Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Dangerous Knowledge? Morality And Moral Progress After Naturalism Daniel Diederich Farmer Marquette University Recommended Citation Farmer, Daniel Diederich, "Dangerous Knowledge? Morality And Moral Progress After Naturalism" (2014). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 344. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/344 DANGEROUS KNOWLEDGE? MORALITY AND MORAL PROGRESS AFTER NATURALISM by Daniel Diederich Farmer, B.A., M.A. A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin May 2014 ABSTRACT DANGEROUS KNOWLEDGE? MORALITY AND MORAL PROGRESS AFTER NATURALISM Daniel Diederich Farmer, B.A., M.A. Marquette University, 2014 From the perspective of at least some of our valuing practices, the advance of the sciences can seem to constitute a threat. The question I take up in this dissertation is whether or not naturalism—understood as the picture of the world and of ourselves bequeathed to us by the sciences—should be understood as a threat to our moral practices, to moral living. On the account I defend, the knowledge we gain from empirical inquiry need not undermine moral living in toto, although a naturalistic mindset does raise some possibly dangerous questions for particular inherited moral norms and ideals. In defense of my claim that the examined life need not destroy the moral life, I develop a social view of morality. On this view, both moral authority and moral justification are viewed as fundamentally social phenomena, and morality itself as a tool for social living. With a case study on the development of the ethics of care, I illustrate ways in which a concern for empirically truthful representations of humanity can also dovetail with liberatory political concerns. That is, I defend not only the claim that moral living can survive critical scrutiny, but also the claim that it can be enriched by this scrutiny—that the truth can be transformative. Expansive moral ideals, such as those humanist views that see progress in the expansion of our moral vocabularies and institutions, are compatible with a naturalistic outlook, I argue. However, a strong defense of humanist views, according to which such ideals flow unproblematically from the nature of reason or from the history of ethical practice, does not seem possible. A weak defense of humanism, which connects the ideals of humanists to more widely held values, seems more promising. In working socially and politically for their cause, I contend that humanists in some sense have the truth on their side: sexist, racist, classist, or otherwise inegalitarian views regularly trade in falsehoods and obfuscation. Empirically truthful accounts of particular inherited norms and ideals thus continue to be dangerous, at least for those invested in the continued existence of the corresponding institutions. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Daniel Diederich Farmer, B.A., M.A. I am very grateful to my committee for inspiring me and for supporting my work on this project: to Margaret Walker, for patiently steering me in fruitful directions; to Nancy Snow, for consistently direct and consistently helpful comments; to Theresa Tobin, for introducing me to feminism and feminist ethics; and to Kevin Gibson, for the big picture. For their camaraderie, their thoughtfulness, and our many thought-provoking conversations, I thank my fellow Marquette philosophy graduate students, and Celeste Harvey Gustafson, Trevor Smith, and Chad Kleist in particular. I also want to thank the Philosophy Department for nominating me for the Schmitt fellowship, which I received in the 2011-2012 school year. I am grateful to the friends and family members who cared for my children while I worked on the dissertation: Rebecca Keiser, Rachel Stolpe, and Lisa Diederich especially. Finally and most importantly, I am infinitely grateful to my wife and partner Nicole Elisabeth Farmer, whose support every step of the way has meant the world to me. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . i INTRODUCTION . 1 CHAPTER I. NATURALISM AND SKEPTICISM . 6 1. Introduction . 6 2. Naturalism . 8 What We Know . 8 How the World Works . 10 What Must Disappear . 14 3. Morality after Naturalism . 16 The Optimistic View . 16 Preemptive Adjustments . 19 4. Skeptical Considerations . 22 Mortality and Moral Authority . 22 Evolutionary Skepticism . 25 Fictionalism and Abolitionism . 29 5. Conclusion . 32 II. PICTURING MORALITY AFTER DARWIN . 35 1. Introduction . 35 2. Joyce’s Master Argument . 37 Practical Clout . 37 The Evolution of Conscience . 40 iii Usefulness and Justification . 43 Non-Cognitivism . 45 The Failure of Moral Naturalism . 47 Joyce’s Conclusion . 49 3. Revisiting Moral Authority . 51 Two Sources of Authority . 51 Convention and Convention-Transcendence . 54 The Moral-Conventional Distinction . 58 4. Transparency and Justification . 60 Pictures of Morality . 60 Opacity and Transparency . 64 Moral Justification . 66 5. Conclusion . 69 III. MORAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE ETHICS OF CARE . 72 1. Introduction . 72 2. The Ethics of Care . 74 A Different Voice . 74 Feminine Ethics . 77 Maternal Practice . 80 Intersectionality . 82 Meeting Needs . 84 3. An Interpretation . 87 Feminist Skepticism . 87 iv Moral Equilibrium . 91 Naturalism . 95 4. Conclusion . 98 IV. THE ROLE OF REASON IN MORAL PROGRESS . 101 1. Introduction . 101 2. Singer on Progress . 103 Sociobiology and Ethics . 103 Choosing Rationally . 106 Expanding Sympathies . 111 Singer’s Five Theses . 114 3. The Rational Altruism Argument . 115 Beyond Biology? . 115 Indirect Reciprocity . 118 Reason as a Psychological Capacity . 123 The Social Activation of Reason . 128 4. The Rational Foundation Argument . 132 Why Reason? . 132 The Default Utilitarianism Version . 133 The Normative Truth Version . 137 Reasons for Whom? . 142 5. Conclusion . 144 V. THE CASE FOR UTOPIA . 147 1. Introduction . 147 v 2. Pragmatic Naturalism . 149 The Ethical Project . 149 Functions, Ethics, and Progress . 154 Utopia . 159 3. Against Functionalism . 162 The Original Function of Ethics . 162 Functions, Problems, and Personal Ends . 167 4. Defending Utopia . 175 Dealing with Skeptics . 175 Justifying Utopia to Whom? . ..