UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title First, the Bad News: Opposition Media in Authoritarian Regimes Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/488535rm Author McGreevy-Stafford, Eoghan Wallace Publication Date 2020 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles First, the Bad News: Opposition Media in Authoritarian Regimes A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Eoghan Wallace McGreevy-Stafford 2020 c Copyright by Eoghan Wallace McGreevy-Stafford 2020 ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION First, the Bad News: Opposition Media in Authoritarian Regimes by Eoghan Wallace McGreevy-Stafford Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2020 Professor Barbara Geddes, Chair Why do dictatorships sometimes allow opposition groups to publish media, but at other times forbid opposition media? I propose a theory that dictators tolerate opposition media selectively in order to limit protests. I formalize the theory in a signaling model, from which I derive several testable empirical implications. I illustrate the logic of the theory with a case study of the Ben Ali dictatorship in Tunisia during its first five years (1987-1992), based in part on interviews I carried out in Tunisia. I show how the theory explains variation in Ben Ali's willingness to allow opposition media, across both time and opposition groups. To test the implications of the model quantitatively, I construct a panel dataset on ten Arab countries with authoritarian regimes during 1992-2017. The data measure which regimes allowed opposition groups to produce media in which years and are based on my research on a wide range of opposition groups (of various ideologies and legal statuses) and of media ii (including newspapers, websites, and TV channels). I find that dictators allow opposition media when their regimes are most likely to survive an uprising, in order to signal their strength to citizens and discourage them from protesting. In particular, in years when authoritarian regimes experience strong economic performance | including low unemployment, high economic growth, and plentiful revenue from oil and natural gas | they are far more likely to permit opposition media. After the \Arab Spring" uprisings of 2011 revealed that the region's authoritarian regimes were more vulnerable to mass unrest than they previously appeared, those regimes became much less likely to tolerate opposition media. By advancing a new theory and analyzing original empirical evidence, this study contributes to our understanding of why media freedom varies in authoritarian regimes. iii The dissertation of Eoghan Wallace McGreevy-Stafford is approved. Michael S. Y. Chwe James D DeNardo Tim Joseph Groeling Daniel Simon Treisman Barbara Geddes, Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2020 iv I dedicate this work to Ceren, with boundless gratitude and love. v Contents Abstract ii Dissertation Committee iv Dedication v List of Figures xii List of Tables xviii Acknowledgments xix Vita xxiii vi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 My Argument in Brief . .3 1.2 Why study this question in Arab countries? . .5 1.3 Outline of the Study . .5 2 Amplifying Pessimism: A Theory of Opposition Media Under Dictatorship 8 2.1 Argument . 10 2.2 Literature Review . 20 2.3 Model . 28 2.4 Equilibria . 31 2.5 Empirical Implications . 36 3 \A Weird Period": Opposition Media in Tunisia, 1987-1992 42 3.1 Background . 45 3.2 Variation in state tolerance for opposition media across groups and time . 46 vii 3.3 Why the difference in media policies for the secularist and Islamist opposition? 50 3.4 Why Ben Ali first prohibited and later allowed Islamist media . 51 3.5 Why Ben Ali cracked down on Islamist media . 58 3.6 Why secular opposition newspapers were shut down, but only briefly . 61 3.7 Conclusion . 63 4 \Constructive Criticism": A Cross-National Study of Opposition Media in Arab Authoritarian Regimes 65 4.1 The Arab Region Since the Cold War . 68 4.2 A Dataset of Arab Opposition Media . 76 4.3 Explanatory Variables . 94 4.4 Methodology . 106 4.5 Main Findings . 108 4.6 Alternative Specifications . 117 4.7 Conclusion . 134 viii 5 Conclusion 140 5.1 Summary of Findings . 141 5.2 Contributions of this Study . 144 5.3 Limitations of this Study and Suggestions for Future Research . 147 5.4 Conclusion . 151 Appendix 1: Proof of result in model 152 Appendix 2: Regime Narratives 154 Appendix 3: Opposition Group Narratives 171 Appendix 4: Opposition Media Narratives 202 Appendix 5: Regime Leaders 229 Appendix 6: Histograms of continuous explanatory variables 241 Appendix 7: Dropping one regime at a time: tolerated 246 ix Appendix 8: Dropping one regime at a time: banned 269 Appendix 9: Alternative coding of main opposition 292 References 294 x List of Figures 4.1 Significant opposition groups per regime-year . 87 4.2 tolerated over time: Algeria-Egypt . 95 4.3 tolerated over time: Jordan-Morocco . 96 4.4 tolerated over time: Sudan-Yemen . 97 4.5 banned over time: Algeria-Egypt . 98 4.6 banned over time: Egypt-Jordan . 99 4.7 banned over time: Kuwait-Morocco . 100 4.8 banned over time: Sudan-Yemen . 101 4.9 Residuals . 112 xi 4.10 Cook's Distances . 112 4.11 Partial regression plot: unemployment . 