Florida Law Review Volume 67 | Issue 2 Article 1 January 2016 Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens United, and SpeechNow Albert W. Alschuler Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr Part of the Election Law Commons Recommended Citation Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens United, and SpeechNow, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 389 (2016). Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Alschuler: Limiting Political Contributions After <i> McCutcheon</i>, <i>Cit LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AFTER MCCUTCHEON, CITIZENS UNITED, AND SPEECHNOW Albert W. Alschuler* Abstract There was something unreal about the opinions in McCutcheon v. FEC. These opinions examined a series of strategies for circumventing the limits on contributions to candidates imposed by federal election law, but they failed to notice that the limits were no longer breathing. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC had created a far easier way to evade the limits than any of those the Supreme Court discussed. SpeechNow held all limits on contributions to super PACs unconstitutional. This Article argues that the D.C. Circuit erred; Citizens United v. FEC did not require unleashing super PAC contributions. The Article also considers what can be said for and against a bumper sticker’s declarations that “MONEY IS NOT SPEECH!” and “CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE!” It proposes a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of campaign-finance regulations that differs from the one currently employed by the Supreme Court. And it proposes a legislative scheme of campaign-finance regulation that would effectively limit contributions while respecting the Supreme Court’s campaign-finance decisions. INTRODUCTION: THE ELEPHANT (OR SUPER PACHYDERM) IN THE ROOM .......................................................................... 392 I. AN OVERVIEW OF THIS ARTICLE ............................................ 407 II. CITIZENS UNITED, SPEECHNOW, AND HOW THESE DECISIONS CHANGED ELECTION LAW ......................... 409 III. HOW CITIZENS UNITED AND SPEECHNOW CHANGED ELECTION FINANCING ............................................ 418 IV. REFLECTIONS ON A BUMPER STICKER .................................... 424 A. “Money Is Not Speech” .................................................. 424 1. Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Wrong (Mostly): The First Amendment Protects the Use of Money to Bring Speech to an Audience ............................................ 424 * Julius Kreeger Professor, Emeritus, the University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to James Phander, Michael Rocca, Sonja Starr, John Stinneford, and Laurence Tribe for valuable comments. 389 Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016 1 Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1 390 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 2. Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Right (Partly): Unlike Other Funds Used to Bring Speech to an Audience, Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Are Conflict-Creating Gifts to Candidates ..................... 425 B. “Corporations Are Not People” .................................... 430 1. Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Wrong (Mostly): The First Amendment Affords Speakers the Same Right as Non-Speakers to Use the Corporate Form of Organization ............................................................ 430 2. Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Right (Partly): The First Amendment Affords No Right to Make Corporate Contributions and Expenditures That Circumvent Valid Limits on Individual Contributions ........................................................... 434 a. Contributions .................................................... 434 i. Corporate Entities Are Not People ........... 434 ii. Limiting and Equalizing Clout ................. 435 iii. Anonymous Clout ..................................... 436 b. Expenditures .................................................... 437 c. Other Regulations ............................................ 440 V. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAMPAIGN-FINANCE REGULATIONS ........................................................................ 441 A. John Hart Ely’s Variation on a Theme by O’Brien ...................................................................... 441 B. Can Campaign Speeches Be Hybrids Too? .................... 442 C. How Deeply Did Buckley Bury O’Brien? ...................... 443 VI. A PROPOSED SCHEME OF CAMPAIGN-FINANCE REGULATION .......................................................................... 445 A. Tracking Individual Contributions ................................. 446 B. Tracking the Money Coming In ...................................... 447 C. Tracking the Money Going Out ...................................... 449 D. Exemptions ..................................................................... 450 E. Independent Expenditures .............................................. 452 1. Drawing the Line ..................................................... 453 2. How Big Is the Loophole? ...................................... 454 a. Groups .............................................................. 454 b. Individuals ........................................................ 454 http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1 2 Alschuler: Limiting Political Contributions After <i> McCutcheon</i>, <i>Cit 2015] LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 391 VII. CONCEPTS OF CORRUPTION .................................................... 457 A. Two-Part Typologies ...................................................... 457 B. Understanding Quid Pro Quo Corruption ..................... 459 1. A Four-Part Typology ............................................. 459 2. Preferential Access .................................................. 460 3. Explicit and Implicit Agreement ............................. 461 4. Conscious Favoritism .............................................. 462 a. The Significance of Buckley v. Valeo .............. 465 b. Decisions Following Buckley ........................... 468 c. McCutcheon ..................................................... 469 VIII. WHY SPEECHNOW ERRED BY STRIKING DOWN LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUPER PACS ......................... 471 A. An Inappropriate Premise .............................................. 471 B. A Better Starting Place ................................................... 474 IX. SUPER PACS AND AGGREGATE CONTRIBUTION LIMITS .................................................................................... 477 X. STORY TIME: OTTO’S FRIENDS EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS ................................................................................... 479 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 481 APPENDIX A: HAVE CITIZENS UNITED AND SPEECHNOW ENDED THE GAME?................................................................. 484 APPENDIX B: THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS I: STATISTICAL AND NON-STATISTICAL EVIDENCE ............................................................................... 487 APPENDIX C: THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS II: THE GENEROSITY OF SHELDON ADELSON .............................. 493 APPENDIX D: THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS III: EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY .......................................................... 498 APPENDIX E: THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS IV: THE APPOINTMENT OFAMBASSADORS .................................... 502 APPENDIX F: PARTISAN ADVANTAGE AND INCUMBENT PROTECTION ........................................................................... 505 Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016 3 Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1 392 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 INTRODUCTION: THE ELEPHANT (OR SUPER PACHYDERM) IN THE ROOM Both the plurality and the dissenting opinions in McCutcheon v. FEC1 seem unreal. At issue in McCutcheon was the validity of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA’s) “aggregate” contribution limits—its limits on the total amounts a person may contribute to all candidates and political committees during a single election cycle. The principal issue dividing the U.S. Supreme Court was whether, in the absence of these limits, donors could evade the BCRA’s “base” limits— its limits on the amount a person may contribute to an individual candidate. The Court held the aggregate limits unconstitutional by a vote of five-to-four.2 In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued that limits on campaign contributions and expenditures should be subject to strict scrutiny—a standard that apparently would invalidate them all.3 The most significant aspect of the McCutcheon decision, however, may be the willingness of the other eight Justices to assume the validity of the base limits and of measures truly necessary to prevent their circumvention.4 The four dissenting Justices described a series of circumvention strategies they feared might follow invalidation of the aggregate limits. These strategies involved multiple political action committees (PACs),5 party committees, joint fundraising committees, and contributions from one campaign to another.6 The dissenters and the four Justices of the plurality debated at length whether the hypothesized scenarios were realistic and whether