The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review The Rt Hon Sir Desmond de Silva QC December 2012 Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 12 December 2012 for The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review The Rt Hon Sir Desmond de Silva QC Volume I Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 12 December 2012 HC 802-I London: The Stationery Office £75.00 Two volumes not to be sold separately © Crown copyright 2012 You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or email: [email protected]. Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available for download at www.official-documents.gov.uk This document is also available from our website at www.patfinucanereview.org ISBN: 9780102981087 Printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ID 254679 12/12 23621 19585 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum. Contents Foreword 1 Executive Summary and Principal Conclusions 3 CHAPTER 1 Background to this Review 25 Introduction 25 Interpretation of my Terms of Reference 26 Methodology 31 Previous investigations and the Judgment in Finucane v The United Kingdom 39 The right to life 45 PART 1: THE CONTEXT TO THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE CHAPTER 2 The historical and political context 49 The Northern Ireland Troubles 49 The Anglo-Irish Agreement 50 The security forces 52 The UDA and loyalism in the late 1980s 53 The legal profession 55 The pattern of violence during the late 1980s 56 CHAPTER 3 Intelligence structures 59 The structure and roles of the intelligence agencies 59 Co-ordination of the intelligence machinery 63 The relationship between the intelligence agencies 65 CHAPTER 4 Agent-handling 68 Agent-handling guidelines 69 The operational environment for agent-handling in Northern Ireland 91 CHAPTER 5 Action taken by the security forces to tackle loyalist terrorism 94 The arrest and imprisonment of loyalist terrorists 94 The seizure of loyalist arms in the late 1980s 95 Intelligence operations to frustrate loyalist terrorists 97 iii The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review CHAPTER 6 The recruitment of Brian Nelson 98 Brian Nelson’s background 98 Nelson’s involvement in the attempted murder of T/27 99 Allegations that the State facilitated the illegal importation of weapons 104 The re-recruitment of Nelson in 1987 107 CHAPTER 7 The activities of Brian Nelson 1987–89 118 Nelson’s dissemination of targeting material to loyalists 118 The passing of information from the FRU and the RUC SB to Nelson 132 Nelson’s involvement in the murder of Terence McDaid 145 Nelson’s involvement in the murder of Gerard Slane 150 Nelson, the RUC SB and the murder of James Pratt Craig 154 Nelson’s involvement in other UDA attacks 159 UDA attacks frustrated by the security forces 168 Assessment of the impact of Nelson’s re-recruitment 173 CHAPTER 8 Accountability in the Nelson case 180 The accountability gap 180 Assessment of the FRU 205 The Army chain of command 212 The Security Service and the Nelson case 221 CHAPTER 9 The response of the RUC to threat intelligence 231 Threat intelligence and Article 2 231 The RUC and threat intelligence in the period 1987–89 231 CHAPTER 10 The recruitment and handling of William Stobie 246 The recruitment of William Stobie 246 Stobie’s record as an agent prior to the murder of Patrick Finucane 247 CHAPTER 11 The flow of information from members of the security forces to the UDA 250 The context 250 The scale and nature of leaks from the security forces 251 Action taken to prevent leaks 261 iv The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review PART 2: THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE CHAPTER 12 Overview of the murder of Patrick Finucane 275 The UDA preparations for the attack 275 The shooting of Patrick Finucane 276 Events subsequent to the shooting 276 CHAPTER 13 The theft of the UDR weapon in 1987 277 The theft of the gun by a UDR Colour Sergeant 277 The arrest of Colour Sergeant A/23 278 Warning signs prior to the theft 279 The subsequent disposal of the Browning pistol 280 CHAPTER 14 The comments made by Douglas Hogg MP 282 The circumstances surrounding Douglas Hogg’s comments 283 The reaction to Douglas Hogg’s comments 289 Did Douglas Hogg’s comments incite Patrick Finucane’s murder? 