Formalism, Compositionism, Affect Wendy Anne Lee Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, Volume 49, 2020, pp. 321-326 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/sec.2020.0026 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/773138 [ Access provided at 3 Mar 2021 17:37 GMT from New York University ] Formalism, Compositionism, Affect WENDY ANNE LEE n their introduction to Critique and Postcritique, Elizabeth Anker and IRita Felski ask whether “postcritique require[s] a different ethos or affect” than critique?1 Bruno Latour offers one clear option in his 2004 hard-nosed injunction to “return to the realist attitude.”2 Expressing his uneasy sense that climate-change deniers have co-opted “the weapons of social critique” to undermine the validity of scientific findings, Latour endorses a turn away from the “debunking impetus” inherited from the Enlightenment and toward a mission “to protect and to care” (CRS, 230, 232). Such a shift in ethos would allow academics to face a new set of “threats” in the world: “there is no greater intellectual crime than to address with the equipment of an older period the challenges of the present one” (CRS, 231). What intellectuals find in their new and improved arsenal is what Latour will in a subsequent essay specify as “compositionism,” an alternative to critique that “takes up the task of searching for universality but without believing that this universality is already there, waiting to be unveiled and discovered.”3 Compositionism would appear to meet the postcritical or “constructivist” call to replace “the ethos of someone who . subtract[s] reality” with that of one who “adds reality” (CRS, 232). According to Latour’s “Attempt at a ‘Compositionist Manifesto,’” this work would entail 1) introducing gaps between causes and consequences, in part because consequences have overwhelmed their causes and we now inhabit that overflow; 2) extending agency to nonhumans in a return to animist thinking; and 3) composing or projecting these agencies across space and time “slowly 321 322 / L E E Formalism, Compositionism, Affect / 323 and progressively” in the making of another world—one that is “much more material, much more mundane, much more immanent, much more realistic, much more embodied” (ACM, 484).4 It is worthwhile to compare Latour’s theoretical reset to another glimpsed in our own field of eighteenth-century studies, Sandra Macpherson’s (anything but) “little formalism,” a critical redirection that would basically detonate Latour’s “wish to compose a common world” (ACM, 484).5 “My own wish,” Macpherson states, is “for a genuinely formalist critical practice, a little formalism that would turn one away from history without shame or apology” (ALF, 385). What Macpherson means by form is partly the inquiry of her essay, but one offering is “a perceptible, perhaps a recurring pattern that makes something the thing it is” or, in reduced form, “merely . being the thing one is” (ALF, 388, 401). In comparing the outlooks of these two materialist thinkers, we might start by observing their tonal differences. Latour’s “Manifesto” risks a certain chirpiness as it toggles between dogged affirmation (let’s reboot modernity!), productive alarm (oh god, the planet!), and mood-enhancement (surely we can dispute, compose our futures, say yes to the sixteenth century?!). Where Latour’s exclamatory style lifts, lightens, and rallies, Macpherson’s dark austerity brings us back to an unforgiving earth—solid ground wholly indifferent to critique, a cold planet after all. Their points of countervision are profound. To Latour’s emphasis that we attend to gaps in causation, we have Macpherson’s “philosophy of life committed to the notion that biology is destiny” (ALF, 400). To Latour’s embrace of nonhuman agents, we have Macpherson’s objection to critical projects based on agentive solutions, in particular, object-oriented ontology (“OOO”), which for Macpherson is forever granting objects the status of subjects in a predictable celebration of freedom, autonomy, and knowledge- production—an all-too-human posthumanism. “To move beyond the human, it turns out, is to find her everywhere,” writes a disappointed Macpherson (ALF, 399).6 No formalism without ontology! is the slogan to her own “determinist formalism” (ALF, 390, 401, emphasis mine), and where for Latour, “critique has not been critical enough” (CRS, 232), for Macpherson, “OOO isn’t reactionary enough, isn’t committed enough to the ‘staleness’ of substance” (ALF, 397). Instead of agents who subtract or add reality, what emerges is just reality: impervious, durable matter. Finally, to Latour’s urbane optimism, we have Macpherson’s stalwart commitments far beyond the pleasure principle. “About the end of our