FHE GREATNES AND. DECLIN OF ROME GOG LI ELMO THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME By GUGLIELMO FERRERO I. THE EMPIRE-BUILDERS II. JULIUS CAESAR III. THE FALL OF AN ARISTOCRACY The Press on Volumes I. and II. "The characters are made to live upon their stage and their innermost souls are laid bare with the ruthless penetration of Balzac ; situations and classes are summed up in incisive para- graphs. Whatever be the reader's opinion, he cannot help being struck by the force with which Signer Ferrero puts his argument and the admirable way in which he supports it from authorities. Other merits in the work can only be named the insight into the social life and the psychology of the Roman people, the full justice done to Lucullus and Cicero, and the excellent appendices. Mr. Zimmern has done his work most admirably, and has succeeded in reproducing, in a great measure, the vivacity of the original." Times. " The reader who starts to read the young Italian scholar's book will find a fresh and vigorous treatment of a great subject, with a new handling of the evidence. The whole book is very stimulat- A thenteum. ing."" Everywhere he gives us the impression of mastery of his com- plicated subject. The great merit of the book is that it is not only scholarly, but also thoroughly readable. History is meant to be read, and no amount of laborious exposition by the most pains- taking specialist is of any use, if the specialist cannot write." Notes and Queries. " ' The appearance of a translation of the famous history of The ' Greatness and Decline of Rome is an event in our academic world. The width and acuteness of Ferrero's study of the period and his special point of view are very striking. His studies of Caesar and the other leading figures are interesting and novel ; on the other hand, his handling of recondite questions such as that of the corn trade in the ancient world is confident and learned in the highest degree." The Outlook. LONDON : WILLIAM HEINEMANN, 21 BEDFORD ST., W.C. THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME VOL. IV. ROME AND EGYPT BY GUGLIELMO FERRERO TRANSLATED BY REV. H. J. CHAYTOR, M.A. HEADMASTER OF PLYMOUTH COLLEGE LONDON WILLIAM HEINEMANN 1908 All rights reserved CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE I. CLEOPATRA'S MARRIAGE i II. THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN n III. ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA 29 IV. THE NEW EGYPTIAN EMPIRE 50 V. ACTIUM 76 VI. THE FALL OF EGYPT 104 VII. THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC .... 121 VIII. THE POSITION OF AUGUSTUS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR. 143 IX. ROME AND EGYPT 173 X. THE RELIGIOUS REVIVAL AND THE ^ENEID . 212 XI. THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM .... 235 APPENDIX 257 INDEX 279 CHAPTER I CLEOPATRA'S MARRIAGE The plan of the Parthian campaign Antony resolves to marry Cleopatra Octavianus prepares for a final campaign against Sextus Pompeius The marriage of Antony and Cleopatra Public opinion in Italy The first epodes of Horace. MEANWHILE, apparently in July 37, Jerusalem had fallen into Antony's plan campaig:n< the power of Herod and Sossius;* the conclusion of this struggle so far modified the situation as to make the trouble expended upon the convention of Tarentum partially unnecessary. The army which had been besieging Jerusalem was set free, and Antony, who had already transferred part of his naval expendi- ture to his colleague, was glad to save the pay and maintenance of the twenty-one thousand soldiers which he had proposed to borrow from Octavianus ; he had now no further need of them to carry out Caesar's plan, which was an application on a large scale of the advice vainly offered to Crassus by the King of Armenia in the year 55. The conquest of Persia could only be completed by the destruction of the Parthian army, and, in particular, of their famous cavalry with its marvellous skill in drawing the enemy from his base of operations, turning his positions, making frontal attacks and harassing his flanks, while avoiding any decisive conflict. How were these tactics to be avoided ? How could Antony oblige the Parthians to give battle at a short distance from his base of operations at a favourable place and moment ? Should he follow the route * This is the opinion of Kromayer, Hermes, xxix. p. 563 ff., but the date is very disputable, and it seems to me difficult to reach any posi- tive conclusion. Cp. Van der Chijs, de Herode Magno, p. 36. Gardt- hausen, Augustus undjseine Zeit, u. p. 118, n. 12, IV * A 2 GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME 37 B.C. of Crassus