Samuel KEMBOU NZALE, PhD October. 2020 Email: [email protected] | Phone: +41 79 801 15 53 67 Avenue de Chillon, 1820 Montreux – Switzerland. CURRENT POSITION Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Lausanne University (Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration). RECENT EMPLOYMENT HISTORY INNOVATIONS FOR POVERTY ACTION (IPA) – Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) Country Representative and Research Manager Sept. 2018 – Sept 2020 • Overseeing project design and budgeting; • Building systems and structures to build staff capacity and ensure overall data quality; • Working closely with IPA M&E unit to implement projects and support NGOs, social businesses, funders and governments to be smarter users of data and evidence; • Identifying priority research questions and key concerns for policymakers in Cote d’Ivoire. AIX-MARSEILLE UNIVERSITY (AMU) & UNIVERSITY OF LYON (UdL) Assistant Lecturer Sept 2014 – Sept 2019 • University of Lyon (2014-2015); assistant lecturer in Macroeconomics & Growth; Economics of Information • University of Aix-Marseille (2017-2019); assistant lecturer in Statistics, Industrial Organization and Microeconomics. RESEARCH-HEALTH & DEVELOPMENT (RSD) – Yaoundé (Cameroon) Junior Research Associate Sept 2012 – Aug. 2013 Involved in two projects: one related to access to glycated hemoglobin test for diabetic patients and another that aimed at developing a system for the collection, treatment and analysis of data on road traffic accidents in Cameroon • Hiring and management of enumerators (team of 10-15 enumerators) • Overseeing data quality checks • Public relationship manager with policy makers in the sector of transports EDUCATION PHD IN ECONOMICS (2019) Aix-Marseille School of Economics • Thesis title: Essays on healthcare providers’ incentives and motivations • Visiting fellow, Dartmouth college (January 2018) and Cambridge University (April -Sept. 2018) • 2019-thesis prize of Aix-Marseille University Master’s in Game Theory, Econometrics and Experimental Economics (2015) University of Lyon; Jean Monnet University of Saint-Etienne (Eiffel Excellence scholarship) Bachelor’s in Economics and Management: Money, Banking and Finance (2011) University of Yaoundé 2, Faculty of Economics and Management Summer trainings: a. Experimental economics. Tinbergen institute, summer 2017 (Amsterdam, Holland). b. Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models, summer 2018 (Prague, Czech Republic). 1/2 RESEARCH ACTIVITIES PUBLISHED WORK • Regulation and Altruism (with Izabela Jelovac), Journal of Public Economic Theory,2020;22:49–68 • Inequalities in access to personalized medicine in France (with Bill Weeks et al.), PLOS ONE, (forthcoming) SELECTED WORK IN PROGRESS • Physicians’ responses to previous exposure to Pay-For-Performance Incentives: Experimental evidence • Physicians’ incentives to use personalized medicine techniques (with David Bardey and Bruno Ventelou), Revise and Resubmit Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization • Using Mobile Technology to Improve Early Childhood Development in Remote Areas: Evidence from Ivory Coast (with Bastien Michel), RCT ID AEARCTR-0005746 • Objective and performance contracts and education quality: evidence from Côte d’Ivoire (with Kaja Jasinka & Amy Ogan) • Promoting learning and reducing child labor in Cote d’Ivoire through family- and school-based interventions (with Sharon Wolf, Kaja Jasinka & Amy Ogan) JOB MARKET PAPER’S ABSTRACT Physicians’ responses to previous exposure to Pay-For-Performance Incentives: Experimental evidence I report on short term effects of withdrawing Pay-For-Performance (P4P) incentives. I experimentally mimic the physician-patient relationship through a text proofreading assignment with prospective physicians as the subject pool. Physicians' exposure to P4P incentives is randomly decided to be either anterior or posterior to Fee-For-Service (FFS) or CAP (Capitation) payment systems. I compare ``treated physicians'' (those exposed to P4P incentives before FFS or CAP payment systems) to ``control physicians'' (those exposed to FFS or CAP payment systems as their first experimental condition). P4P is constructed to remunerate only proofreading actions that are beneficial to the patient. I find that exposure to P4P incentives reduces the overall quantity of care provided. This reduction does not have the same consequence in FFS and CAP plans: in a FFS plan, quality is crowded-in while in a CAP plan, intrinsic motivation is crowded out. Policy makers should be aware of this heterogeneous response when designing P4P incentives. LANGUAGE, IT SKILLS 1. LANGUAGES French (Native); English (Fluent); Spanish (Basic) 2. IT R, STATA, GEODA, Microsoft Office RECENT ACADEMIC CONFERENCES 1. February 2020, University of Lyon (France): ADRES conference 2. September 2018, University of Catania (Italy): 5th European Health Economic Association’s PhD Student-Supervisor and Early Career Researcher Conference 3. June 2018, University of Cambridge (United Kingdom): Cambridge Theory Workshop; 4. June 2018, University of Bordeaux (France): 34th Applied Microeconomics Days; 5. March 2018, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, (Belgium): Invited 6. September 2016, University of Lyon, GATE LSE (France): Invited 7. June 2016, University of Ottawa (Canada): 15th Canadian Health Economists’ Workshop 8. May 2016, University of Hamburg (Germany): 17th European Health Economics Workshop 2/2 .