Ozili Futur Bus J 2020, 6(1):24 https://doi.org/10.1186/s43093-020-00031-y Future Business Journal RESEARCH Open Access Does competence of central bank governors infuence fnancial stability? Peterson K. Ozili* Abstract This study investigates whether the competence of central bank governors afects the stability of the fnancial sys- tem they are responsible for. Using publicly available information about central bank governors from 2000 to 2016 together with data on fnancial stability and the macroeconomy, the fndings reveal that central bank governors’ com- petence promotes fnancial stability, depending on how competence is measured. Specifcally, the fndings reveal that the fnancial system is more stable when the central bank governor is older and male. The fnancial system is also stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that has a combination of cognitive ability, social capital and tech- nical competence in economics. The gender analyses reveal that the fnancial system is also stable during the tenure of a female central bank governor that has high social capital or high cognitive abilities while the fnancial system is relatively less stable during the tenure of a male central bank governor that has high social capital or high cognitive abilities. Comparing developed countries to developing and transition countries, the fndings reveal that the fnancial system of developed countries is more stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that has high cognitive ability, social capital and technical competence in economics while the fnancial system of developing and transition countries is less stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that has high cognitive ability, social capital and technical competence in economics. Also, there is evidence that the fnancial system of developing and transition countries is more stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that has knowledge in disciplines other than economics. The fndings are consistent with the view that certain characteristics of central bankers shape their beliefs, preferences and choice of policy, which in turn, are consequential for policy outcomes during their tenure. Keywords: Financial stability, Central bank governor, Financial system, Banking stability, Competence, Education, Gender, Financial institutions, Economics JEL Classifcation: G21, G24 Introduction in the economic system [1]. Te central bank governor Every country needs a stable fnancial system. Usually, the is also responsible for ensuring that fnancial institutions head of the government appoints a person who will be in the fnancial sector provide funds to the real sector responsible to manage the fnancial system over a defned for the production of goods and services, thus leading to period of time. We call this individual ‘the central bank economic growth. To achieve the goals of fnancial and governor’, although diferent countries may use diferent macroeconomic stability, central bank governors are names to describe the individual such as ‘chief regula- expected to use their competence—skills, knowledge and tor’, ‘central bank leader’, etc. Te central bank governor experience—and should work with other parties to man- is responsible for fnancial stability in the fnancial sys- age the fnancial and economic system [1]. tem and is also responsible for macroeconomic stability Te competence of central bank governors can infu- ence the extent of fnancial regulation, the severity of *Correspondence: [email protected]; [email protected] regulatory sanctions, the level of systemic risks in the Governor’s Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria fnancial system, the kind of monetary policy decisions © The Author(s) 2020. 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Ozili Futur Bus J 2020, 6(1):24 Page 2 of 20 that are made, how the economy is managed and the type fxed-efect regression methodology, the fndings reveal of interventions in the economy during bad times in a that (1) the central bank governor’s competence pro- country [2]. Romer and Romer [3] show that the choice of motes fnancial stability, (2) the fnancial system is more central bank governor can substantially infuence policy stable during the tenure of a central bank governor that outcomes, especially factors such as some education in is male and older, (3) the fnancial system is also stable economics, experience on Wall Street, experience in pub- during the tenure of a central bank governor that has a lic service and their own writings and statements. Tese combination of cognitive ability, social capital and tech- two studies have shown that the competence of central nical competence in economics. Te fndings from the bank governors can infuence policy outcomes, which gender analyses reveal that the fnancial system is also suggest that competence should be taken into considera- stable during the tenure of a female central bank gover- tion when choosing central bank governors. But no stud- nor that has high social capital or high cognitive ability. ies have examined the relationship between central bank Also, there is evidence that the fnancial system of devel- governors’ competence and fnancial stability, and this is oping and transition countries is more stable during the the gap in the literature which this study seeks to fll. tenure of a central bank governor that has knowledge in Existing studies on fnancial stability focus largely on disciplines other than economics. fnancial crisis scenarios and stress testing [4, 5], fnan- Tis paper makes several contributions to the litera- cial stability determinants [6, 7], the efect of central bank ture. Firstly, we add to the fnancial stability literature by governor changes on stock markets [8], the efect of past introducing the competence of the central bank gover- employment and educational characteristics of central nor as a determinant of fnancial stability. Secondly, the bank governors in the design of fnancial regulation [1] study contributes to the literature that examine the efect and the factors that propagate contagion in fnancial sys- of central bank governors’ characteristics on fnancial tems [9, 10]. But these studies did not explore the role of regulation (see [1, 2, 8]). Tese studies show that certain the competence of central bank governors in infuenc- characteristics of central bank governors can infuence ing the policies that fnancial stability depends on. Tis the dynamics of fnancial regulation. Finally, our analysis paper is the frst attempt to examine the relationship contributes to the literature that identify the determi- between central bank governor’s competence and fnan- nants of fnancial crises (see [7, 13]). Te analysis in this cial stability. study focuses on established indicators of fnancial stabil- Does the competence of the central bank governor ity and shows how stability outcomes may depend on the afect fnancial stability? Tis is the question we address competence of central bank governors. in this paper. If a new central bank governor is appointed Te rest of the paper is organised as follows. ‘Teoreti- by the government on the basis of competence alone, will cal framework’ section presents the theoretical frame- superior (or poor) competence be the reason for fnan- work. ‘Related literature and hypothesis development’ cial stability (or instability)? Surprisingly, there is scant section presents the related literature and develops the empirical research addressing this question. We focus on hypothesis. ‘Methods’ section presents the data and ‘competence’ which is a specifc characteristic of central methodology. ‘Results and discussion’ section reports the bank governors. In the literature, competence is a char- empirical results. ‘Conclusion’ section concludes. acteristic of an individual that has been shown to drive superior job performance [11, p. 107], such as visible Theoretical framework knowledge, skill, experience and other underlying ele- Upper echelon theory ments of competencies like traits and motives [12]. We Te competence of central bank governors can be under- focus on the ‘competence’ of the central bank governor stood in the context of upper echelon theory. Upper ech- because of the prevailing view in central banking settings elon theory is a management theory which states that an that the central bank governor’s experience and compe- organisation is a refection of the characteristics of its tence is an important determinant of which policies are top-level management team [14]. It argues that the stra- implemented and which policies are not implemented tegic decisions and policies adopted by members of an during their tenure [1]. Yet, research in fnance and eco- organisation’s upper echelon are a refection