Book Reviews The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying York Times—suggested that the Unites States Inside Story of America’s War in was losing the war. Under the leadership Afghanistan of General David McKiernan, USA, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) By Michael Hastings had reached a stalemate. McKiernan’s main Blue Rider Press, 2012 problem seemed to be a matter of style, as he 381 pp., $27.95 preferred a low-key public relations approach ISBN: 978-039915-988-6 with the media. Though well respected by his peers, McKiernan was looked upon as a mem- ber of the “old school” generation of generals, REVIEWED BY GEORGE MICHAEL unlike General David Petraeus, who champi- oned the popular counterinsurgency (COIN) s the U.S. military enters its 11th doctrine. McKiernan refused to resign, and year of operations in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates effectively A public support for the effort dwin- fired him, which amounted to the first sack- dles, according to recent polls, as a solid ing of a wartime commander since President majority of Americans now believe the war Harry Truman removed General Douglas is going badly and is not worth fighting. In MacArthur at the height of the Korean War. The Operators, journalist Michael Hastings By removing McKiernan, the Pentagon saw explores the recent history of America’s lon- an opportunity to escalate and reset the war gest military campaign through the prism of in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal and his staff. McKiernan’s replacement, General Not long after his story broke in June 2010 in McChrystal, was the first Special Forces Rolling Stone magazine, General McChrystal Soldier to assume such a prominent bat- was forced to resign. The episode illustrated tlefield command. Over the course of his the deepening division between the White career, McChrystal learned to walk a fine House and Pentagon over the appropriate line in the rigid military hierarchy yet still prosecution of the war. succeed. He first entered the public spot- Hastings begins his story in the autumn light in March 2003 when he served as the of 2008, when conditions noticeably dete- Pentagon spokesman during the invasion riorated in Afghanistan. At that time, some of Iraq. Later that year, he took over as com- major media outlets—including the New mander of the Joint Special Forces Operations Command, overseeing the most elite units in the military, including Delta Force, Navy George Michael is an Associate Professor of SEALs, and Rangers. Relentlessly, his spe- Nuclear Counterproliferation and Deterrence Theory at the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation cial forces rooted out terrorists, most nota- Center, Maxwell Air Force Base. bly Abu Musab al-Zaraqawi, the recognized 146 | BOOK REVIEWS PRISM 3, NO. 4 MichAEL leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. His willingness to As Hastings explains, several members of get results endeared him to Donald Rumsfeld McChrystal’s staff questioned Obama’s abil- and Dick Cheney, even when it included ity to lead the war effort. Early into his term, bending the rules or skipping the chain of military leaders sensed that the new President command. Controversy seemed to follow was uncomfortable with the military. The him. For instance, in Iraq, he oversaw a net- Pentagon—filled with many Republicans work of prisons where detainees were beaten from the Bush years—viewed him with sus- and tortured. Furthermore, he was accused picion. of attempting to whitewash the friendly fire McChrystal was disappointed over death in Afghanistan of Pat Tillman, the NFL Obama’s lack of engagement in the war. star who joined the Army not long after the Hastings relates the tenuous relationship September 11 terrorist attacks. between U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry The pitched political battles that occurred and McChrystal as they clashed over strat- over troop levels in Afghanistan are recounted egy. McChrystal also had difficulty selling by Hastings. Essentially, there were two major his COIN plan to Afghan President Hamid camps in the debate. The Pentagon wanted a Karzai, whom Hastings depicts as a less-than- big footprint in order to launch a compre- competent leader of very questionable legiti- hensive COIN program. The other camp, led macy who effectively rigged the presidential by Vice President Joe Biden, favored a small election in 2009. footprint consisting of U.S. Special Forces McChrystal operated in the shadow of that would focus on hunting and killing the General Petraeus, whose COIN campaign remnants of al Qaeda. Through sporadic in Iraq—the surge—did much to stabilize and strategic leaks, McChrystal was able to the security in that country. But applying force President Barack Obama’s hand. In the same template in Afghanistan has been September 2009, Washington Post writer Bob more challenging. Petraeus, in The U.S. Army/ Woodward