A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kocka, Jürgen Article Revolution and nation - 1989/90 in historical perspective The European studies journal Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Kocka, Jürgen (1993) : Revolution and nation - 1989/90 in historical perspective, The European studies journal, ISSN 0820-6244, University of Northern Iowa, Department of Modern Languages, Cedar Falls, Iowa, Vol. 10, Iss. 1/2, pp. 45-56 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122768 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. 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Weitere Informationen zum Projekt und eine Liste der ca. 1 500 digitalisierten Texte sind unter http://www.wzb.eu/de/bibliothek/serviceangebote/open-access/oa-1000 verfügbar. This text was digitizing and published online as part of the digitizing-project OA 1000+. More about the project as well as a list of all the digitized documents (ca. 1 500) can be found at http://www.wzb.eu/en/library/services/open-access/oa-1000. Revolution and Nation - 1989/90 in Historical Perspective1 Jürgen Kocka I Europe’s Unity The French Revolution of 1789 deepened the division of Europe. It led into two decades of European wars. For more than a century, the development of Central and Eastern Europe differed from the West European pattern, since most countries east of the River Rhine neither accepted nor imitated the socio-political model of the French Revolution, but reacted with a mixture of adjustment and rejection. A gradual estrangement between Western Europe and Central Europe began, and this was one root of the "German divergence from the West" which reached its climax in the 1930s and 1940s. The Russian Revolution of 1917 laid the ground for another, even deeper division of Europe. It triggered a long conflict between oppositional ideologies and systems, a conflict which fundamentalized the struggle between the two great powers after 1945 and which reached its climax in the Cold War. This East/West conflict divided Germany, polarized Europe and contributed to the levelling-off of the old line of tension which had separated Germany from the West. By contrast, the Central and East-European revolutions of 1989 have contributed to uniting the continent. They have started or accelerated the transition towards a general European pattern where it had been forestalled until then. This general European pattern consists of a market-based but government influenced economy; of a pluralist, but unequal society; and of a liberal-democratic government organized around parties and state-interest-group mediation. Certainly, in individual countries, transition towards this pattern is occurring with different speed in different forms, with different chances of success. On the way it may turn out that such a transition The European Studies Journal Vol. X, No. 1-2 /1993 ISSN 0820-6244 presupposes a degree of socio-economic maturity and certain cultural traditions which do not yet exist everywhere. Probably, differences between the West and the East of the continent, between the European core and the European periphery will become more visible again in the years to come. Old divides along national and cultural lines will reemerge. These will be sources of new problems, tensions and conflicts. There will be no "end of history" and no end of wars, even within Europe. Nevertheless, with respect to the basic economic order, with respect to constitutional principles, and with respect to official political philosophy, Europe today is less fragmented, less divided than it has been at any point in time within the last two centuries. Actually, this new European consensus is a Western consensus, shared by countries like the United States of America and Australia, while Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union approach it only halfheartedly and with very uncertain chances of success. 2 Particularities of the Revolution of 1989 Why should the changes of 1989/90 have had such a unifying effect on most of Europe? Certainly, the developments differed from country to countiy, but there were some similarities. There are three characteristics of the 1989 revolutions which can be put into historical perspective, and which may explain their unifying effect.I. I. On Ideas and Aims In contrast to 1789 and 1917, the revolutions of 1989 were not inspired by new, utopian ideas, nor did they give birth to new visions of alternative systems or alternative ways of life. Certainly, theories of a "third way" between Eastern state socialism and Western state-influenced capitalism were looked for, but could not be found. Certainly, intellectuals and some politicians advocated "socialism with a human face" again, but wherever such visions became more concrete they turned out to be mere variations of the social-democratic and ecological program which can be regarded to be part of the Western system. Certainly, there has been some talk about "Mitteleuropa” as distinguished from the East and the West, and this did have some influence in preparing the revolution, at least in Budapest and Prague. But by and large, these ideas remained vague and marginal. Certainly, the breakdown of the old régimes led to a new stress on direct-democratic, consensus-orientated, participatory forms of politics. One remembers 46 the "round tables," the mass demonstrations, citizens’ councils, ”Btirgerforert” and other expressions of grass root democracy, most clearly perhaps in East-Germany. There were utopian moments in Leipzig and Berlin in October 1989, small minorities saw themselves to a more perfect form of democracy, reaching beyond the parliamentary party democracy of the West. But these manifestations of direct democracy were a reaction to a short-lived vacuum of power in the early phase of transition, much weaker than comparable manifestations in history, especially the council movements, in 1917 or 1918/19. They were soon absorbed by representative, forms of democratic politics, without much resistance and eveiywhere. As a whole, the revolutions of 1989 were inspired and guided by democratic and liberal ideas which have become central in Western political thought since the 18th century: the norms of a civil society, human and civil rights, the principles of constitutional, democratic government; pluralism and the legitimacy of dissent; a separation of economic and political power; individual freedom and national autonomy, and in this context: the market. Principles of this kind - together with a desire for improved material standards of life- have inspired the opposition to the Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, the debates of the intellectuals in Warsaw, Budapest and Prague, but also -partly- the rhetoric of revolution in Leipzig and Berlin. These were principles which, to some extent, have become reality in the West, although not without exceptions and always at risk. This is why the revolutions of 1989 basically had the aim and the function of catching up with the West, or rather: with some essential elements of Western society which contains many other, less attractive elements as well. II. On Causation The momentum of change was partly generated within the societies between the river Elbe and the Soviet border.