FIIA REPORT 45 Fog of Falsehood Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine Katri Pynnöniemi & András Rácz (eds.) FIIA REPORT 45 Fog of Falsehood Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine Fog of Falsehood Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine Katri Pynnöniemi & András Rácz (eds.) ULKOPOLIITTINEN INSTITUUTTI UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FIIA rePort 45 Reports can be ordered from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. +358 9 432 7707 [email protected] All FIIA reports and other publications are also available on our website at www.fiia.fi. Language editing: Anna Sinkkonen (chapters 1-4), Aakkosto Oy (chapters 5-14) Graphic design: Nordenswan & Siirilä Oy / Tuomas Kortteinen Layout: Kaarina Tammisto Printed by Grano Oy, 2016 The Finnish Institute of International Affairs Ulkopoliittinen instituutti PL 400 00161 Helsinki Finland www.fiia.fi ISBN 978-951-769-485-8 (print) ISBN 978-951-769-486-5 (web) ISSN 2323-5454 The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is an independent research institute that produces high-level research to support political decision-making and public debate both nationally and internationally. All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two other experts in the field to ensure the high quality of the publications. In addition, publications undergo professional language checking and editing. The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors. Acknowledgements The research process for this report started in early summer of 2014 in the form of informal discussion on how to better understand Russia’s strategic communication concerning the conflict in Ukraine. An ad hoc working group consisting of the authors of this report, our then- colleague at the FIIA Noora Kotilainen and Doctor of Military Science Saara Jantunen formulated the research framework, the results of which are presented in this report. We would like to thank Kotilainen and Jantunen for their contribution to this important first phase of the research. We are also grateful for the experts on information war in general and Russian information operations in particular who participated in numerous discussions in Finland and abroad, which helped us to understand the nature and scope of Russia’s strategic deception. Conducting the research would not have been possible without the support of the Finnish Ministry of Defence and the International Visegrad Fund (IVF). The case studies in Estonia, Sweden, Germany and Poland were conducted with research funding from the Ministry (on project ’Russian strategic communication on the Ukraine crisis’). The IVF contributed to the case studies covering Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (Small Grant No. 11520259 titled ‘Russian Information Warfare on the Crisis in Ukraine and its Visegrad Implications’). The majority of the research funding was provided by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). Hence, we would like to express our gratitude to the Finnish Ministry of Defence and the International Visegrad Fund, as well as to our institutional partners in Central Europe: the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association in Bratislava, EUROPEUM in Prague and the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy in Hungary. Finally, we would like to thank the individual authors of the case studies for their contribution to this research, as well as our colleagues at the FIIA for their outstanding support at every stage of the process. However, any mistakes in the report are the responsibility of the editors. Editors Katri Pynnöniemi and András Rácz Table of contents ackNowLedgemeNtS 7 1. introductIoN 13 part I: BAckgrouNd 2. the coNcePtuAL ANd historIcAL rootS oF decePtIoN 27 2.2. The Soviet Roots of Russian Influence Operations 33 2.3. The Russian Strategic Deception Scheme: A Hypothesis 42 3. reSeArch methodoLogy 51 3.2. Distinctive Vocabularies and Metanarratives 54 3.3. Empirical Research Material 59 part ii: NArrAtIveS 4. the metANArrAtIveS oF russian StrAtegIc decePtIoN 71 4.2. Terms of Distraction: Provocation, Humanitarian Convoy, Russophobe 75 4.3. Framing Russia as a Passive Outsider in the Conflict 79 4.4. Making Ukraine Part of the Russian World 91 5. introductIoN to cASe StudIeS 125 part iii: cASe StudIeS 6. russian StrAtegIc commuNIcAtIoN reFLected IN the german medIA 131 6.2. The Media Landscape in Germany and Attitudes Towards Russia 132 6.3. Russian Metanarratives in the German Media 135 6.4. Conclusion 142 7. the cASe oF eStoNIA: dIFFereNt INFormAtIoN SpaceS, But the SAme NArrAtIveS 149 7.1. Introduction 149 7.2. The Estonian Media Space and Public Trust Towards the Media 150 7.3. Appearance of Russian Metanarratives in Estonian-Language Media 152 7.4. Main Narratives in the Russian-language Media 155 7.5. Conclusion 157 8. Finland ANd ruSSIA’S metANArrAtIveS oN the conflict IN ukraine 165 8.2. Scope of the Research 167 8.3. The Variation of Terms used in Framing the Conflict 169 8.4. The Crimean Operation 173 8.5. The Burning of the Trade Union