Country Advice Pakistan Pakistan – PAK35880 – Swat Valley – PML-N – Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah- Mohammadi – Landowners – April 2009 Army Offensive – Internal relocation – Asylum seekers 23 December 2009 1 Please provide a concise history of recent events in the Swat Valley, including the ‘Talibanisation’ of the valley and the April 2009 offensive by the Pakistan army to retake the valley. 2 What is the law and order situation in the Swat Valley since the April 2009 Pakistan army offensive in the valley? What has become of the Taliban leadership and militants in the valley since the offensive? Do they still pose a threat to the peace and stability of the valley? Origins of the Tehreek Nifaz e Sharia Mohammadi in the Swat Valley The terms ‘Taliban’ and ‘Taliban in Pakistan’ (TIP) are often employed by the Pakistani and International media as shorthand for a number of militant Islamic groups espousing the introduction of Sharia law, the creation of an Islamic state or the pursuit of violent jihad. It has been reported that a number of such groups currently operate in the Malakand district of North West Frontier Province, which includes the Swat Valley. In the Swat region itself, the primary movement since the early 1990s to the present day has been the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e- Shariah-Mohammadi (TNSM). The February 2009 IRIN article ‘Pakistan: Origins of the violence in Swat Valley’ provides useful and concise information on the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah-Mohammadi (TNSM). On the subject of its origins IRIN states “[i]n 1992, Sufi Mohammad Khan established the Tehrik- e-Nifaz-e-Shariah-Mohammadi (TNSM) in Swat, as a party seeking an Islamic order. The party rose to national prominence in 1995, when Khan demanded the immediate imposition of Sharia, Islamic law. Violence followed as paramilitary forces began an operation against him.” In 2002 Sufi Mohammad Khan was arrested and imprisoned by Pakistani authorities and the TNSM was declared an illegal organisation. At this point, according to IRIN, the TNSM was taken over by Sufi Mohammad Khan’s son-in-law Maulana Fazalullah. The most recent clashes between the TNSM and the army have their origins “after Fazalullah in July 2007 ordered supporters to avenge a security force operation to clear militants out of the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad”. According to IRIN, the violence in 2007 alone claimed over 400 lives, destroyed over a 1000 houses and led to over 800,000 valley residents fleeing. Of particular interest is the examination of Maulana Fazalullah’s edict on the banning of girl’s education and the closure or bombing of approximately 200 schools in the valley. In January 1 2009 a truce was signed between the TNSM and the government of North West Frontier Province.1 A February 2009 IRIN article provides more detail on the TNSM since Maulana Fazalullah’s 2002 ascension to the leadership. According to IRIN, Fazalullah established links with “the militant Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)”, set up “at least 30 illegal FM radio stations to get his message across”; opposed “girls and any active role for women in society was opposed”; while schools were closed and “music shops and barbers’ businesses were attacked”. In 2008 violent actions employed by the TNSM and its followers are described as “atrocities”. IRIN reports that these included “the killing of women who decline to stop work and public beheadings of those accused of spying”. A suicide bombing at the funeral of a policeman in Mingora in February 2008 kills over forty and in December 2008 “Fazalullah announces a ban on education for girls”. In February 2009 “Ameer Hussain Hoti, the chief minister of NWFP, said a bill had been signed that would implement Islamic Sharia law in the Malakand division, which includes Swat. This would mean a separate justice system from the rest of the nation. The Taliban reacted by announcing a 10-day truce and said they would examine the document before ending hostilities permanently.”2 In April 2009 Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zadari signed a similar agreement with the TNSM to the one established by the government of North West Frontier Province, allowing the imposition of Sharia law in the Swat Valley. Human Rights Watch argued that the agreement was tantamount to handing over the valley to the ‘Taliban’ and states that “the Taliban and their affiliates are not only violating international human rights standards, but also acting in contravention of fundamental rights as enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution. The Nizam-e-Adl law also violates the fundamental rights provisions of the Pakistani constitution and seeks to provide a legal framework for abusive administration by the Taliban.”3 Defending his decision Zadari is quoted in The Long War Journal in April 2009 as having said “[w]e have not and will not negotiate with extremist Taliban and terrorists. The clerics with whom we have engaged