Studies in European Cinema ISSN: 1741-1548 (Print) 2040-0594 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rseu20 Gillo Pontecorvo's ‘dictatorship of the truth’—a legacy Thomas Riegler To cite this article: Thomas Riegler (2009) Gillo Pontecorvo's ‘dictatorship of the truth’—a legacy, Studies in European Cinema, 6:1, 47-62 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1386/seci.6.1.47/1 Published online: 03 Jan 2014. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 260 View related articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rseu20 SEC_6_1_05-Riegler_090006 10/28/09 6:54 PM Page 47 Studies in European Cinema Volume 6 Number 1 © Intellect Ltd 2009. Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/seci.6.1.47/1 Gillo Pontecorvo’s ‘dictatorship of the truth’ – a legacy Thomas Riegler Abstract Keywords The article explores the impact and legacy of the ‘dictatorship of the truth’ exem- Gillo Pontecorvo plified in Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers (1965). Its central claim of The Battle of Algiers realism has left an extraordinary impact on viewers: the film was (and still is) Algerian war of seen as a truly authentic depiction of the Algerian FLN’s successful struggle independence against French rule. Thus, The Battle of Algiers influenced leftwing revolutionary dictatorship of the groups, but it was also screened at military academies for training in anti-guer- truth rilla warfare. The image of the ‘dictatorship of the truth’ has since grown to cinematic realism almost ‘mythical’ proportions, while necessary questions about accuracy tended Italian cinema to be sidelined. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize its central claim – offering a view of an historical event as it ‘really’ was – not only on matters of bias and his- torical accuracy, but also along the inherent limitations of cinematic ‘realism’. The Battle of Algiers and ‘the dictatorship of the truth’ The Battle of Algiers dramatises a well-known episode during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962). It began as the National Liberation Front (FLN) made a calculated decision to move the existing conflict into the capital. Years of rural guerrilla warfare had achieved little for their cause; by making Algiers a central battlefront and deliberately striking against civilians, the rebels could count on media coverage as well as French reprisals that would in turn gain them popular support. Their move was effective: in January 1957, after a string of bombing attacks on cafés and public places, the army was called in to deal with the ‘emer- gency situation’. General Jacques Massu and the 6,000 men of his 10th Paratrooper division responded with indiscriminate violence, torture and repression. This event was only afterwards called ‘Battle of Algiers’ and it lasted until September 1957, when the last FLN-activists were either killed or arrested. Even though the French won it, they proved to lose the war, granting independence to Algeria in 1962 (Horne 1977: 183–202). The Battle of Algiers would probably never been made, had the FLN not displayed an interest in telling its story. Saadi Yacef, who had com- manded the bomb-network during the last months of the Battle of Algiers and had come to hold the post of government minister afterwards, proved critical. Not only did he publish a memoir, but he also founded the first pro- duction and distribution company to make a movie about the struggle. He SEC 6 (1) 47–62 © Intellect Ltd 2009 47 SEC_6_1_05-Riegler_090006 10/28/09 6:54 PM Page 48 enlisted Italian director Gillo Pontecorvo and script writer Franco Solinas, who had already planned to make a movie about the war, but from a western perspective – through the eyes of a French journalist (and former paratrooper). Yacef initially offered a script he had composed out of his memoirs, but the Italians rejected it as ‘awfully’ propagandistic. Instead Solinas composed a much more balanced draft, although it kept the main structural elements of Yacef’s version (Forgacs 2007: 357). With a budget of US$ 800,000, half from private sources and half from the Algerian gov- ernment, The Battle of Algiers was then produced on location during 5 months in 1965. The film was an outstanding success: it won the grand prize at the Venice Film Festival, and survives as one of the most important movies in cinema history (Mellen 1973: 16–23). Putting it first in context of Pontecorvo’s filmography, The Battle of Algiers exemplifies the ‘dictatorship of the truth’. One has to refer first to a unique visual style that echoes both Pontecorvo’s training as professional photographer and the aesthetics of post-war Italian Neorealismo. Shot in black and white with high contrast, giving it a ‘grainy’ look, The Battle of Algiers has the tone and atmosphere of a documentary, a historical ‘cinema vérité’. Marcello Gatti’s mostly handheld camerawork resembled newsreel so closely, that an American distributor inserted a disclaimer: ‘This dramatic re-enactment [. .] contains NOT ONE FOOT of Newsreel or Documentary Film’. Second, since Pontecorvo considers a ‘contrapuntal relationship’ between image and sound, music is a vital element (Said 2000: 24, 25). In the case of The Battle of Algiers, one reviewer went so far to call it a ‘musical’. Indeed, Ennio Morricone’s themes structure the movie: it is the same scored mourning for both French and Arab victims. In this way, intimidating drum beats mark the appearance of Paras, and the war woops echoing from the old Arab quarter towards the splendid ‘European’ city underline the impression of unbroken, defiant spirit, that cannot be broken. The baba salem (an African percussion instrument) is also used in many key scenes, reinforcing the underlying tension with effect. Third, showing ‘real faces’ was always a concern for Pontecorvo than casting big stars. In The Battle of Algiers, he used an all-amateur ensemble, with the notable exception of French theatre actor Jean Martin in the role of Lt. Colonel Mathieu. For the counterpart on the insurgent’s side, ‘El-hadi Jaffar’, Pontecorvo convinced Yacef Saadi to play himself as the leader of the FLN bomber-network. When he had been captured by the French in 1957, Yacef had already given the personal impression of being more an ‘actor’ than a ruthless guerrilla (Morgan 2007: 231). As his trusted adju- tant and short-time successor, Ali La Pointe, Pontecorvo selected Brahim Haggiag, a poor and illiterate peasant, whom he had picked up by chance on a market because of his fitting looks: ‘His was the face we were imagin- ing when we were writing the screenplay – the exact face!’ (Holmes 2004). Haggiag had to be coached step by step, but grew accustomed to his part and in this process resembled the conversion of the real Ali La Pointe from a crook into a ‘conscious’ resistance fighter. 48 Thomas Riegler SEC_6_1_05-Riegler_090006 10/28/09 6:54 PM Page 49 It was in the alleys of Algiers old Muslim quarter, the Casbah, where Pontecorvo found all the faces he envisioned for his central hero – the ‘choral personality’ of Algerians winning their freedom through collective effort. Many of these people simply ‘re-lived’ the conflict a second time: ‘[. .]; the wounds of the war were still raw. [. .] That’s why we didn’t use actors’, Yacef recalled. For example, the condemned FLN prisoner, who is led to the guillotine in one of the opening scenes, had in fact been sen- tenced to death during the struggle: ‘So he knew his role, without Pontecorvo saying anything to him’ (Harrison 2007b: 407). The fourth formal element is the recherché: Pontecorvo and Solinas spent 8 months not only researching all aspects of the conflict, meeting representatives of the FLN in Rome, Paris and Algiers, but also taped inter- views with some Para-commanders and veterans. For days, former FLN- activist Sala Bazi toured the film-makers around the Casbah, and told them how his organization made explosives and put them to use. Pontecorvo described the result of this process: ‘We came away with an idea of the situ- ation as complete as if we had lived it ourselves’ (Solinas 1973: 181). Saadi Yacef advised on castings and secured anything they needed from the Algerian government: tanks, firearms, trucks and helicopters. However, it was the historical setting that contributed most to the work’s authenticity – shooting in the narrow streets only 3 years after the end of that bloody con- flict certainly was an achievement. Even the locations for some of the key events in the film were the ‘real’ place as Saadi claimed in an interview: ‘My arrest in the hideout. All details were recreated. The bombs were exploded in the same locations. [. .] Where Ali La Pointe died behind the false tiled wall, we rebuilt exactly the same house’. All those stylistic elements – the grainy newsreel-like cinematography, a propulsive score, preferring physical resemblance over professionals and a pedantic observance of both factual information and set design – result in what Pontecorvo called the essence of his film-making: ‘staying close to reality’ and conveying a ‘sense of truth’. He credits the BBC for calling this the ‘dictatorship of the truth’ (Esposito 2004). A model for revolution? Because of Pontecorvo’s goal of authentic representation through a dis- tinct visual style and profound knowledge, the film still resonates across the years. Indeed, The Battle of Algiers not only reveals much of the tactics inherent in asymmetric war – such as random shootings, bombings of public places and even a ‘suicide’-like mission – but also explores the ratio- nality and effectiveness of terrorism in the context of a confrontation between unequal opponents.