United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons Learned INTERVIEW #175 Interviewed by: Marilyn Greene Interview date: June 27, 2011 Copyright 2011 USIP & ADST INTERVIEW SYNOPSIS Participant’s Understanding of the PRT Mission Interviewee served twice in Afghanistan. In 2009 he was with the Agribusiness Development Team of the Tennessee Army National Guard in Paktia and Paktika provinces. From May 2010 to May 2011 he was an advisor to the Swedish-Finnish PRT in Mazar-i Sharif, Balkh Province. He saw the goal of the most recent job as building Afghan agricultural capacity by strengthening agricultural extension and by working with students at Balkh University. Relationship with Local Nationals Observations: Poor security made it impossible for the interviewee to work in three other provinces as he had intended, so he focused on Balkh Province alone. He taught classes at the university and took students into the field for practical experience. He had excellent cooperation with the university. Insights: Without his presence, students would not have been able to go into the field. The Afghan Agriculture Department functions very poorly. Its employees have other jobs and do very little. Afghans were initially leery of techniques such as covering seeds and no-till technology, but were swayed through experience of dramatically larger yields. Lessons: Development of an Afghan Cooperative Extension Service is crucial. Pay a good wage, provide traveling funding and require that agents have no other jobs. Create demonstration farms. Hire female and male agents. Did the PRT Achieve its Mission? (Impact) Observations: The PRT accomplished a great deal with resources available. Introduced a saffron project and conducted livestock vaccinations. Afghans completely took over saffron and fruit- tree projects, and were beginning an insecticide program against locusts. By the end of his tour, the interviewee was standing back as advisor and Afghans were completely in charge. The PRT's impact was limited because funds were limited. 1 Insights: Saffron is four to five times more profitable than poppy production. The interviewee could have done much more promoting saffron production but there was not enough money for the program. Only current way to implement a USAID or CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program) project is by hiring contractors. But that does a lot of harm by hiring the best people away from the Afghan government. Lessons: U.S. funds should be released to build capacity in Afghan agricultural ministries. All funds that are transmitted through USAID are wasted since they implement nothing directly and the money goes to companies in the U.S., not to Afghans. Overall Strategy for Accomplishing the PRT Mission (Planning) Observations: There was close coordination in the PRT, among civilians and with military, and with Swedes and Finns. Military escort and transport were provided freely. The Swedes and Finns, who funded the small amount of capacity-building work, would spend only through the Afghan government and only on capacity-building efforts. Started farmers off with 10 trees and required they be planted in irrigated area. Insights: Funneling money through the Afghan system gave recipients a sense of involvement and provided lasting training and education. Lessons: The primary goal should be develop Afghan government capacity to continue development unassisted. Building agricultural program can enhance stability. What Worked Well and What Did Not? (Operations) Observations: Interviewee was not replaced. Projects he helped develop were very successful but limited by lack of money. Example of U.S. waste: In a $4 million USAID project to plant 100,000 pistachio trees, only 18,000 were actually planted and only 12,000 trees survived due to inadequate irrigation. Security deteriorated over interviewee’s tour. A Civilian Technical Assistance Program, with civilian advisors, worked well. There were no translators; interviewee had to depend on students or borrowed personnel to interpret. Insights: Newly trained agricultural extension agents went, albeit reluctantly, into kinetic areas because they were committed to development programs that would help hold the province. Unfortunately the projects are too small ($5,000-$15,000). USAID and CERP, as currently structured, do not help strengthen Afghan institutions. Lessons: PRTs need to include an agricultural advisor. Without maintenance, agricultural development will wither or be taken over by insurgents. Successful agriculture projects are very effective in effecting counter-insurgency. The only way agricultural extension programs will survive is with outside funding. CERP and USAID rules need to be changed to allow support for government programs. Teach Afghans to do the work, do not do it for them. All projects should go through Afghan government and all must be sustainable and profitable to Afghan farmers. Do not go through contractors. 2 THE INTERVIEW Q. When were you in Afghanistan? A. This last trip to Afghanistan was May of 2010 to May of 2011. I was a PRT advisor at Camp Northern Lights in Mazar-i Sharif, Afghanistan, Balkh Province. That was my job this last year with USDA. I was with the Tennessee Army National Guard in the Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) Paktia and Paktika provinces in 2009. Q. What was the mission of the PRT overall? A. Well of course this was a Swedish-Finnish PRT. Officially I had four provinces: Balkh Province, Jowzjan Province, Sari Pol, and Samangan. In reality, with the travel restrictions, I was only in another province one time. All of my work was centered in Balkh province. Q. Because of the kinetic activity going around? A. Yes that is right. After a couple of months we could no longer drive to the other provinces. Of course air flight was difficult; any ag-project needs numerous trips. If you can only get there two or three times in a year there is really no point in starting. Q. So was the principal mission of the main PRT improving security or was there a development aspect to the overall mission? A. There was both—of course I was embedded with that PRT. There were varying views in Washington and Kabul as to what our mission was. I felt like Ambassador Eikenberry and President Barack Obama said, and that was to strengthen Afghan institutions—from my perspective that meant trying to build capacity within the MAIL and DAIL—of course the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) and at the provincial level the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (DAIL). So that meant trying to build their capacity, to do agricultural Extension work, and I also worked at Balkh University—working with the students there. Q. Did you teach classes, do lab work or both? A. Both, yes ma’am. What I did—and of course, I had support for this for this from my supervisor—up till January this year. My supervisor agreed with my initiatives. But yes, I taught classes. I would teach a class in the classroom and then I would take the students with me— usually 15 to 20 students—on the field exercise. This was important because without my involvement they would not get any practical experience in an Agricultural education—they would not actually go to the field. Q. What was the main type of Agriculture you were doing with the students—was it animals? A. Yes, we did livestock vaccination programs. That was one of the projects, funded by the 10th 3 Mountain Division. I was trying to introduce saffron as a new crop in the area, more profitable than opium. We did that in four districts. The students worked with me on the saffron projects. Q. Is it really that much more profitable? I always thought that opium was the most profitable. A. A lot of people are misled on that. It is about four to five times more profitable than opium. The main problem—I could have done a great deal more with the saffron—but no money is available for projects like that. No U.S. funding is available to support projects like that—at the PRT level of course. No U.S. funding to build capacity with the DAIL-MAIL (Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock), so having funds for developing these projects was very limiting. Aside from the livestock vaccination programs all my funding came from either Swedish or Finnish donors. Q. Since your PRT was not commanded by the U.S. that meant there were no CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program) funds that came through it. A. Even if I had been in a U.S. PRT there are no CERP funds available, period, to work with the DAIL and MAIL. Q. Would you recommend that they should be? A. Oh absolutely—I was sent out by the President and Ambassador Eikenberry to help strengthen Afghan institutions and that definitely is not the way that USAID works, that is definitely not the way that CERP works. The only way you can implement a USAID project or a CERP project, that is Commander's Emergency Response Program, is by hiring contractors. And of course the really bad thing about that is that it doesn’t do any good but it does a lot of harm. Artificially it hires people away from the Afghan government that might make a contribution— the salaries are much much higher—as much as ten times higher. If they go to work for a contractor or an implementing partner, then there would be if they stayed within the DAIL, Directory of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock part of the Afghan government. So the very best people will not stay as far as the Afghan government. So not only are you not building capacity, you are taking away capacity.