52540®Flight Safety iss 94 14/3/14 08:26 Page 1 ISSUE 94 SPRING 14 ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY The official publication of the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee ISSN 1355-1523 52540®Flight Safety iss 94 14/3/14 08:26 Page 2 Contents The Official Publication of THE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE ISSN: 1355-1523 SPRING 2014 FOCUS is a quarterly subscription journal devoted Editorial 1 to the promotion of best practises in aviation safety. It includes articles, either original or reprinted from other sources, related to safety issues throughout all areas of air transport operations. Besides providing information on safety related matters, FOCUS aims to promote debate Chairman’s Column 3 and improve networking within the industry. It must be emphasised that FOCUS is not intended as a substitute for regulatory information or company publications and procedures. Commercial Air Transport Operations in Class G Airspace – Are You Aware? 4 Editorial Office: The Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey. GU24 8HU Tel: 01276 855193 Fax: 01276 855195 e-mail: [email protected] Web Site: www.ukfsc.co.uk Distraction 6 Office Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday by Giles Wilson – DHL Air Advertisement Sales Office: UKFSC The Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey GU24 8HU Tel: 01276 855193 Fax: 01276 855195 Helicopter safety: Everybody’s concern 9 email: [email protected] Web Site: www.ukfsc.co.uk by Jos Stevens Office Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday Printed by: Woking Print & Publicity Ltd The Print Works, St. Johns Lye, St. Johns, Woking, Surrey GU21 1RS Hard Landing, a Case Study for Crews and Maintenance Personnel 16 Tel: 01483 884884 Fax: 01483 884880 by Nicolas Bardou & David Owens e-mail: [email protected] Web: www.wokingprint.com FOCUS is produced solely for the purpose of improving flight safety and, unless copyright is indicated, articles may be reproduced providing Accident Review - Fairchild SA 227-BC Metro III, Cork Airport 20 that the source of material is acknowledged. by Dai Whittingham Opinions expressed by individual authors or in advertisements appearing in FOCUS are those of the author or advertiser and do not necessarily reflect the views and endorsements of this journal, the editor or the UK Flight Safety Committee. Members List 24 While every effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained herein, FOCUS accepts no responsibility for any errors or omissions in the information, or its consequences. Specialist advice should always be sought in relation to any particular circumstances. Front Cover Picture: Seaflight Av. (VP-BSI departing Luton). Accredited Photo Terry Figg focus spring 14 52540®Flight Safety iss 94 14/3/14 08:26 Page 3 EDITORIAL How do we know when we are good enough? by Dai Whittingham, Chief Executive UKFSC n a world where there is always pressure of reducing the training burden which is has also been reported that the captain had Ito do more with less, one of the first a key factor in cost of ownership. The never flown a go-around. If, as seems casualties in the quest for cost reduction is manufacturers are in business to sell aircraft probable, the crew fell foul of a somatogravic often training.This is perhaps not a surprise and they will not want to produce a platform illusion while hand flying, experience may well because training is a costly venture and it is that requires extensive training to operate it have played a part in events; work for the UK difficult to argue for more when results at because their customer will simply go MOD suggests there is a direct correlation first glance seem to show that training is somewhere else.The result is that type ratings between experience (including experience adequate. Our accident rates across the produce a bare minimum standard deemed to on type) and susceptibility to spatial industry are generally excellent and hull be ‘good enough’. disorientation. The 1500 hr ATPL experience losses are mercifully infrequent, at least for threshold imposed by the US Congress in the the western hemisphere, to the point The evidence for ‘good enough’ comes from wake of the Colgan Air accident may seem a where complacency is now a real threat. the fact that pilots completing a rating are blunt instrument but there is no denying it capable of operating the aircraft to the provides a certain element of protection in However, loss of control in flight (LOC-I) and satisfaction of a TRE, who in turn works to a light of the above; whether it is a wholly CFIT continue to feature in global statistics, set of standards laid down by the regulator. appropriate measure is for another debate. and runway excursions are relatively But is it ‘good enough’? There are plenty of And we should also remember that accidents common, especially in the business sector. examples of type-rated pilots failing to are not restricted to short-haul operations; Sadly, there are very few accidents where understand their systems in sufficient depth to where