Constitutional Features of Presidential Elections and the Failure of Cross-ethnic 41 Coalitions to Institutionalize M. Bashir Mobasher Contents Introduction ...................................................................................... 736 The Contributing Features of Presidential Elections ........................................... 737 Unipersonal or Slate-Based Contest? ........................................................ 737 Pre-electoral Coalition-Making .............................................................. 739 The Fifty Percent Threshold ................................................................. 741 Coalition-Deterring Features of Afghan Presidential Elections ................................ 742 Two-Round Elections ........................................................................ 742 Candidate-Centric Elections ................................................................. 743 Zero-Sum Games ............................................................................ 746 Presidential Term Limits ..................................................................... 747 Nonconcurrent Electoral Cycles ............................................................. 749 Parallel Legitimacy .......................................................................... 750 Exclusion of Minorities ...................................................................... 751 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 751 References ....................................................................................... 753 Abstract This chapter studies the constitutional features of Afghan presidential elections and their impact on coalition-building. Based on the constitution, Afghan presiden- tial elections are candidate-centric, zero-sum games, prone to pre-electoral bargaining, majoritarian, double ballots, religiously exclusive, and constrained by electoral cycles, as well as presidential term limits. Examining the presidential electoral features, this chapter argues that they do not have unidirectional impacts on coalition-building: some electoral features incentivize the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions, while others hinder their institutionalization. Therefore, while some function as constructive features, others are obstructive to coalition-building. M. B. Mobasher (*) Department of Political Science, American University of Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 735 S. Ratuva (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Ethnicity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2898-5_157 736 M. B. Mobasher This chapter proposes that the obstructive features of presidential elections can be remedied through institutional designs. The remedies proposed in this chapter include holding concurrent elections and adopting nomination thresholds. Keywords Presidential elections · Electoral features · Cross-ethnic · Coalition-building Introduction Presidential elections have a number of distinct features, which are different from those of premier elections. For example, unlike premier elections, presidential elections are zero-sum games and single-seat contests. However, these distinct features of presidential elections have barely attracted the scholarly attentions that they deserve. Oftentimes, these features are explained in the margins of plurality and runoff systems. Sometimes, the literature tends to draw conclusions based on evaluation of just one or a few presidential electoral features (rules) in isolation and, therefore, misses some of the important effects that can be caught only with a wider lens. For example, Juan Linz (1994), Arend Lijphart (1977), and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) point to the zero-sum game and candidate-centric features of presidential elections as evidence that presidential systems are unfit for coalition- building and power-sharing (Linz 1994,21–23, 42–46). They argue that even the most successful presidential systems are linked with undisciplined parties and coalitions because presidents are less dependent on such organizations for winning and holding their offices (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 450). Further, power- sharing is meaningless in presidential democracies because an elected president is almost inevitably from one of the ethnic groups (Lijphart 2008, 169). On the opposite end, Donald Horowitz (2001), Gary W. Cox (1997), Maurice Duverger (1984), and others have emphasized that being one-seat elections and prone to pre-electoral bargaining, presidential elections are conducive to coalition- building and power-sharing. They have referred to the examples of Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, all of which abandoned the parliamentary system for a presidential constitution primarily for the purpose of nation-building and party development. They have also argued that it was presidential offices rather than anything else that led to a two-party system in the United States and two political blocs in France (Cox 1997, 188; Duverger 1984, 97; Suleiman 1992, 142). This chapter indicates that these scholars come to different conclusions because they have examined different features of presidential elections in isolation. No one electoral feature alone can explain the conduciveness (or lack thereof) of presidential systems to coalition-building. To understand how presidential elections influence cross-ethnic coalitions in a particular social setting, all electoral features must be studied including those of the electoral system. In case of Afghanistan, presidential elections are candidate-centric, zero-sum games, prone to pre-electoral bargaining, majoritarian, double ballots, religiously exclusive, and constrained by electoral cycles, as well as presidential term limits. 41 Constitutional Features of Presidential Elections and the Failure of... 737 Examining all these features, this chapter reveals that they do not function cohesively and unidirectionally: while some contribute to cross-ethnic coalition- building, others function in the opposite direction. This has been the most likely reason that most cross-ethnic coalitions were able to form in the presidential elections, but these coalitions were rarely ever able to survive after or even during elections. In other words, if we divide the process of coalition-building into two simple phases of formation and consolidation, some electoral features contribute to the former phase, while others deter the latter. The relationship between these features and development of cross-ethnic coalitions is illustrated in the following figure (Fig. 1). The following sections begin with explaining the contributing features of Afghan presidential elections. The subsequent section examines deterring features of pres- idential elections and their influence on halting or even reversing the consolidation of coalitions. Several new democracies have recognized some of these deficiencies and have attempted to remedy them through legal manipulations such as mandating party nomination, concurrent elections, co-presidency, superlative voting system, distributional threshold, legislative runoff, threshold adaptations, and many more. Further research is required to investigate the impacts of these electoral remedies for presidential elections in different sociopolitical contexts. The Contributing Features of Presidential Elections Unipersonal or Slate-Based Contest? While it may be true that a single presidential office cannot be distributed among different groups, this office has indeed functioned as a unifying force as it has encouraged vote pooling and interethnic accommodation in Afghanistan. In other words, unlike the multi-seat Wolesi Jirga (WJ), where ethnic votes are easily translated to ethnic share of seats, the unipersonal nature of the presidential office has compelled ethnic groups to form alliances in order to share the resources that come with that office. This is primarily because as head of the state and the government, the office of the president is the highest office in the country, raising the stakes for any ethnic group in the presidential elections. To date, most cross- ethnic coalitions have been formed to compete in presidential elections than in parliamentary ones: a ratio of 21 to 2. The vote pooling effect of presidential office is reinforced by vice-president candidates also running alongside presidential candidates. In fact, one can argue that Afghan presidential elections are not unipersonal but slate-based elections where each slate (presidential ticket) includes two vice-president candidates as well. In order to win votes across ethnic groups, the first thing that most presidential candidates tend to do has been to choose their running mates from two different ethnic groups. Afghan elections have indicated that picking the right VPs more than anything else determines the viability of presidential candidates. Those who are able to pick the most prominent elites from different ethnic groups as their running mates 738 M. B. Mobasher Ethnic distribution Ethnic parties irrelevant 50% Depend on threshold vote pooling Contributing Slate-based Tri-ethnic Formation of Cross- Features election Ticket ethnic Coalition Pre-electoral Information As many allies bargaining gap as possible Presidential Electoral Features Anti-party Political Commitment outsider Candidate Rely on centric patronage No Multiple discipline candidates Presidential Disloyal Disintegration De-consolidation of Term allies