RUSSOPHOBIC NEUTRALITY: TURKISH DIPLOMACY, 1936-1945 A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History By Onur Isci, M.A. Washington, DC February 27, 2014 Copyright 2014 by Onur Isci All Rights Reserved ii RUSSOPHOBIC NEUTRALITY: TURKISH DIPLOMACY, 1936-1945 Onur Isci, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Mustafa Aksakal, Ph.D ABSTRACT This dissertation tells the story of Soviet-Turkish rivalry during the crucible of World War II. By 1939, Turkey began fast reverting to its old imperial attitude, when Istanbul’s foreign policy had been dictated largely by the Sultan’s fear of Russia. The state of wartime affairs between Ankara and Moscow gradually fell in sharp contrast with the cordial atmosphere of the 1920s and 1930s. As opposed to previous historians who have dismissed Turkey’s wartime neutrality as a wily strategy of capitalizing on war, I argue that the underlying factor, guiding the Turkish state in its quest to remain neutral was the revival of Russophobia amongst the ruling circles in Ankara. There had never been a moment during the war for neither the Allies nor the Axis to depart Turkey from its neutrality unless some form of guarantee had soothed its Russian complex. A closer examination of the Turkish archives and the parliamentary minutes reveals that Turkey desired a German victory over Russia provided that this was followed by a British victory over Germany. In other words, Turks very much hoped to see another Brest-Litovsk status quo: two separate wars involving Germany, conducted independently by Britain and the USSR without cooperation. But, through unleashing Operation Barbarossa, Hitler presented to Churchill one ally as the hereditary enemy of another. By the same token, for both Nazi Germany and Great Britain, Turkey once again became the linchpin in their policy of containing the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastern theatre. iii Overall, my conclusions point to a common fallacy in historical scholarship that construes Turkey’s peculiar neutrality as an attempt to cash in on both warring blocs. On the contrary, I argue that Turkey’s neutrality was precarious, rather than active or cunning, and that, in the face of growing pressure from Moscow between 1939 and 1945, Ankara admitted the need for stronger allies in Western Europe. As the war came to an end, Turkish leadership ultimately stumbled back into the Middle East while seeking to deter Russian encroachment in the region. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the support and assistance of the following people. Firstly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my current and former advisors. I should start by thanking the late Professor Richard Stites, whose “revolutionary dreams” and “utopian visions” shaped my sense of direction in Russian and Soviet history. You are truly and greatly missed. I am equally thankful to my mentor at Georgetown, Professor David Goldfrank. You have been a tremendous advisor for me after Richard’s untimely death. Your guidance in historical scholarship and dazzling perception of life in general has shaped my understanding of our world in academia and beyond. I would also like to thank my dissertation advisor, Professor Mustafa Aksakal, for welcoming my belated quest in Turkish scholarship. Your meticulous feedback and inspiring books encouraged me to look for more transnational connections in studying Turkey’s past. In addition, I thank Professor Gábor Ágoston, who continuously conveyed a spirit of adventure in regards to linguistics and archives, and an excitement in regards to teaching. You have supported me in every stage of my journey in Washington DC, which I shall not forget. I also owe a huge debt of appreciation to my former advisor at Bilkent University in Ankara, Professor Norman Stone, who has been the foremost influential figure in my academic career since 1997. I thank you for encouraging my work, and for allowing me to grow as a young scholar. I am also grateful to Professors Steve Norris of Miami University and Catherine Evtuhov and James Shedel of Georgetown University, who have influenced me greatly in Russian and Habsburg histories and helped me become a passionate historian. I am forever indebted to you and Georgetown’s History Department for their financial support granted through numerous teaching opportunities and an extended overseas research fellowship. v Many friends deserve special thanks for helping me shape the present work. Anita Kondoyanidi and Anton Fedyashin; I am blessed to have found your camaraderie. I thank you for teaching me all things good and Russian in life. Sean McMeekin; you have been a great friend and tutor. I will always admire your multi-tasking abilities between parenthood and writing exceptional history books. Amongst my hilltop fellowship, I am particularly indebted to Binio Binev, John Bowlus, and Emrah Safa Gurkan. At the University of Virginia, I thank my long-time friend and colleague, Barin Kayaoglu, who has contributed to my work greatly through our extended telephone conversations. A big hello goes to my dearest friends and family in Turkey and France. I am truly grateful to each one of you for your compassion and presence in my life. In Petersburg and Istanbul, I thank Sam Hirst and Marc Hoffman for their heartfelt friendship. I am grateful for your ideas and thoughts that inspire mine, and I will always look forward to our next reunion – hopefully with anise-flavored laughter and a table by the Golden Horn. Like brothers you have been to me closer than friends. Last but never the least, I would like to thank my mother, Prof. Gunseli Sonmez-Isci, and my father, Prof. Sedat Isci. Words cannot express my gratitude to you and to all of the sacrifices that you have made on my behalf. Your encouragement and guidance (both academic and otherwise) was what sustained me thus far. Likewise, I am indebted to my grandfather, Prof. Resit Sonmez, who has always inspired me with his devotion to knowledge, and cemented my sense of belonging to university halls. Most of all, I thank my beloved wife, Gamze Ergur Isci, to whom this work is dedicated. You walked me through sleepless nights and lit up those moments when there was no one to answer my queries. It has been a better life than I could ever ask for, and to you I will forever be grateful. ONUR ISCI vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BCA Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Prime Ministerial Republican Archive, Ankara, Turkey). TBMM Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Ceridesi (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1983). IUK Istanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi (Istanbul University Library, Turkey). IAK Istanbul Ataturk Kütüphanesi (Istanbul Ataturk Library, Turkey). DKVP Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970). GPT Dokumenty Ministerstva inostrannykh del. Germanii, vyp II: Germanskaia politika v Turtsii (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946). PRO FO Public Record Office – Foreign Office (London, United Kingdom). DGFP Documents on German Foreign Policy (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt, 1949). FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington DC: GPO, 1952). DBFP Documents in British Foreign Policy (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1954). A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION For all Russian names and words I have used the Library of Congress transliteration system, except in the case of a very few names for which different transliterations are seen recurrently in English-language sources (e.g. Trotsky instead of Trotskii). Likewise, for all Turkish names and words I have followed the modern Turkish spelling, with the exception of a few words that can be found commonly in English dictionaries (e.g. pasha not paşa). When writing about Turks in contexts before 1934, I have given their later surnames in parentheses only at the first instance. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 I: Rebus Sic Stantibus .................................................................................................... 18 II: Eyes on Moscow ....................................................................................................... 57 III: Imperial Visions ..................................................................................................... 103 IV: The Barbarossa Bubble .......................................................................................... 145 V: Turks, Tatars, and Germans .................................................................................... 189 VI: When the Hurlyburly’s Done ................................................................................ 228 VII: Epilogue ............................................................................................................... 258 Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 277 viii INTRODUCTION On a bright Sunday morning on October 29, 1933, Turks celebrated the tenth anniversary of their young republic in Ankara. Hours before the opening of festivities, people from all segments of society – from shop-keepers to students, bureaucrats, and peasants – flooded the narrow streets on the periphery of the recently adorned Red Crescent Square (Kızılay Meydanı). The accomplishments of the new Kemalist regime were displayed in an extravaganza of parades, dances and national hymns, as