291 CHAPTER 15 Security Service propaganda initiatives 293 The importance of public disclosure 293 The context to the propaganda initiatives 293 The propaganda initiatives 295 CHAPTER 16 The response to threat intelligence relating to Patrick Finucane 303 The context: the threat to Oliver Kelly in 1981 303 The 1981 targeting of Patrick Finucane 307 The 1985 targeting of Patrick Finucane 311 The Security Service and the 1988 threat intelligence 313 CHAPTER 17 The failure to take action against the West Belfast UDA prior to the murder of Patrick Finucane 319 The use of intelligence to arrest terrorist suspects 319 UDA suspects linked to the murder of Patrick Finucane 320 CHAPTER 18 Allegations that RUC officers encouraged the murder of Patrick Finucane 329 Allegations of threats to Patrick Finucane 329 Alleged incitement of loyalists in RUC Castlereagh 333 CHAPTER 19 Allegations that RUC officers facilitated the murder of Patrick Finucane 342 Kenneth Barrett’s allegations 342 Other allegations relating to RUC involvement 361 v The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review CHAPTER 20 The role of Thomas ‘Tucker’ Lyttle and his relationship with RUC officers 365 Background 365 The comments made by ‘Tucker’ Lyttle to journalists 365 Was Lyttle involved in the conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane? 367 Did Lyttle discuss Patrick Finucane with an RUC officer? 369 CHAPTER 21 Brian Nelson and the murder of Patrick Finucane 377 The involvement of Brian Nelson in the murder 377 The FRU’s knowledge of Brian Nelson’s involvement in the murder 399 CHAPTER 22 William Stobie and the murder of Patrick Finucane 416 The Special Branch documentary record 416 Was any action taken as a result of Stobie’s pre-murder intelligence? 418 Stobie’s accounts of events following the telephone call 420 Special Branch records of events following the murder 424 The RUC SB’s failure to act on Stobie’s post-murder intelligence 426 CHAPTER 23 The response of the State to the murder of Patrick Finucane 429 The protection of defence solicitors after the murder 429 The investigation into the murder 433 The recruitment of Kenneth Barrett in 1991 445 CHAPTER 24 The Stevens I Investigation and the prosecution of Brian Nelson 453 The obstruction of the Stevens I Investigation 453 The prosecution of Brian Nelson 470 The evidence given by the former Commanding Officer of the FRU at Brian Nelson’s trial 487 CHAPTER 25 Allegations that Government Ministers sanctioned colllusive activity 495 The UK Government’s approach to loyalist paramilitaries 495 Were Government Ministers briefed on the role of Brian Nelson during the period 1987–89? 497 Allegations that Government Ministers knew about the targeting of Patrick Finucane 499 vi Foreword “… amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace.” 1 These memorable words, spoken by Lord Atkin during a landmark case at the height of the Second World War, have been ever present in my mind during the preparation of this Report. Few words could be more appropriate to the facts and events that my staff and I have explored as we stepped back in time into the Troubles of over 20 years ago, when assassination and torture stalked the political landscape of Northern Ireland. It has been my singular good fortune to have had the support of an outstanding and dedicated team, with a vital grasp of the location and content of the million pages of documents which formed the basis of this Review. The most detailed scrutiny and sifting of intelligence material which gave rise to the bulk of our work was done with true professionalism by my staff, who have worked tirelessly for over a year to help me produce this Report on time. To them I extend my wholehearted thanks and admiration. Their good humour, commitment and unfailing courtesy helped to sustain me during the onerous year it has taken to complete this Review. My gratitude to my permanent staff knows no bounds. To those who came in to assist with certain aspects of this Review I wish to extend my most profound thanks. The Rt Hon Sir Desmond de Silva QC December 2012 1 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 1 Executive Summary and Principal Conclusions 1. Patrick Finucane, a practising lawyer, was murdered in his home in North Belfast on the evening of Sunday 12 February 1989. The attack was carried out by gunmen from the loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), as he sat down for dinner with his wife, Geraldine, and their three young children. Geraldine Finucane was injured in the attack. 2. I was appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 12 October 2011 to conduct an independent Review into the question of State involvement in the murder. On that day the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon David Cameron MP, made the following comments in the House of Commons: “I profoundly believe that the right thing for the Finucane family, for Northern Ireland and for everyone in the United Kingdom is … for the British Government to do the really important thing, which is to open up and tell the truth about what happened 22 years ago.