GRENFELL FIRE GRENFELL FIRE Why were so many failed? About 80 people lost ix weeks ago, we lived in a more person. Unlike in previous national disasters, innocent time. It was possible to such as Hillsborough, in 2017 the voices of their lives in the smoke believe in a robust system of regula- the Grenfell residents and survivors are likely tion and enforcement that was driv- to be heard loud and clear throughout the and flames of Grenfell Sing fi re risk down, that residents of high-rise inquiry. So it’s through their eyes that we have Tower. The disaster blocks were no less safe than those of us who to look at Building Regulations, in particu- live closer to the ground, and that the con- lar the fi re safety requirements in Approved has exposed shocking struction sector and building control failures, and shocking inspectors were working to standards that protected public safety. But that There was a systemic complacency. Elaine was the past, and now we live in a world where regulation, enforcement breakdown in fire safety Knutt looks at the and accountability failed at least 80 residents of Grenfell Tower who were regulation and governance. regulations that should killed in horrifi c circumstances. Decisions are disjointed ... As the Grenfell Tower inquiry gets have kept people safe underway, Health and Safety at Work with not enough regard for has asked architects, fi re sector repre- fire safety” sentatives, construction experts and lawyers for their view on what contrib- Celestine Cheong, Fire Protection Association uted to the disaster. And while no one wants to pre-judge criminal and civil proceedings, or make assumptions on what Document B (AD B); and the system of fi re went wrong, it’s right to bring that scrutiny risk assessments brought in by the Regulatory to bear: it’s been argued that lack of media Reform (Fire Safety) Order. interest was one reason why known regula- Thomas Roche, chair of the built environ- tory weaknesses and fi re risks persisted. ment workstream at the Fire Sector Federa- One theme that emerges is that regula- tion, which aims to shape policy on fi re safety, tion around fi re safety was too disconnected, says there were “gaps” in accountability. “Do ambiguous and impenetrable for the lay we have the right priority on fi re and the right 18 August 2017 | healthandsafetyatwork.com 23 GRENFELL FIRE Marco Gott ardi Gloria Trevisan 22 Raymond Bernard Zainab Choucair Fathia Hasan Mierna Choucair Hania Hasan Fati ma Choucair Rania Ibrahim Bassam Choucair Hesham Rahman Nadia Choucair Mohamed Neda Sirria Choucair Fathia Alsanousi Firdaws Hashim Abufars Ibrahim Yaqub Hashim Esra Ibrahim Yahya Hashim Hashim Kedir Nura Jamal Ligaya Moore 21 Anthony Disson Mehdi El-Wahabi Mariem Elgwahry Nur Huda El-Wahabi Yasin El-Wahabi 20 Fouzia El-Wahabi Mary Ajaoi Augustus Mendy Abdul Aziz El-Wahabi Khadija Saye Malak Belkadi 19 Leena Belkadi Deborah Lamprell Farah Hamdan Ernie Vital Omar Belkadi Marjorie Vital Jessica Urbano Ramirez Mohamednur Tuccu Amaya Tuccu 16 Amal Ahmedin Sheila Smith 18 15 Fati ma Afrasehabi Steven Power Sakineh Afrasehabi Isaac Paulos Hamid Kani Biruk Haft om 17 f-caption f-caption f-caption f-caption Vincent Chiejina 14 Brkite Haft om Mohammed Abdul Hanif Mohammed Abdul Hamid Denis Murphy Husna Begum Mohammed Alhajali Rebeya Begum Jeremiah Deen Kamru Miah Zainab Deen Khadija Khalloufi 11 Abdeslam Sebbar Ali Yawar Jafari + GRENFELL’S VICTIMS Out of 350 people who were supposed to be in Grenfell Tower on 14 June, the Met- ropolitan Police confi rmed on 10 July that 255 people survived, 14 were elsewhere at the ti me, and around 80 lost their lives. The BBC has compiled informati on about the victi ms of the fi re, naming 64 of the 80 individuals who died. Their names appear above. Thirty-two victi ms have been identi fi ed by the coroner: their names are in bold, although not all 32 have been named. The informati on above is accurate as of 13 July. healthandsafetyatwork.com | August 2017 19 STRAP GRENFELL FIRE controls in place to insist on that priority? contributed to the Grenfell disaster. But the explained that it expected the inner fi lling Have we got a consolidated approach across weeks following the fi re have seen a consist- inside the Aluminium Composite Material the government and the sector? We’ve created ent focus on the materials used in the tower’s (ACM) “rainscreen” cladding panels to meet gaps: not intentionally, but just by the nature £8.7m refurbishment, following shocking a “limited combustibility” standard. But of the complexity of the building process. The video evidence of a strip of fl ame reaching up many construction teams – and presumably sticking plaster solution would be clearer the corner of the building by 1.30 am on 14 building control inspectors too – relied on an guidance on material specifi cation, but that June. The investigations might conclude that interpretation of AD B that suggested that a wouldn’t fi x the overall issues.” the fi re also spread within poorly-compart- building’s external surface at heights over At the Fire Protection Association, which mentalised fl oors, or in risers. But it seems 18m simply had be “Class 0” for the spread had pressed the government to implement obvious the blaze would not have been so and propagation of fi re. In the DCLG’s inter- the recommendations of the Lakanal House deadly if the building had not been reclad. pretation, the Class 0 “external surface” was coroner on re-writing AD B for clarity, spokes- The immediate questions on the Gren- the external face of the panel; others thought person Celestine Cheong says that Grenfell fell refurbishment, which reportedly had it referred to the entire panel as a whole. highlights a “broken system”. “There was a 16 building control inspections from the As many have highlighted, AD B is very systemic breakdown in fire safety regula- council, soon widened into a national issue. A complex, off ering multiple alternative routes tion and governance. Decisions about design government testing programme found that at to compliance, and zig-zag references to strategies, products, techniques, certifi cation, least 190 other high-rises featured rainscreen appendices, tables and other guidance: hous- competency and auditing are made in a dis- cladding that failed its combustibility test. If ing architect Julia Park, writing in Building jointed and often ineff ective and inconsistent the Grenfell refurb team, led by contractor Design, calculated that AD B makes reference manner, with less regard for fi re safety than Rydon, had misinterpreted the Regulations, to no fewer than 93 other documents. should be the case.” then so had hundreds of others across 51 local Rudi Klein, a barrister and chief executive authorities. of the Specialist Engineering Contractors’ National cladding crisis The explanation is found in AD B, which Group, says: “[Building Regulations] are not It seems clear that multiple failures – from has not been comprehensively revised since drafted in a prescriptive way, they don’t say the council’s “value engineering” to opera- 2006. On 2 July, the Department for Com- ‘you shall’, they’re drafted in terms of out- tional issues at London Fire Brigade – all munities and Local Government (DCLG) comes. They need to be easily understood by + CLADDING FIRE TIMELINE Abdallah Adel/NurPhoto/REX/Shutt erstock Adel/NurPhoto/REX/Shutt Abdallah Ben Curti s/PA Archive/PA Images Archive/PA s/PA Curti Ben Xinhua News Agency/REX/Shutt erstock Agency/REX/Shutt News Xinhua Wooden Pegg/YouTube Wooden JUNE 1999 MAY 2012 NOVEMBER 2014 FEBRUARY 2015 DECEMBER 2015 Garnock Court, Irvine Mermoz Tower, France Lacrosse, Melbourne Marina Torch, Dubai The Address, Dubai The flats had been given The Roubai x tower had More than 400 people A fire started on the Fire engulfed the 63 sto- new of floor-to-ceiling been refurbished and were evacuated when 51st floor of the 86 rey hotel on New Year’s unplasticised polyvinyl reclad nine years before a fire that started on storey tower, thought Eve, the third major chloride (uPVC) window the fire killed one person an eighth floor balcony to have been started blaze in Dubai after the units. When a fire started and injured six. The spread vertically to the by a cigarette or shisha Tamweel in 2012 and on the fifth floor, a vertical refurbishment included roof within 10 to 15 coal left on a balcony. the Marina Torch in ribbon blazed. A 55-year- adding metal compos- minutes. The build- Eyewitness video shows 2015. Sixteen people old man died. A House of ite cladding above the ing was clad in 4mm large quantities of burn- suffered minor injuries. Commons Select com- ground floor: the panels aluminium composite ing material falling from The cladding on The mittee report questioned had a 3mm polyethyl- material (ACM) panels a high-level fire starting Address was described the fire tests under AD ene core sandwiched with a polyethylene a secondary fire at a by supplier Alumco as B at the time. In 2000, between two 0.5mm core, from Alucobest. lower level. The Marina an ACM with a poly- the Regulations were aluminium sheets. Investigations found that was among the 70% of ethylene core material. changed, introducing the According to one they had not been tested the high-rise develop- Similar products were BS 8414 test. But other researcher, residents in accordance with ments in Dubai clad with used routinely in Dubai’s compliance routes and were concerned about the relevant Australian aluminium composite building boom, but were ambiguities remained. the quality of the refit.