VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 11 • JUNE 04, 2019 SPECIAL ISSUE: THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TIANANMEN MASSACRE IN THIS ISSUE: The Tiananmen Massacre Remembered at 30 Years: The Chinese Communist Party’s Political and Military Considerations By Larry Wortzel The June 4th Massacre and the Militarization of Chinese Politics By Willy Lam “Study May Fourth,” But Not June Fourth: The CCP Seeks Control of China’s Historical Legacies By John Dotson ​ Editor’s Note: This week marks the 30th anniversary of the Chinese government’s violent military crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Beijing, an event that has entered history as the “Tiananmen Massacre.” Estimates of the numbers of those killed on the night of June 3-4, 1989 range from the low hundreds to nearly three thousand—although the true figures may never be known, due to the Chinese government’s tight ​ ​ ​ censorship of information surrounding these events. Violence on a smaller scale was also seen in other Chinese cities, and the crackdown inaugurated a campaign of nationwide repression whose effects are still felt in China today. This special issue of China Brief includes three articles that commemorate the anniversary of the mass ​ protest movement of spring 1989, as well as the tragic repression that followed. In our first article, Dr. Larry Wortzel—who in 1989 was a U.S. Army officer serving in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing— offers an analysis of ​ ​ ​ the divisions within the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that led first to policy paralysis, and ultimately to the horrific violence that filled the streets of Beijing. Next, longtime analyst of Chinese politics Dr. Willy Lam discusses the ways in which the post-Tiananmen trajectory of the CCP has impacted Chinese society and politics into the present day, particularly in terms of the increasing militarization of education and public life. Finally, my own contribution will look at some of the ways in which the CCP ChinaBrief • Volume 19 • Issue 11 • June 4, 2019 ​ seeks to shape historical narratives: contrasting the suppression of historical memory surrounding June 1989 with the Party’s recent propaganda campaign related to the May Fourth Movement. We modestly hope that this issue will help to honor the memories of those who died in Beijing and other Chinese cities thirty years ago, and illuminate for our readers some of the ways that the legacy of Tiananmen lives on today. -- John Dotson, editor *** The Tiananmen Massacre Remembered at 30 Years: The Chinese Communist Party’s Political and Military Considerations By Larry Wortzel Image: Backlit by flames, PLA troops advance through Tiananmen Square in the early morning hours of June 4, 1989. (Source: ABC News/Youtube) Introduction—Divisions Within the Communist Party Set the Stage for Tiananmen We don’t know how many demonstrators or ordinary citizens were killed during the Tiananmen Massacre, but it was bloody and brutal. After June 4, 1989, the CCP set the death toll at 200—of which it claimed that only 36 were students, and that 23 members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or People’s Armed Police (PAP) were killed. [1] A discreet source of information affiliated with the Chinese Red Cross, a doctor, told ​ the U.S. Embassy on June 4, 1989 that the death toll was around 2,600. [2] Even after the violence on the ​ night of June 3-4, the streets of Beijing were filled with sporadic gunfire from the PLA for days after that. [3] ​ ChinaBrief • Volume 19 • Issue 11 • June 4, 2019 ​ One reason for the violence was an extended period of internal debate and inaction by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as the protests spread throughout China in the spring of 1989. The length and size of the protests in China, and the ultimate scale of the violence, resulted in part from an inability to reach decisions on handling the protests by the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). [4] The CCP leadership had been in disagreement over the pace of economic and political reform in China for some time. After an extended period of student demonstrations in 1986, CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang was criticized for his handling of events. Hu, along with a group of CCP Leaders (Zhao Ziyang, Lu Dingyi, Wan Li and Xi Zhongxun), had argued that economic reform should proceed in parallel with Party political reforms, including an expanded role for labor unions. [5] Hu’s main critics in the CCP were a group of Party ​ elders and conservatives: Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, Li Peng, Deng Liqun, Wang Zhen, Hu Qiaomu, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, Yu Qili and Yang Shangkun. In 1987, Hu was dismissed from office and replaced as General Secretary of the CCP by Zhao Ziyang. Hu Yaobang’s critics eventually formed the core group of “conservatives” (a CCP group of more orthodox Maoist, Marxist-Leninist Party