University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1983 Doubt, certainty, and the Cartesian Circle. Robert Stephen Welch University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Welch, Robert Stephen, "Doubt, certainty, and the Cartesian Circle." (1983). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2256. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2256 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DOUBT, CERTAINTY, AND THE CARTESIAN CIRCLE A Dissertation Presented By Robert Stephen Welch, II Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY February 1983 Philosophy © Robert Stephen Welch, II All Rights Reserved 11 , DOUBT, CERTAINTY, AND THE CARTESIAN CIRCLE A Dissertation Presented By ROBERT STEPHEN WELCH, II Approved as to style and content by: ^ 7 tel **— Fred A. Feldman, Chairperson of Committee JZtdi'fJ-C- U • J) S/ (wJ Robert C . Sleigh Jr . , Member \j AsUL- c csi^jisi Vere C. Chappell, Member L^c j James P. Leheny^ Jnember Michael Jubi^i^Department Head Department of Philosophy iii There are a number of individuals to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. Each member of my committee contributed in various ways to my undertaking and completing this dissertation. I first encountered the problem of the Cartesian Circle in a seminar given by Vere Chappell. Portions of Chapters III and IV began as a paper for that seminar . Robert Sleigh provided encouragement to take on this task long after I had dropped a prior dissertation topic. In fact, without his support I would not have started all over again. Fred Feldman was particularly helpful. As my committee chairman, his suggestions for revisions and his patience and willingness to provide me with additional time to write and revise are all things for which I am grateful. It was his article, a discussion of which appears in Chapter IV, which prompted me to think in terms of distinguishing between kinds of doubt and certainty in the Meditations . James Leheny also provided encouragement, particularly when I would despair of ever completing my task. I would also like to thank the University for granting me a leave of absence to complete a second draft. There are many others to whom I am also grateful for their support, encouragement, and assistance, including Julie Lansner, who typed the final copy. Finally, a very special thanks is due to Patricia Welch IV (who typed the first draft) without whose support and patience I would have had neither the opportunity nor the time to do any of this. v ABSTRACT Doubt, Certainty, and the Cartesian Circle (February 1983) Robert S. Welch, A.B., Brown University M.A., University of Massachusetts Ph-D., University of Massachusetts Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman Ever since Arnauld and others first pointed it out in their objections to Descartes ' Meditations , philosophers have concerned themselves with what appears to be a vicious circle: that the principle of clarity and distinctness which is employed to validate God's existence is itself in need of a guarantee which only God's existence can provide. In general, contemporary commentators proposing solutions to this problem can be divided into three camps: first, there are those who see reason as autonomous for Descartes and the principle of clarity and distinctness as needing no guarantee. By 'autonomy of reason' I mean that the faculty by which the Cogito and other of Descartes' first principles are perceived is not in need of any verification of its inability to err. Second, there are those who see reason as only partially autonomous for Descartes with that part validating the proof of God's existence which in turn vi validates that aspect of reason which is not autonomous. Third, there are those who see reason as non-autonomous and who argue for distinctions in the concepts of certainty and doubt in order to avoid the circle. In this dissertation I present the problem by drawing directly from the Meditations and the Objections and Replies and I outline the strategy I will employ in dealing with the problem. I proceed to discuss in turn each of the aforementioned three positions, the arguments offered by proponents of each, and the criticism of each, both my own and those found in the literature of the problem. Taking the third position, the non-autonomy of reason, as my starting point, I then present my own interpretation of Descartes' strategy which, I argue, succeeds in circum- venting the problem of circular reasoning and in over- coming the objections raised against others. Vll TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IV INTRODUCTION IX CHAPTER 1 1 11 32 111 80 IV 134 V 203 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 248 viii . INTRODUCTION In Meditation I Descartes sets forth reasons which will allow 1,1 him to "doubt about all things. and having systematically attempted to do this, turns in Meditation II to seek that which is indubitable and discovers that he, Descartes, exists as a thinking being. Using this discovery as a basis for further investigation Descartes concludes at the beginning of Meditation III that: I am certain that I am a thing which thinks; but do I not then likewise know what is requisite to render me certain of a truth? Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive very ^ clearly and very distinctly are true. Having asserted the doctrine of clarity and distinct- ness Descartes immediately appears to cast doubt upon it. X The Philosophical Works of Descartes , transl. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. T. R. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1931), Volumes I and II (hereafter abbreviated as HR I and HR II). HR I, p. 140. ^Ibid . , p 158 IX But when I took anything very simple and easy in the sphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration, e.g. that two and three together made five, and other things of the sort, were not these present to my mind so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were true? Cer- tainly if I judged that since such matters could be doubted, this would not have been so for any other reason than that it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a nature that 1 may have been deceived even concerning things which seemed to me most manifest. But every time that this precon- ceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am con- strained to confess that it is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence. And, on the other hand, always when I direct my attention to things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into words such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can never cause me to be nothing while I think that I am, or some day cause it to be true to say that I have never been, it being true now to say that I am, or that two and three make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see a manifest con- tradiction. And, certainly, since I have no reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all, the reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical. But in order to be able altogether to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see ^ that I can ever be certain of anything. ^Ibid. , pp. 158-159. x . : I shall hereafter refer to this passage as the Circle Passage Descartes then proceeds to argue for the existence of a non-deceiving God. Although he never explicitly employs the doctrine of clarity and distinctness to support the premises of his argument, its use is implicit in the following And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps materially false and that consequently I can derive it from naught (i.e. that possibly it exists in me I because am imperfect) , as I have just said is the case with ideas of heat, cold and other such things; for, on the con- trary, as this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it more objective reality than any other, there can be none which is of itself more true, nor any in which there can be less suspi- cion of falsehood. 4 Having demonstrated to his own satisfaction that a non-deceiving God exists, Descartes, in Meditation IV , appears to use this demonstration to guarantee the veracity of clear and distinct perceptions.