Strategic Survey for Israel 2011 Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors Strategic Survey for Israel 2011 Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors Institute for National Security Studies The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, was founded in 2006. The purpose of the Institute for National Security Studies is, first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel’s national security as well as Middle East regional and international security affairs. Second, the Institute aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are – or should be – at the top of Israel’s national security agenda. INSS seeks to address Israeli decision makers and policymakers, the defense establishment, public opinion makers, the academic community in Israel and abroad, and the general public. INSS publishes research that it deems worthy of public attention, while it maintains a strict policy of non-partisanship. The opinions expressed in this publication are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, boards, research staff, or the organizations and individuals that support its research. Strategic Survey for Israel 2011 Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURcITY STUDIES INCORPORATING THE JAFFEE bd CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES Graphic design: Michal Semo-Kovetz and Yael Bieber Cover design: Michal Semo-Kovetz Printing: A.R.T. Offset Services Ltd. Cover Photo: Egyptian demonstrators in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, July 29, 2011 Courtesy: Image Bank / Getty Images Institute for National Security Studies 40 Haim Levanon Street POB 39950 Ramat Aviv Tel Aviv 61398 Israel Tel. +972-3-640-0400 Fax. +972-3-744-7590 E-mail: [email protected] http:// www.inss.org.il © 2011 All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-965-7425-25-1 Contents Introduction 7 Part I: The Middle East Agenda A New Middle East? Mark A. Heller 19 The Superpowers and the Middle East: Walking a Fine Line Oded Eran, Zvi Magen, and Shimon Stein 31 Israel and the Arab World: The Power of the People Shlomo Brom 43 The Israeli-Palestinian Arena: Independent Moves, Little Coordination Anat Kurz 57 Part II: Iran, Turkey, and the Northern Axis Iran’s Regional Status: Expanding Influence alongside Weaknesses Ephraim Kam 77 The International Community vs. Iran: Pressures, Delays, No Decisive Results Emily B. Landau 93 Turkey and the Middle East: Between Euphoria and Sobriety Gallia Lindenstrauss 105 PART III: Israel: Coping with the Challenges The Delegitimization Threat: Roots, Manifestations, and Containment Yehuda Ben Meir and Owen Alterman 121 The IDF Multiyear Plan: Dilemmas and Responses Giora Eiland 139 The Civilian Front: From the Threat to the Response Meir Elran 153 Israel’s National Security Economy: Defense and Social Challenges Shmuel Even 171 Conclusion Israel and the Regional Shockwaves Shlomo Brom and Anat Kurz 193 Appendix: The Middle East Military Balance Trends in Military Buildup in the Middle East Yiftah S. Shapir 205 Review of Armed Forces Yiftah S. Shapir and Tamir Magal 221 Contributors 275 Introduction Introduction Strategic Survey for Israel 2011 is the most recent volume in the Strategic Survey for Israel series, published annually by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). The articles compiled here review principal events and developments in the Middle East over the past year, emphasizing the ramifications of regional and international trends for Israel’s national security. The articles in this volume were written during a particularly tumultuous period in the Middle East. Since late 2010, several countries in the Middle East have experienced political shockwaves originating in the outbreak of popular protests against the regime. To be sure, the Bush administration’s pursuit of democratization in the greater Middle East, as well as the support for popular forces crying out for liberalization in Arab countries that was expressed by President Barack Obama early in his presidency, raised awareness in the region of the need for change. Nevertheless, the momentum of the protests that spread through the Middle East showed actual potential for change in the region’s countries. The intensity of the demonstrations challenged longstanding assumptions on the strength of the regimes in the Middle East, which underestimated the importance of popular forces and their ability to come together spontaneously, with the aid of social networking websites, in revolutionary challenges to the regime. This volume goes to press in the midst of the storm, when it is still not possible to ascertain whether the revolutionary trend has peaked, or whether the turmoil will evolve and spill over to states that have thus far maintained relative stability, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Nor is it possible to envision what the nature of the new regimes will be in states where the regime has collapsed, or how regimes that have been forced to regroup in 7 Introduction the face of a sweeping popular uprising will change, if