for espionage.”6 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Appointed by Ronald Reagan, 1985 Prior Legal Experience: Deputy U.S. solicitor general, 1978-79. Assistant to the U.S. solicitor general, 1974-77. "Mandatory minimum penalties, combined with a power to grant exceptions, create a prospect of inverted sentencing. The more serious the defendant's crimes, the lower the sentence--because the greater his wrongs, the more information and assistance he has to offer to a prosecutor. Discounts for the top dogs have the virtue of necessity, because rewards for assistance are essential to the business of detecting and punishing crime. But what makes the post-discount sentencing structure topsy-turvy is the mandatory minimum, binding only for the hangers on. What is to be said for such terms, which can visit draconian penalties on the small fry without increasing prosecutors' ability 4 William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the Nat'l Symposium on Drugs and Violence in America (June 18, 1993). 5 Chapman v. U.S., 500 U.S. 453, 468 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 6 JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAW HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 95 (2001). 5 to wring information from their bosses? Our case illustrates a sentencing inversion. Such an outcome is neither illegal nor unconstitutional, because offenders have no right to be sentenced in proportion to their wrongs. Still, meting out the harshest penalties to those least culpable is troubling, because it accords with no one's theory of appropriate punishments.”7 Senior Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Appointed by Ronald Reagan, 1985 “Proportionality between crime and sentence is difficult to lay out abstractly. To achieve it is a matter of judgment--the judgment of the sentencing judge. To eliminate proportionality is to eliminate the virtue of prudence which should guide every act of judgment. To eliminate proportionality is to leave the way wide open to the cruel and unusual punishments that our Constitution proscribes. In the present climate, Congress's attempt to control crime by escalating the punishments has gone very far in the direction of eliminating the prudential, proportionate judgment of the sentencing judge.”8 Judge Edward C. Prado Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Appointed by George W. Bush, 2003 Prior Legal Experience: Assistant District Attorney, Bexar County, Texas, 1972-1976 “You’re not getting the kingpins, you’re getting some of these low-level people. Furthermore mandatory minimum sentences, are not being used uniformly. The prosecutors are using their discretion in deciding who gets a mandatory sentence and who doesn’t. It’s not longer up to the judge to decide. But (rather) that prosecutor is making that decision, which is not right. That’s what the judge is there for. And these mandatory sentences do not serve a deterrent effect. Crime has not gone down. Crime is just as bad as it was before. Mandatory minimums are applied inconsistently. The prosecutor decides who gets them.”9 Judge George C. Pratt (ret.) Second Circuit Court of Appeals Appointed by Ronald Reagan, 1982 “The irony of a mandated sentence, in the face of our long tradition that trumpets the importance of judicial discretion in sentencing, is not lost on us. The district judge was troubled by the harsh sentence that he was compelled to impose on Madkour, following a process that, in his words, 7 U.S. v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 8 U.S. v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998) (Noonan, J., dissenting). 9 Terry Hatter and Edward Prado, Sentencing – The Miscarriage of Mandatory Minimums, THE CHAMPION, July 1996, at 17. 6 ‘makes a judge a computer,’ automatically imposing sentences without regard to what is right and just." We too are troubled, but unfortunately, have no power to disregard the clear mandate of congress, however ill-advised we might think it to be.”10 Judge Reena Raggi Second Circuit Court of Appeals Appointed by George W.