Building in Odessa 176 8.6. The Shooting Down of Malaysian Airlines Flight mh17 177 8.7. The Humanitarian Catastrophe Narrative 179 8.8. Conclusion 183 9. russian NArrAtIveS ANd the SwedISh deBAte oN ForeIgN PoLIcy 193 9.2. Crimea: Representation of Crimean People as Independent Actors 196 9.3. Odessa: Destruction of the Positive Legacy of the Maidan Revolution 199 9.4. Specific Propaganda and Disinformation Themes in the Swedish Context 201 9.5. Conclusion 204 10. huNgAry: where the goverNmeNt-coNtroLLed medIA wAS the mAIN Entry PoINt For russian metANArrAtIveS 211 10.2. The Media in Hungary and the Research Sample 212 10.3. Annexation of Crimea 215 10.4. The Burning of the Trade Union Building in Odessa 219 10.5. The Shooting Down of Malaysian Airlines Flight mh17 223 10.6. The “Humanitarian Disaster” Narrative and the Battle of Ilovaysk 229 10.7. Disinformation Targeted at Hungary 234 10.8. Conclusions 236 11. the ruSSIAN metANArrAtIveS IN the Polish Online medIA 247 11.2. Description of Research Sample 248 11.2. Analysis of the Onet.pl website 250 11.3. Analysis of Kresy.pl Website 257 11.4. Conclusions 263 12. MetANArrAtIveS oF russian PropagANdA IN the czech oNLINe medIA 277 12.2. The Czech Media Space and Russian Influence 278 12.3. The Annexation of the Crimea 283 12.4. Burning of the Trade Union Building in Odessa 284 12.5. The Downing ofmh 17 285 12.6. The Emergence of the Humanitarian Catastrophe 286 12.7. Concluding Remarks 288 13. the chANNeLS and dIStINguIShing eLemeNtS oF russian PropagANdA IN SLovAkIA 295 13.2. The Research Framework and Data Set 296 13.3. Analysis of the Selected Events 298 13.4. Discussion 300 part Iv: coNcLuSIoN 14. coNcLuSIoN 311 PrevIouSLy PuBLIShed IN the SerIeS 316 1 1. Introduction Katri Pynnöniemi1 It is not at all easy to be sure what this tremendous growth of propaganda in the contemporary world signifies, whether it is a passing phase or something deep and permanent. Sometimes it seems as if the august nations of the world have become for the time like little boys at school who make horrid faces at one another and shout resounding threats F.C. Bartlett, 19422 It is remarkable how little the world has changed in hundred years when it comes to falsehood in wartime. The Great War, or the war currently known as the First World War, was fought in a “fog of falsehood” made of deliberate official lies, deliberate lies, mistranslations, forgeries, omissions, faked photographs and descriptions of atrocities that never took place. In an introduction to a study of lies, which had a significant impact on the course of the Great War, Arthur Ponsonby noted: “There must have been more deliberate lying in the world from 1914 to 1918 than in any other period of the world’s history”.3 This has proved to be an understatement. However, a sample collected by Ponsonby in 1928 shows that the forms of falsehood have changed only little since the Great War. 1 Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, [email protected] 2 Bartlett 1942, 2. 3 Ponsonby 1928, 19. 13 The story of a “crucified person” – sometimes a girl, sometimes an American, but most often a Canadian solder, underwent many variations in 1915, and was used again in the context of the war in Ukraine in 2014.4 The Allies of the Great War were able to convince the public of Germany’s “sole responsibility”5 for the conflict and to personify the enemy in the image of “Criminal Kaiser”6. Currently, Russia is feeding its domestic public with stories of “the West sponsoring violence in Ukraine” or, in turn, “the West turning a blind eye” to what is happening in the country. The fact that these claims are mutually contradictory is a characteristic feature of Russian strategic deception and something that makes it different from Soviet propaganda campaigns. Soviet propaganda was anchored in ideological truth claims, whereas the contemporary Russian variant can be compared to a kaleidoscope: a light piercing through it is instantly transformed into multiple versions of reality. One of the most infamous examples of WWI propaganda was the sinking of the passenger ship Lusitania on May 7, 1915, which inflamed popular indignation and brought the United States into the war. It destroyed German propaganda hopes in the U.S. but provided a valuable asset in the hands of British propagandists whose job was to demonize Germans.7 Almost exactly hundred years later, the downing of the Malaysian airline MH17 on July 17, 2014, brought the conflict in Eastern Ukraine to the world’s attention. It was only after this tragic event that the existence of a warlike situation in the region was recognized officially by the US and the EU.8 Immediately after the event, Russia sought to distract the public with several invented and often contradictory stories of the Ukrainian air defence having hit the MH17, or a Ukrainian ground attack airplane Sukhoi SU-25 having brought down the Boeing, or President Putin’s plane being 4 The Russian state-controlled Channel One tv aired a forged report of a witness claiming to have seen Ukrainian soldiers crucifying a three-year-old boy on a billboard.