are not Taliban. Indeed, in our dialogue we’d made it clear that it is their responsibility to rein in and neutralize Taliban and other insurgents.”4 Declan Walsh reports on the backlash to the Zadari governments signing of a bill in April 2009 ratifying Sharia law in the Malakand district of North West Frontier Province. Writing in The Guardian in April 2009, Walsh quotes a number of domestic and international critics of the bill. The United Nations special rapporteur on religious freedoms, Asma Jahangir, stated that “I don’t think this law is going to appease the Taliban. It’s just going to give them a taste of victory”. Farooq Sattar, a minister in the national coalition, is quoted as stating that “The government is buying peace at gunpoint”. Ali Dayan Hasan from Human Rights Watch 5 describes the deal as “bad peace”. 1 ‘Pakistan: Origins of the violence in Swat Valley’ 2009, IRIN, 26 February http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=83105 – Accessed 30 May 2009 – Attachment 1 2 ‘Pakistan: Timeline on Swat Valley turbulence’ 2009, IRIN, 11 February http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82864 – Accessed 30 May 2009 – Attachment 2 3 Human Rights Watch 2009, Pakistan: Swat Deal Grave Threat to Rights, HRW website, 15 April http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/15/pakistan-swat-deal-grave-threat-rights – Accessed 30 May 2009 – Attachment 3 4 Roggio, W. 2009, ‘Analysis: Pakistani TNSM serves as Taliban front’, The Long War Journal, 11 April http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/04/analysis_pakistani_t.php – Accessed 7 December 2009 – Attachment 4 5 Walsh, D. 2009, ‘Pakistan bows to demand for sharia law in Taliban-controlled Swat Valley’, The Guardian, 14 April http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/14/sharia-law-in-pakistans-swat-valley – Accessed 18 December 18, 2009 – Attachment 5 2 Writing in the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor in 2006, Hassan Abbas not only describes Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi as “one of the most dangerous religious militant groups in Pakistan”, he also describes its supporter base in Malakand and the adjacent Bajaur districts as “solid”. Furthermore, Abbas, a former Sub-Divisional Police Chief in NWFP and the Deputy Director of Investigations in Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau, claims that much of the TNSM’s success has been due to the “lacklustre” and “weak” response by the police and successive governments.6 The April 2009 Offensive Within days of signing the peace deal with the TNSM, President Asif Ali Zadari responded to national outrage and international pressure by ordering the Pakistan Army to retake the Swat Valley in April 2009. Popularly referred to in the media as the April Offensive, the military operation lasted for many months. A number of sources indicate that the army’s offensive in the valley caused a large number of casualties and destruction of property. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reported in May 2009 that the Pakistan Army had claimed to have recaptured Mingora, the main city in the Swat Valley; however, they conceded that fighting continued in the suburbs of the city and elsewhere in the valley. The fighting in Mingora was described as “street to street, with troops having to check houses for booby traps as they move through.”7 Two days later the ABC cites a BBC source reporting that in Mingora only 40,000 of the original 300,000 residents remained and “buildings and shops in the centre of town have been entirely flattened.” In the valley as a whole, “[m]ore than 2.5 million people have been displaced by the fighting between Taliban militants and the Pakistan military, the largest movement of people since the country was created 62 years ago.”8 A report in the New York Times in September 2009 suggested that the Pakistani Army committed significant war crimes in the valley during both the offensive and the cleaning up operations. The authors states that “[t]wo months after the Pakistani Army wrested control of the Swat Valley from Taliban militants, a new campaign of fear has taken hold, with scores, perhaps hundreds, of bodies dumped on the streets in what human rights advocates and local residents say is the work of the military.” The authors express concern that the operation, conducted with the emphatic support of the United States, now threatens to “further taint Washington’s association with the military”. The primary allegations regarding army behaviour relates not to the capture and killing of TNSM or ‘Taliban’ guerrillas, but rather accusations of deliberate mass killings of civilians; “[t]he number of killings suggests that the military is seeking to silence any enthusiasm for the Taliban and to settle accounts for heavy army casualties, said a senior provincial official who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprimand by the army.” One estimate in the article suggests that the number of civilian deaths numbers “around 3000”.9 6 Abbas, H.