at all. Even in Egypt and Tunisia, where the government collapsed within a number of weeks after the protests began, manifestations and characteristics of the old order have not been entirely erased, and hopes for democratization may not be realized, certainly not in a rapid, direct process. As in Iran in the summer of 2009, regimes in Syria, Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen mobilized their resources fully in a determined struggle for survival and a stronger hold on the political system, and a violent confrontation – in many places still ongoing – erupted between government forces and protesters. All of these states, whether or not they have seen the rise of new regimes, will likely face an indefinite period of instability with uncertain outcomes. Yet against the background of upheavals and instability, it is already possible to assess that the prospects for fundamental changes in inter-state relations in the Middle East and a thaw in regional tensions and hostilities are limited. Of course domestic matters – the form of government and the economic system – and not matters of foreign policy led the demonstrators’ agenda of change. At the same time, the upheaval underscored the importance of the public mood, and in this context, the need to avoid steps that challenge nationalist and Islamic sentiments. Therefore, most of the regimes will likely hesitate to adopt a policy of compromise, which would help curb traditional rivalries in the region. This is true for acting leaderships and for those hoping to supplant them, as well as for states seeking greater stability, such as Egypt and Syria, states that for years have rested on unsteady foundations, such as Iraq and Lebanon, and states that for the most part enjoy a large measure of stability, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In fact, in several instances internal upheaval has already come to exacerbate existing tensions or create new areas of conflict. Saudi Arabia, together with forces of the UAE, intervened militarily to protect the regime in Bahrain in the wake of the Shiite revolt that erupted there, largely out of fear that the fall of the regime would help Iran expand its influence in the Gulf. The Arab League, demonstrating Qaddafi’s isolation in the Arab world, supported the Security Council’s approval for NATO forces to attack Qaddafi’s strongholds in an effort to topple the regime and thereby end the war between the Libyan army and the rebels. Members of the Arab 8 Introduction League, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, sharply criticized the Asad regime for its violent response to the demonstrations in Syria, albeit only several months after armed clashes began between demonstrators and the military. The suppression of the uprising in Syria, which prompted masses of Syrian refugees to flee to Turkey, and the fear that the turmoil would spill over into Turkish territory muddied the close relations formed between Ankara and Damascus in recent years. The potential for continued instability in the Middle East impelled Turkey to reconsider its regional role and its relations with the regimes and populations of the region. One of the results was that Turkey extended feelers about a rapprochement with Israel. However, the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic process has prevented a mending of the rift between Turkey and Israel, given the Turkish criticism of Israel on the issue, and in particular, the Gaza Strip situation. Similarly, tension between Israel and Egypt has increased because of the security anarchy in Sinai, the openness displayed by the Supreme Military Council, which replaced the Mubarak regime, toward Hamas, and the possibility of Hamas’ integration in the Palestinian Authority. This tension has been joined by the concern in Israel over statements by Egyptian figures in favor of reexamining the peace treaty with Israel. The recent events in the Middle East have heightened the imperative, emphasized for years by the international community, to stabilize the region. Indeed, the very conflicts that were on the regional and global agenda before the popular uprisings began remain the focus of attention. Issues connected to Israel have retained their positions at the top of the list: the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian question and the Iranian nuclear program in particular. Moreover, the fundamental political-security dilemmas that currently preoccupy the government of Israel are the same that faced previous governments. And yet, in light of the events in the Middle East in the past year and in particular the weakening of Israel’s standing in the international arena, it appears that the severity of these dilemmas and the urgency of dealing with them have increased significantly. Israel must decide between waiting for regional stabilization while maintaining its deterrence against state and sub-state threats, and attempting 9 Introduction to mold the strategic environment, especially through an initiative for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.