Briefing nr. 5 2019 The breakdown of nuclear arms control and its implications Dr. Stefan Forss Introduction Russian interest. It reduced the U.S. strategic arsenal, and The important but cumbersome bilateral nuclear arms more importantly, delayed U.S. response to Russia’s nuc- control process between the United States and the Soviet lear build-up, which already was well on its way, not only in Union and later Russian Federation, a result of genuine the strategic field, but also in INF and short-range weapon efforts leading to impressive legally binding nuclear arms systems. This was the starting point of a process, which has control treaties (INF 1987, START 1991, START II 1993), led to a situation where nuclear arms control between the ran into trouble in the early 2000s. Presidents George W. two major nuclear powers is on the verge of collapse. Bush and Vladimir Putin couldn’t agree on how to proceed. American officials believe Russia began conducting flight Missile defense was a key priority for the Bush adminis- tests of a missile, prohibited by the INF treaty as early as 3 tration which decided to withdraw from the 1972 land- 2008. The U.S. informed NATO of Russia’s treaty breach 4 mark ABM treaty, effective 13 June 2002. President Vladi- in January 2014. At that time the particular missile type mir Putin responded in kind and declared that Russia no was not yet disclosed. longer was bound by START II.1 That treaty specifically This dispute between Russia and the U.S. was not solved prohibited multiple warheads (MIRV) on strategic ICBM and finally the Trump administration, with its open dislike missiles and heavy ICBMs, such as the huge SS-18 Satan for bilateral or multilateral agreements constraining the missile altogether. USA, drew its own conclusions. For the Russian political and military leadership U.S. mis- st The U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, the 1 of sile defense, however limited in quantity and performance February 2019 announced the U.S. withdrawal from the capability, was perceived as too threatening in the long INF treaty, an agreement which eliminated ground-based run. Vocal objections from Russian missile professionals ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and missile launchers in and designers claiming overwhelming superiority of Rus- the 500 – 5 500 km range. Legally, the INF treaty would sia’s offensive missiles over any missile defense systems for be terminated six months later. The decision was widely decades to come, were dismissed.2 5 feared to lead to an arms race. Russia embarked upon a vigorous program to rebuild its strategic nuclear forces. The New START treaty, which 3 Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite came into force in February 2011, was however still in the Treaty, The New York Times, 29 January 2014 4 Jonathan Marcus, US briefs Nato on Russian ‘nuclear treaty 1 Caroline Wyatt, Russia abandons Start II arms treaty, BBC breach’, BBC News, 30 January 2014 News, 14 June 2002 5 Anne Gearan, Paul Sonne och Carol Morello, U.S. to withdraw 2 Russian Nukes Not Undercut by U.S. Missile Defense, State Expert from arms control treaty with Russia, raising fears of a new arms Says, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 18 March, 2011 race with Russia, The Washington Post, 1 February 2019 www.frivarld.se @freeworldforum [email protected] /FreeWorldForum Briefing nr. 5 2019 The following day, Russia reacted with an equivalent with INF-ranges. President Putin approved Shoigu’s decision.6 President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov and request but insisted on not getting into an arms race and Defense Minister Shoigu, looked theatrically serious when said the program should be carried out within the stated they assured that they had done everything in their power defense budget, which Shoigu confirmed.9 to save the treaty, which the U.S. had violated. As a part of “Arms race” is obviously a relative term, but the rhetoric of the U.S. missile shield in Europe, they had already in 2014 president Putin is intelligible even from the fact that Rus- started to deploy Mk 41 launchers which also could be sia has progressed far in its dedicated and INF-violating used for firing Tomahawk cruise missiles at Russia.7 programme. The Russian approach may have some legal relevance, but from a practical standpoint it is absurd. The character of The USSR’s investment in INF-missiles the European missile shield – known as European Phased Soviet’s quantitative growth of nuclear weapons accelera- Applied Approach, EPAA – is exclusively defensive. The ted in the 1960s. In the 1970s they reached a compara- last nuclear warheads of U.S. Navy Tomahawk missiles ble level to the U.S., as they jointly had the breathtaking 10 were dismantled at the beginning of the 2010s.8 There are number of 50 000 operative or stored nuclear warheads. no American intentions to obtain offensive missiles for the Ten years