STRATEGIES OF STATEBUILDING : CAUSES OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN ARMED INTERNATIONAL STATEBUILDING CAMPAIGNS BY LIBERAL POWERS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Paul D. Miller, M.P.P Washington, DC August 30, 2010 This dissertation is a United States Government work. ii STRATEGIES OF STATEBUILDING : CAUSES OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN ARMED INTERNATIONAL STATEBUILDING CAMPAIGNS BY LIBERAL POWERS Paul D. Miller, M.P.P Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The United States and United Nations have deployed military force three dozen times in attempts to rebuild failed states in the last century but have achieved success in just 56 percent of cases. Policymakers and scholars have yet to discover reliable policy options for rebuilding failed states. This dissertation is a response to that problem. What causes the success or failure of armed international statebuilding campaigns by liberal powers? The existing literature generally argues that statebuilding outcomes are a function of statebuilders’ inputs (e.g., military deployments, international aid, or the sequencing of reconstruction programs) or of the military, political, and economic conditions in the failed state. I conduct statistical tests on these existing hypotheses using the set of 36 cases of international statebuilding since 1898 and demonstrate that they lack broad explanatory power. I begin to develop a new hypothesis by advancing a definition of statehood that incorporates five key concepts: security, legitimacy, capacity, economy, and humanity. I argue that states can fail to varying degrees (weak, failing, or collapsed) in any or all aspects of statehood. Failed states can be anarchic, illegitimate, incapable, unproductive, or barbaric. iii I develop a typology of strategies of statebuilding. In contrast to scholars who argue strategy is a matter of correctly sequencing statebuilding efforts (e.g. “institutionalization first,” “security first,” or “liberalization first,”), I define strategies by reference to the degree of statebuilder involvement the intervention entails. Statebuilders can observe and monitor reform; build things and train and equip people; or assume executive authority. I term these, respectively, the Observer, Trainer, and Administrator strategies. I argue that successful strategies must correspond to the type and degree of state failure. More extensive failure requires more invasive statebuilding. No strategy is appropriate for all failed states because states fail in different ways. There may not even be one strategy appropriate for all aspects of state failure within one state because states can fail to different degrees across the different aspects of statehood. I test my theory through structured, focused case studies of West Germany (1945- 1955), Nicaragua (1989-1992), Liberia (1993-1997), Sierra Leone (1999-2006), and Afghanistan (2001-2009). iv Preface and Acknowledgments I served in Afghanistan with the United States Army in 2002. I also served in the White House on the National Security Council staff as Director for Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009, during the last 16 months of the Bush Administration and first eight months of the Obama Administration, on the staff of the Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. I assisted with the Presidential transition and supported the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy reviews in 2008 and 2009. These experiences demonstrated to me the tremendous resources and capabilities of the United States and our partners and allies around the world for delivering international assistance, yet also the equally tremendous challenge of bringing our resources to bear in a concerted, coherent way to achieve goals halfway around the world in a broken state in the midst of war, extreme poverty, and a foreign culture. None of my colleagues doubted that we should do everything possible to succeed, but many began to wonder as the years went by if we could succeed. I heard many soldiers, officers, bureaucrats, aid workers, and analysts ask, “Can this be done? Can we succeed? What does it take to succeed in an environment like this? Have we ever done anything like this before?” This dissertation is an effort to help them answer these questions, and it is dedicated to them and to the people of Afghanistan. The views and errors in this dissertation are my own. They do not reflect the views of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, the White House, either Administration for which I worked, or any other organization or agency. In the long journey of this dissertation, and the longer journey of life and work, I have incurred many debts. I would like to thank Robert Baldwin, high school English v teacher, for inspiring me to learn; Josh Mitchell, college philosophy professor, for teaching me that ideas matter; Alan J. Young, Army drill sergeant, for showing me that I am capable of more than I thought possible; Harold E. Brown, Jr., friend and fellow soldier who gave the last, full measure in Afghanistan; my wife Jennilee for her patience, support and love; my son Liam, for giving Daddy much needed laughter and study breaks; my daughter Lily, whose imminent birth was the strongest motivation to finish this dissertation; and my Dad, for everything else. vi Table of Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii Preface and Acknowledgments ........................................................................................... v Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. vii Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... ix List of Tables and Figures ................................................................................................ xii Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 The Puzzle and Its Importance ........................................................................................ 1 What is International Statebuilding? ............................................................................... 4 What is International Statebuilding not? ........................................................................ 9 Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 12 Methodology and Outline of Work ............................................................................... 47 The Argument ............................................................................................................... 51 Chapter 2: Testing Theories ............................................................................................. 54 Case selection ............................................................................................................... 55 An Objection ................................................................................................................. 61 Measuring Success and Failure ..................................................................................... 65 Identifying Variables .................................................................................................... 73 Methodology ................................................................................................................. 79 Findings ........................................................................................................................ 81 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 88 Congruence Tests .......................................................................................................... 90 Cross-Tabulation Tables ............................................................................................. 112 Regression Results ...................................................................................................... 138 Chapter 3: States and State Failure ................................................................................ 147 What is the State? ....................................................................................................... 148 What is a Failed State? ................................................................................................ 175 The Dynamics of State Failure During Statebuilding ................................................. 198 Synopsis ...................................................................................................................... 204 Chapter 4: Strategies of Statebuilding ........................................................................... 205 Lessons from Comparative Politics ............................................................................ 208 Strategies of Statebuilding .......................................................................................... 214 Chapter 5: Selected Cases of International Statebuilding .............................................. 264 Historical Background ................................................................................................ 264 Case Selection ............................................................................................................