published McChrystal’s confiden- Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, tial assessment of the war in Afghanistan, argued that the cornerstone of the new strat- which concluded that the U.S. military was egy was to protect and gain the trust of the on the verge of “mission failure.” The story population. So-called kinetic operations— spurred Washington to take action, and, in that is, killing and capturing the insurgents— the end, Obama agreed to the 40,000 addi- were given less emphasis. The goal was to tional troops that McChrystal requested with recreate the Afghanistan of 1979, before the proviso that they begin leaving in July it was wracked with foreign invasion and 2011, a year earlier than the general wanted. internecine warfare. For McChrystal, it was President Obama, who voted against imperative to switch from the “shoot-first- the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a Senator from and-blow-shit-up” soldiering of the Special Illinois, pushed for fixing Afghanistan, which Forces to the COIN emphasis on protect- he identified as the most important theater ing the civilian population. To that end, he in the war on terror. But civil-military rela- issued a tactical directive that encouraged tions had been strained by the Afghan war, soldiers to avoid shooting in situations in which led to disagreements over planning. which civilians could be harmed. Over time, PRISM 3, NO. 4 BOOK REVIEWS | 147 MichAEL however, soldiers became frustrated with the In a protracted guerrilla campaign, new policy, which hampered their ability to perceptions are important. According to fight back. Hastings, the “military-media-industrial com- Currently worrisome is the growing plex” in large measure shapes policy on the insularity of the U.S. military from the rest Afghan war. Ostensibly, Operation Enduring of America. As Hastings points out, less than Freedom was launched to capture Osama bin 1 percent of the U.S. population serves in the Laden and crush al Qaeda in retaliation for military or has any connection to the ongoing the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. wars. According to his reasoning, the guilt of Over time, however, bin Laden was practi- the general public for not having served in the cally forgotten in the U.S. military effort military is covered up by an uncritical attitude in Afghanistan. In a sense, his death at the toward those who have. As for what motivated hand of SEAL Team Six was anticlimactic. the soldiers, Hastings found it was not so Nevertheless, it gave the Obama administra- much the objectives of the war, but rather a tion the political cover it needed to declare nearly metaphysical quality that one attained victory in Afghanistan and begin the draw- through tribulation that involved sacrifice and down of troops. White House officials could the risk of one’s life. To his loyal entourage, now make the case that the Afghan surge had McChrystal was a historic figure who gave worked. them a sense of identity. The war on terror, Hastings explains, did Why, Hastings asks, did McChrystal agree not unfold as it was originally planned. When to the Rolling Stone story? According to his take it commenced, President George W. Bush on the man, the general sought to immortalize announced that there would be no “battle- his image as a “badass” and a “snake-eating fields or beachheads.” Rather, there would be rebel” that would be cultivated by a cover story a secret war, conducted in the dark with no in the magazine. As the war in Afghanistan holds barred. As it turned out, however, there extended to the end of the decade, it is not were battlefields and beachheads after all, as surprising that Hastings found that McChrystal evidenced by the fighting in Kabul, Kandahar, and his entourage often comported themselves Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul. To Hastings, irreverently in the style of soldiers on the front- the military approach was misguided. Citing line, displaying “frustration” and “arrogance” a 2008 RAND study—“How Terrorist Groups and “getting smashed” and “letting off stress.” End: Implications for Countering al Qa’ida”— Not long after the story was released, President Hastings insists that the best way to defeat Obama fired McChrystal and named General terrorist networks is through law enforcement Petraeus as the new commander of U.S. forces rather than military force. Rejecting the “safe in Afghanistan. According to Hastings, what havens” pretext for the war, Hastings argues was most troubling about the story to the that terrorists do not need to take over a White House’s national security team was country and establish a sanctuary insofar as not that it questioned the competence of the numerous terrorist plots have been planned President and his advisors, but rather its sug- and carried out in the West. gestion that the troops were in near revolt Overall, Hastings paints a grim picture against McChrystal. of the U.S.