114 4.12 Partial regression plot: fuel revenue per capita . 114 5.1 Distribution of unemployment rate (percentage) . 241 5.2 Distribution of annual GDP per capita growth (percentage) . 242 5.3 Distribution of fuel revenue per capita (2018 USD) . 242 5.4 Distribution of oil revenue per capita (2018 USD) . 243 5.5 Distribution of natural gas revenue per capita (2018 USD) . 243 5.6 Distribution of years regime leader has been in power . 244 5.7 Distribution of fuel revenue per capita (2018 USD), given greater than 0 . 244 5.8 Distribution of oil revenue per capita (2018 USD), given greater than 0 . 245 5.9 Distribution of natural gas revenue per capita (2018 USD), given greater than 0245 xii List of Tables 4.1 Regimes included in the dataset . 86 4.2 Bans and Toleration of Opposition Media . 94 4.3 Explanatory Variables (continuous and integer) . 105 4.4 Explanatory Variables (binary) . 106 4.5 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE) . 110 4.6 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), continued . 111 4.7 Effect sizes of focal variables . 115 4.8 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE) . 118 4.9 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), continued . 119 xiii 4.10 Tolerated Opposition Media (Country FE) . 121 4.11 Tolerated Opposition Media (Country FE), continued . 122 4.12 Opposition Media Bans (Country FE) . 123 4.13 Opposition Media Bans (Country FE), continued . 124 4.14 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), disaggregated fuel . 125 4.15 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), disaggregated fuel, continued . 126 4.16 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), disaggregated fuel . 127 4.17 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), disaggregated fuel, continued . 128 4.18 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE, OLS vs Logistic) . 130 4.19 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE, OLS vs Logistic), continued . 131 4.20 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE, OLS vs Logistic) . 132 4.21 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE, OLS vs Logistic), continued . 133 4.22 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE, alternative coding of main groups) 135 xiv 4.23 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE, alternative coding of main groups), continued . 136 4.24 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE, alternative coding of main groups) . 137 4.25 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE, alternative coding of main groups), continued . 138 5.1 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), dropped Algeria 1992-NA . 247 5.2 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), continued, dropped Algeria 1992-NA248 5.3 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), dropped Bahrain 1971-NA . 249 5.4 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), continued, dropped Bahrain 1971-NA250 5.5 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), dropped Egypt 1952-2011 . 251 5.6 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), continued, dropped Egypt 1952-2011252 5.7 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), dropped Egypt 2011-2012 . 253 5.8 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), continued, dropped Egypt 2011-2012254 5.9 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), dropped Egypt 2013-NA . 255 5.10 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), continued, dropped Egypt 2013-NA 256 xv 5.11 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), dropped Jordan 1946-NA . 257 5.12 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), continued, dropped Jordan 1946-NA258 5.13 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), dropped Kuwait 1961-NA . 259 5.14 Tolerated Opposition Media (Regime FE), continued, dropped Kuwait 1961-NA260 5.15 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), dropped Mauritania 2008-NA . 261 5.16 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), continued, dropped Mauritania 2008-NA262 5.17 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), dropped Morocco 1956-NA . 263 5.18 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), continued, dropped Morocco 1956-NA 264 5.19 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), dropped Sudan 1989-NA . 265 5.20 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), continued, dropped Sudan 1989-NA . 266 5.21 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), dropped Yemen 1978-2012 . 267 5.22 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), continued, dropped Yemen 1978-2012 268 5.23 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), dropped Algeria 1992-NA . 270 5.24 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), continued, dropped Algeria 1992-NA . 271 xvi 5.25 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), dropped Bahrain 1971-NA . 272 5.26 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), continued, dropped Bahrain 1971-NA 273 5.27 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), dropped Egypt 1952-2011 . 274 5.28 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), continued, dropped Egypt 1952-2011 . 275 5.29 Opposition Media Bans (Regime FE), dropped Egypt 2011-2012 .