members) who determined the ultimate course of events during the Tiananmen demonstrations and massacre. [6] ​ Events in Spring 1989 Leading to the Massacre There was a long period of demonstrations around China in spring 1989, which began with the death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989. That day, flags were flown at half-mast. At universities around Beijing, large-character posters were displayed by students with slogans like: “A Great Loss of Democracy and Freedom,” and “The Star of Hopes Has Fallen.” By the next day, April 16, several hundred people placed wreaths honoring Hu at the Monument of the People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square. On April 17, students and teachers from Beijing universities gathered on Tiananmen Square shouting “Long live democracy, down with corruption, and down with bureaucracy.” [7] ​ Students also sent a letter to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress demanding a reappraisal of Hu Yaobang and his career. At this point, the Public Security Bureau was able to control the crowd. [8] Hu Yaobang’s funeral was April 22, which led to larger demonstrations and marches around the ​ city involving students, workers, government employees, and even some military personnel. [9] ​ Demonstrations involving tens to hundreds of thousands of people continued in Beijing through April 25. Meanwhile in Hunan Province, demonstrators were detained and arrested after rioting in the provincial capital of Changsha. At the time the demonstrations began the members of the PBSC were Zhao Ziyang (General Secretary of the Party), Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin (People’s Daily, November 2, 1987). However, despite their ​ ​ high office, these men did not have as much authority as their titles implied. A group of Party elders, many of them veterans of the CCP since its formation, were part of a Central Advisory Commission that influenced ChinaBrief • Volume 19 • Issue 11 • June 4, 2019 ​ debates on how to respond to the demonstrations. [10] Further complicating matters, it was the Party Central ​ Military Commission (Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui, 中国共产党中央军事委 ​ ​ 员会) that formulated military policy and had the authority to give orders to the PLA. To summarize the situation as the demonstrations developed around Beijing: the Party leadership was in disarray and in disagreement about establishing martial law, as well as divided over how to respond to the general unrest, and whether to call in the PLA. [11] ​ After Hu Yaobang’s funeral, demonstrations continued around Beijing through the rest of April, with discussions going on at the highest levels of the CCP about whether to respond, and how to respond. Li Peng and the Propaganda Department began to call the demonstrations a form of “turmoil.” [12] Generally, ​ however, the environment was permissive and the PAP and Public Security Bureau worked to create avenues for the marchers while still keeping traffic flowing around the city. The April 26 Editorial and Hardening Attitudes Among Party Elders Things changed on April 26, 1989. That morning People’s Daily published a front-page, italicized editorial ​ ​ entitled “The Necessity of Taking a Clear-Cut Stance Against Disturbances.” [13] The Defense Attaché Office ​ in the U.S. Embassy began to get reports from former military personnel traveling into the city that their trains had been diverted so that military rail convoys could use the tracks. At the same time, students in universities claimed that as many as twenty thousand troops had been deployed to Beijing by the PLA 38th Group Army stationed south of Beijing in Hebei. Military units were reminded to “trust the Central Military Commission (CMC)” and not to deploy troops unless approved by the CMC. [14] ​ Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang, now CCP General Secretary and CMC First Vice-Chairman, split on how to respond to the demonstrations. Zhao did not want to crack down hard on the demonstrators. Inside the CMC, with Deng Xiaoping as chairman, conservative, hardline military veterans like Yang Shangkun, his brother Yang Baibing, Liu Huaqing, and Hong Xuezhi also differed with Zhao on how to handle the situation. [15] ​ Thus, there were civil-military disagreements at the top levels of both the Party and the military. During May, a few major events catalyzed the matter for the Party leadership, which led to a complete split between reform-minded Party leaders and conservatives, and brought about the dismissal of Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary (The Washington Post, May 15, 2009). Zhao was sympathetic to the protestors, who ​ ​ ​ wanted the April 26 People’s Daily article retracted. On May 13, the students in the square began a hunger ​ ​ strike and refused to leave Tiananmen Square—which increased the loss of face for the government, as a visit to the Great Hall of the People by Soviet President Michael Gorbachev was imminent (Chicago Tribune, ​ ​ May 14, 1989).