pure hand-flying skills are concerned, it there is not some sort of human factor avoid so-called automation traps. For example, is sectors that count, not just hours. involved; many of these accidents could have it is apparent from information already been avoided had the crews had a better released by NTSB on the Asiana accident that There has been a considerable amount of understanding of their aircraft systems and at least one of the pilots did not fully work done in the USA looking at some of the how to manage them. Management of understand the primary automation systems fundamental principles underpinning training automation is a case in point. and the implications of the mode selections he and flight operations today, particularly had made. And is an MPL cadet really ready to concerning the operational use of flight path The investigation into the Asiana B-777 operate a complex modern aircraft after as management systems. The report on the accident at SFO last year is not yet complete, little as 15 days training on type? Perhaps, if Performance-based operations Rulemaking but there seems to be plenty of evidence everything is working as advertised and the Committee work with the CAST Flight Deck pointing towards shortcomings in training, environment is benign, perhaps not if he or she Automation Working Group was published by allied to cultural factors that may have is faced with cascading failures, poor weather the FAA in September 2013 and is available impeded early intervention when things and complex ATC procedures. There is no from the FAA website. It is well worth reading started going wrong. The ongoing substitute for experience and knowledge, and as it contains a number of stark conclusions investigation into the B-787 go-around this combination is not arrived at overnight. and some far-reaching recommendations for accident at Kazan also appears to be revealing designers, manufacturers, regulators and shortcomings in pilot training. With regard to experience and knowledge, operators. there is a greater need to share it than is The manufacturers have responded over the perhaps being recognised by those http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices years with increasingly sophisticated designs responsible for crewing. For example, the /avs/offices/afs/afs400/parc/parc_reco/media/2013/1309 aimed correctly at protecting us from our Asiana crew included a captain on one of his 08_PARC_FltDAWG_Final_Report_Recommendations.pdf human frailties, which has normally involved first few sectors since converting to type, automation. Autoland has been with us for paired with an instructor who was on his first The work identified inter alia vulnerabilities in years, but automation has now reached a ‘solo’ instructional trip. Why? A recent knowledge and skills for manual flight level of maturity where remotely piloted incident in the UK involved a captain on his operations and vulnerabilities in the use and systems are capable of landing on aircraft first day after initial line check being paired management of automation. Its 18 carriers and refuelling in the air – both with an FO who was on his first week of ops recommendations to the FAA included: demanding, high-fidelity tasks. Not strictly since his own initial line check, coupled with a ■ relevant to commercial ops, but the point is challenging destination. Did any element of Revise initial and recurrent pilot training, that almost anything is now possible with judgement come into the rostering system? qualification requirements (as necessary) automation and with sophistication comes If not, why not? and revise guidance for the development complexity. Allied to that has come and maintenance of improved knowledge commonality across aircraft families, again an The Kazan B-737 accident involved a captain and skills for successful flight path understandable development in the interests less 2500 hrs and an FO with 1700 hrs, and it management. focus spring 14 1 52540®Flight Safety iss 94 14/3/14 08:26 Page 4 EDITORIAL CONTINUED ■ Develop and implement standards and underpinned by a better knowledge of how and procedures. Perhaps it is time we had guidance for maintaining and improving the automation is assisting with flightpath some sort of post-graduate qualification - and knowledge and skills for manual flight management and it should therefore be easier not just a command position - that can be operations… for pilots to go back to basics when required. used to distinguish between those who know and those who know just enough. ■ Emphasize and encourage improved The USA work noted that it the increasing training and flightcrew procedures to complexity of modern aircraft and avionics improve autoflight mode awareness as rendered it almost impossible to train for all part of an emphasis on flight path eventualities (QF32…); instead the report management… recommends “developing … flightcrew strategies and procedures to address Prior to publication of the PARC/CAST report, malfunctions for which there is no specific Airbus had already moved to radically alter procedure”.