later, the U.S. inventories were by already dimi- missile shield. nishing, while the Soviet Union reached its peak at 40 000 nuclear warheads. The theoretical threat towards Russia, from a dozen of conventionally loaded and relatively slow Tomahawk mis- The Warsaw Pact’s (read the Soviet Union’s) operational siles, is insignificant. These constitute only a fraction of plan for a war with NATO in the 1960s and the first half the firepower which a single U.S. Navy Ticonderoga Class of the 1970s built on massive use of battlefield tactical cruiser carries onboard. The two converted former Ohio nuclear weapons in the initial phase, primarily against air Class strategic submarines could be mentioned as well, bases and ports, but also against non-military targets and 11 each with the capacity to fire more than 150 Tomahawk potentially even neutral countries. The plan was under- missiles. stood to have been defensive in principle, but if war would break out, this was the most likely modus operandi. Defense Minister Shoigu asked the president for a man- date to proceed with research, development and deploy- In the Soviet Union, however, the environmental consequ- ment of ground-based missile systems in the coming years, ences from large scale use of battlefield nuclear weapons including already existing systems as the sea-based cruise 9 President of Russia, Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei missile Kalibr, as well as new hypersonic missile system Shoigu, 2 March 2019 10 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Estimated Glo- 6 The decision acquired legal force the 4th of March 2019, when bal Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945 – 2018, Federation of the Putin signed an executive order. See President of Russia, Execu- American Scientists, November 2018 tive Order suspending Russia’s compliance with the USSR-US INF 11 Nicholas Watt, Poland risks Russia’s wrath with Soviet nuclear Treaty attack map, The Guardian, 26 November 2005. See also The Bal- 7 President of Russia, Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei tic Initiative and Network, Danish Belts were the link between the Shoigu, 2 March 2019 Baltic Sea and the Atlantic. See also National Security Archive, 8 Hans M. Kristensen, US Navy Instruction Confirms Retirement European Cities Targeted for Nuclear Destruction, Parallel His- of Nuclear Tomahawk Cruise Missile, Federation of American tory Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Press Release, 29 Scientists, 18 March 2013 November 2001 www.frivarld.se @freeworldforum [email protected] /FreeWorldForum Briefing nr. 5 2019 had not been assessed in earnest.12 This task was given in operational plans, including a radical decrease in reliance the 1970s to the professor in mathematics, Vitaly Tsy- of nuclear weapons. According to Danilevich, the General gichko’s Scientific-Technical Institute for Systems Studies Staff believed in 1977 that the conventional phase of a war (VNIISI). The findings were both unexpected and drama- could go on for five to six days. Nonetheless, two years tic. Even the use of just a fraction of the planned quantities later, they estimated that the operation “Into France” could of nuclear weapons in the very initial phase of war, inclu- be carried out conventionally, and in 1981 the general staff ding the expected response from NATO, would entail seriously thought that war could be waged conventionally extensive counterproductive consequences. The radioac- altogether.14 tive fallout would cause devastating loss of civilian lives During Ogarkov’s time as chief of the general staff there in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the usually prevailing was a fundamental shift in Soviet’s operational methods. western winds would cause so heavy radioactive exposure The doctrine was still formally defensive, but if war and eventual radiation sickness to the attacking armoured with the Western powers broke out, the Soviet Union divisions of the Warsaw Pact that they would soon come would surely be victorious, due to its massive conven- 13 to a halt. tional army, with its highly capable elite units in very 15 This fresh insight that the Soviet Union would not win a high readiness. However, this would require a robust nuclear war conflicted with Marxist-Leninist dogma and sub-strategic nuclear deterrence capability, which they could therefore not be accepted. However, Professor Tsy- had in their nearly 2 000 INF missiles. The INF flagship gichko, did not tweak his results despite threats from the SS-20 Saber could project a direct threat to all the bigger commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, Marshal Viktor cities of Europe, which the Soviet leadership believed Kulikov. Warsaw Pact nuclear training practices and pro- would contribute in preventing NATO to seriously consi- cedures, however, continued as before which led to misin- der the use of nuclear weapons. terpretations by the West.