PALESTINE: SALVAGING FATAH Middle East Report N°91 – 12 November 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION: FATAH’S DECLINE...................................................................... 1 II. THE SIXTH GENERAL CONFERENCE ..................................................................... 5 A. REGIONAL ELECTIONS AND FIELD ORGANISATION.......................................................................6 B. ABBAS TAKES CONTROL..............................................................................................................8 C. CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ......................................................................................................12 III. OUTCOME...................................................................................................................... 14 A. LEADERSHIP ..............................................................................................................................14 B. POLITICAL PROGRAM.................................................................................................................18 IV. CHALLENGES AHEAD................................................................................................ 20 A. REORGANISING FATAH AND DEFINING ITS ROLE .......................................................................20 B. THE STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS...........................................................................................25 C. RELATIONS WITH HAMAS ..........................................................................................................26 V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF ISRAEL/WEST BANK/GAZA STRIP.......................................................................................30 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................31 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2006 ...32 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................34 Middle East Report N°91 12 November 2009 PALESTINE: SALVAGING FATAH EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Why should anyone care about Fatah’s fate? The 50-year- privileges of government positions. It sought hegemony old movement, once the beating heart of Palestinian over the PA even as it paid lip service to pluralism. It did nationalism, is past its prime, its capacity to mobilise not bring its political agenda up to date or adapt it to a withered. Racked by internal divisions, it lost the latest shifting environment. It resisted renewal of its leader- and only truly competitive election in Palestinian Author- ship, marginalising generations of activists and depriv- ity (PA) history. It promised to fight for liberation, ing the movement of necessary lifeblood. Worst of all, achieve independence by negotiation and effectively it failed to respond to or learn from a long list of devas- manage daily lives through the PA yet achieved none of tating setbacks: the second intifada and the ensuing this. Those yearning for resistance can turn to Hamas devastation of the PA; Hamas’s electoral victories, be- or Islamic Jihad; the address for diplomacy is the PLO; ginning with municipal elections in 2004 and 2005 and governance depends on Prime Minister Fayyad in the culminating with the parliamentary elections of 2006; West Bank, the Islamists in Gaza. President Abbas’ threat the Islamists’ takeover of Gaza in 2007; and the bank- not to run in upcoming presidential elections is the latest ruptcy of the peace process. sign of a movement and project adrift. Yet Fatah’s diffi- culties do not make it expendable; they make it an organi- Fatah’s General Conference, which took place in Beth- sation in urgent need of redress. A strong national move- lehem, signalled awareness that something dramatic had ment is needed whether negotiations succeed and an to be done. In many ways – beginning with the fact that agreement must be promoted, or they fail and an alter- it was held at all – it exceeded expectations. In the con- native project must be devised. Fatah’s August General ference run-up, the movement organised an unprecedented Conference – its first in twenty years – was a first step. number of regional elections to designate participants, Now comes the hard part: to define the movement’s renewing leadership at many levels; at the conference agenda, how it plans to carry it out, and with whom. itself, governing bodies – the Central and Revolutionary Council committees – long dormant, were reactivated. Fatah’s problems by no means are entirely of its own The vast majority of successful candidates are new to doing. They are an outgrowth of the singular Palestin- official leadership; unlike their predecessors, they grew ian experience: still under occupation yet already in the up in the occupied territories, giving them greater famili- process of state-building; clinging to the notion of armed arity with those among whom they live. Abbas emerged struggle even as it embarked on negotiations. The nation- with new legitimacy, finally stepping out from his prede- alist movement first benefited from this condition: as cessor’s shadow. There were glitches, some significant. the dominant faction in the PLO and the core of the PA A large majority of conference delegates ultimately were when it was established in the mid-1990s, it controlled not elected but appointed by fiat. Heavy-handed control the diplomatic agenda, ran the government and, largely of the conference amid widespread accusations of elec- through its charismatic founder, Yasser Arafat, retained toral fraud left some feeling that they had been manipu- the mantle of resistance. The balancing act soon became lated, assigned bit parts in a piece of political theatre unsustainable. Governance afforded an opportunity to that was decided elsewhere. Still, many saw this as an dispense patronage, but its corollary, corruption, earned important stage in revitalising the movement’s internal the movement public scorn. Fatah was saddled with a organisation and presence on the ground. moribund peace process. In 2004, it mourned the loss of its leader. If Fatah moved toward internal reform in Bethlehem, it fell short when it came to its other major challenge: to But if Fatah did not create its own predicament, it has clarify its political purpose and project as well as rela- been remarkably uninspired in seeking to overcome it. tions with the PA, President Abbas and Hamas. Speaking The movement allowed its institutions to wither and rank- to Fatah members, high and low, is instructive, not so and-file militants to drift, as its elite sought perks and much for what they say as for what they do not: despite Palestine: Salvaging Fatah Crisis Group Middle East Report N°91, 12 November 2009 Page ii a 31-page political program, few can clearly explain let Whether to develop a strategy of non-violent, popular alone agree on what the movement stands for; how it resistance: the conference paid homage to the notion ought to react if the peace process remains paralysed; of armed struggle, and delegates reacted enthusiasti- whether it can or should engage in non-violent, mass cally at its mention. But the concept has shown its protest; how to deal with Hamas or how to reunite Gaza moral failing as well as political shortcomings and, in with the West Bank. practice, Fatah has moved on. The issue is whether it can devise a strategy between violence and passiv- The challenges facing Fatah will likely only heighten ity in which forms of popular action would have in coming months. The last few weeks provided a stark pride of place and which would provide a way for- illustration in the form of two successive political mis- ward if negotiations toward a two-state solution fail. haps that damaged Abbas’s – and by extension, albeit indirectly, Fatah’s – credibility: the Palestinian presi- How to relate to the PA: Fatah is a national libera- dent’s decision to attend a trilateral meeting with Israeli tion movement, yet since the Oslo years it has merged Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. Presi- with a government. This overly promiscuous relation- dent Obama despite the absence of an Israeli settlement ship tarred the movement as corrupt, while demobi- freeze; and, far more injurious, his decision to postpone lising and disorienting its cadres. Fatah will have to consideration of Justice Richard Goldstone’s report on decide whether it wishes to administer the occupied the December-January 2009 Gaza war at the UN Human territories and build state-like institutions or prefers Rights Council. to focus on its liberation agenda, disengage from the PA and let it govern. The future will not be more kind: Israeli-Palestinian talks What to do with Hamas: Reconciliation will depend appear at a standstill, U.S. diplomacy at the mercy of on the actions of both movements, not just Fatah, and events, rather than in control of them; inter-Palestinian on the views of outside actors, not merely Palestini- talks are at an impasse; a competent, independent and ans. Fatah, nonetheless, will have to assess for itself politically savvy prime minister is becoming stronger at whether national unity is a priority, whether it is pre- the PA’s helm; and Abbas has ordered