and threaten Seleucia ? The temporary occupation of the Mesopotamian towns would make no great difference to the Parthians, while Seleucia was so far from the Euphrates that a campaign in that direction would have provided the enemy with every opportunity for pursuing their favourite tactics, as indeed the disaster of Crassus had shown. Caesar had therefore resolved to invade Persia by a longer but safer the instead the east in route, on north of ; Armenia Minor, upon the table-land now known as the plateau of Erzeroum, he proposed to concentrate some hundred thousand legionaries and oriental auxiliary troops, a large supply of provisions and an immense train from this his march would lie siege ; point through rich and populous countries friendly to the Romans until he reached the Araxes, which formed the frontier of a vassal state of the Media thence great Parthians, Atropatene ; he would march upon the metropolis of Media, which was only some four hundred kilometres from the frontier.* If the Parthians came to the help of their vassal king, the Roman army would be able to fight decisive battles in a favourable situation with full for their rear on the other protection ; if, hand, the Parthians abandoned their vassal to his fate, Media would be made the first stage of the conquest and the base from which the Roman army would begin the invasion of Persia. Antony's life of pleasure cannot have made him so effeminate as his have asserted otherwise he would never biographers ; have had the courage to begin so great an enterprise. He required, however, enormous sums of money for the soldiers whom he proposed to concentrate and for the supply of muni- tions and engines of war. At length he was reduced to the conviction that all his efforts to secure the necessary funds had been inadequate. His needs could not be supplied either by the new sovereigns whom he had enthroned in the east in the year 39, or by his quaestors, who debased the silver coinage to strike * Suetonius. Cces. 44 : Parthis inferre helium per Armeniam minorem. For this account of Antony's war, I have followed in almost every instance the masterly reconstruction of Kromayer in Hermes, xxxi. ff he to to have sifted of p. 70 ; seems me every grain truth from the classical texts, and to have made every permissible conjecture. CLEOPATRA'S MARRIAGE 3 the denarii intended for the payment of the legions,* or by the 37 B.C. petty raids upon which he constantly despatched detachments of his army. It was for this purpose that Antony then ordered Canidius to lead six legions into the Caucasus to make war upon the Iberians and Albanians these were to live the ; legions upon country and to winter near the tableland of Erzeroum, where the army was to concentrate in the spring, f It was thus not men but money that Antony required to Antony's carry out Caesar's great project, which was to make him master of the empire. Octavianus was still poorer than himself Cleopatra. and therefore could not be of the smallest use, while Antony's anger must have been aroused by the mistrust and duplicity which his colleague had displayed in the course of their bar- he was to swallow the affront his gaining ; obliged which brother-in-law had inflicted on him at Tarentum by forcing him to beg for an agreement which was much more advan- tageous to Octavianus than to himself. For this reason, on his short journey from Tarentum to Corfu, Antony considered that the moment had come for him to accept the offer which Cleopatra had made him and to become King of Egypt by marriage, t The man who is represented by ancient his- torians as the hero of a long love-story had contrived to endure three of from he was to years separation Cleopatra ; returning her, because she was the queen of the only eastern country which had not been desolated by civil war, and because at that moment his pecuniary anxieties had obliged him to resign part of his fleet to his colleague. This consideration alone is full reason for asking whether the famous love-story was not in- vented to conceal a much more serious struggle of political interests. It was not to satisfy a romantic passion for the of that his Queen Egypt Antony was marrying Cleopatra ; object was to join Egypt to the other countries which he governed and to draw as he pleased upon the treasury of the Ptolemies for the maintenance of his army and the execution of Caesar's great project. In short, this action and indeed the * ix. Cp. Pliny, N. H. XXXIII. 132 ; Mommsen, Rom. Munzw. p. 743. xlix. Ant. this under a t Dion, 24 ; Plutarch, 34 (who puts event different date). % See the appendix. 4 GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME 37 B.C.