species,” she concludes, “I say: fine”—a pronouncement inflectable by either shrugging resignation (okay, fine) or tooth-gnashing anger (fine then) or Cary Grant-like jauntiness (Swell! Fine!) (ALF, 401). (Macpherson’s delivery at the 2015 American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies conference in Los Angeles suggests the last option.) Formalism, Compositionism, Affect / 323 For Latour, it is time to move beyond “the old opposition between what is constructed and what is not constructed,” an outgrowth of the great “Bifurcation” issued by Enlightenment philosophers (ACM, 477). Since “the cage of nature,” he argues, “was invented to render politics impotent, there is no reason why a politics of Nature would ever deliver its promises” (ACM, 482, 480). Instead of leaning on some utopian framework, Latour proposes a politics that seeks “immanence and truth together . matters of concern, not only matters of fact . achieved only by the slow process of composition and compromise, not by the revelation of the world of beyond” (ACM, 478). Macpherson commits to an immanence of the stark and uncompromising variety. A formalism committed to history or to politics (or that regards “its commitment to politico-historical formalism as the only tolerable formalism”) is for her not sufficiently formalist, posthuman, “ontic” (ALF, 397). Critics working under the banner of new formalism or new materialism do not adequately approach objects, she suggests in a reading of Barthes’s “The World as Object” that quotes his “scandal of [the lemon’s] perfect and useless ellipse,” with a view to “their irreducibility, their impenetrability, and their meaninglessness” (ALF, 396).7 It is worth including here the full quotation from Barthes’ essay about how Dutch painting showcases the utility of objects, obscuring their “essential form,” or “core,” or “substance.”8 “What need have I of the lemon’s principial [sic] form? What my quite empirical humanity needs is a lemon ready for use, half-peeled, half-sliced, half-lemon, half-juice, caught at the precious moment it exchanges the scandal of its perfect and useless ellipse for the first of its economic qualities, astringency” (WO, 5). Barthes layers the distinction between an object’s “stubborn matter” and “functional virtues” over an existential division between human habitats, or “[t]his universe of fabrication,” and the “riddle” of the physical world (WO, 5). In the non- isomorphism between environment and matter, Barthes keeps intact the riddle of “form”—work that is carried on by Macpherson, who sniffs out and eschews residual humanisms. Of Jane Bennett’s response to the work of Timothy Morton, Macpherson writes, “if new formalism redeems form by tying it to the contingency of a human agency that goes under the name ‘history,’ new materialism redeems matter by tying it to the contingency of a human agency that goes under the name of ‘politics’” (ALF, 401). For Macpherson, there is no need to redeem form because form does not need to be redeemed—as, say, human beings do: “We are the bad objects,” she clarifies (ALF, 402). Macpherson tantalizingly alludes to “another story: about wanting a determinist feminism to go along with my determinist formalism.” But, she writes, “it is a story for another time” (ALF, 401). In spite of her 324 / L E E Formalism, Compositionism, Affect / 325 deferral, we see that a determinist feminism would probably entail what, in a parenthetical aside on Elizabeth Grosz and Luce Irigaray, she calls “morphological thinking,” or what “we used to call ‘essentialism,’ but I would call . ‘formalism’ inasmuch as morphology is formal for the body.” A gendered formalism would furthermore meditate on “the material conditions of sexed bodies” (ALF, 400). Macpherson’s little, determinist, feminist formalism’s expansion of the range of objects to material conditions resonates in another feminist’s theory, this one looping the critical back to the postcritical. Latour’s full quotation names her: “Can we devise another powerful descriptive tool that deals this time with matters of concern and whose import then will no longer be to debunk but to protect and to care, as Donna Haraway would put it?” (CRS, 232). To Latour’s dream of composing a better world and Macpherson’s wish for a more formal formalism, Donna Haraway, as Heather Love writes in her contribution to Critique and Postcritique, “dream[s] of cultivating a feminist version of objectivity.”9 This task, Love illuminates, “argues that the constitution of new objects of scientific knowledge is inseparable from the creation of modern forms of gender and gendered inequality.”10 In a comparative discussion of Haraway’s “Modest_Witness@Second_ Millenium” and Latour’s essay ostensibly launching postcritique,