This article was downloaded by: 10.3.98.104 On: 01 Oct 2021 Access details: subscription number Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics and Society Graeme Gill, James Young The Medvedev Presidency Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203804490.ch3 Graeme Gill Published online on: 26 Oct 2011 How to cite :- Graeme Gill. 26 Oct 2011, The Medvedev Presidency from: Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics and Society Routledge Accessed on: 01 Oct 2021 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203804490.ch3 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. 3 The Medvedev presidency Graeme Gill Throughout much of the second half of Vladimir Putin’s second presidential term (2004–8), there was considerable discussion about whether he would stand down as president, seek another term in violation of the constitutional provision allowing only two consecutive terms, or change the Constitution to allow him to stand for office once again. Despite his frequent assertions that he would abide strictly by the Constitution, many encouraged him to seek a third term. But Putin stood firm, and on 2 March 2008 his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, was elected as president. Medvedev was not required to go to a run-off election, winning 70.3 per cent of the vote in the first round. His popularity may seem remarkable for someone who at 42 was still quite young and had spent so little time in the public arena, but he was doubtless buoyed by his association with the very popular Putin. Medvedev had worked with Putin in St Petersburg when the latter had been working for the city’s reformist mayor Anatoly Sobchak, and he had run Putin’s 2000 election campaign. He had been brought to Moscow by Putin when Putin became prime minister, with Medvedev becoming deputy head and then from 2003 to 2005 head of the presidential admin- istration. In 2005 he became first deputy prime minister, with responsibility for the national priority projects that became central to Putin’s programme during his second term. This position gave him some public exposure, but what was more important in his emergence was that he was publicly designated by Putin as his preferred successor and had undertaken to appoint Putin as prime minister if he was elected. This was a promise he kept following his inauguration in May. Medvedev was a very different type of politician to Putin. Putin had gone from university into the security services (the KGB, serving in East Germany at the time of its fall), then into the administration of the democratic mayor of St Petersburg Anatoly Sobchak before being brought to Moscow. Medvedev was much younger, being 42 when elected president. Also from St Petersburg, he was a trained lawyer with a PhD, and had written a popular legal textbook. He had served with Putin in St Petersburg and the latter had brought him to Moscow. So although he owed his career advancement to Putin, his age (and consequently less exposure to the Soviet system), his lack of a security background and his legal training suggested to many that he might take Russia in a distinctly different, less authoritarian, direction than that of his mentor. A tandem? Thirty months into Medvedev’s term, by which time speculation was already rampant about whether Medvedev would run for a second term or whether he would step aside to allow Putin to run again for the presidency, the relationship between president and prime minister remained one about which there was significant public discussion. While analysts pored over their speeches and 27 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:17 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203804490, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203804490.ch3 Graeme Gill statements, trying to discern differences between what they were saying and possible policy conflicts between the two men, most Russians seem to assume that they were working largely together in what has been called a “tandem”. On the few occasions they have discussed the issue, both Medvedev and Putin have emphasised that they are working together and that they discuss issues; and Medvedev has said that he would not run against Putin should the latter run in the 2012 presidential poll. But of course, just because they say they work together does not mean that there are not differences, and being in a tandem does not necessarily mean that they must always agree. What it means is that, when they disagree, those disagreements are kept within bounds (i.e. they do not seep from one policy area to another and thereby both build up and infect the general relationship) and they do not get played out in public. It is clear that the tandem has changed the rules of Russian politics, both in terms of the standing of the prime minister vis-à-vis the president and in terms of the spheres of competence of each of these offices. Under both presidents Yeltsin and Putin, the prime minister was a distinctly subordinate figure. It was the president who was the dominant leader, giving the public direction and, more specifically, direct leadership to his prime minister. Except when Yeltsin was ill and, in the absence of a vice-president, the prime minister became the leading political figure, the president was always the leader who dominated the political stage. That has not been the case while the tandem has been in power. Putin has been an activist prime minister, not only making speeches at major gatherings but also being shown as a hands-on, no-nonsense politician who goes to where the problems are and tries to sort them out in an effective fashion. Rather than someone waiting for direction from the president, he appears as a politician who shows initiative, demon- strates leadership and enjoys widespread popularity. Medvedev too gives speeches and reaches out to the populace; like his predecessors he visits different parts of the country and evinces a concern for the problems of his people. But compared with the former presidents, he seems somewhat reduced by the heightened public profile of his prime minister. The contrast was evident in their public images during the fires that gripped much of central Russia in the summer of 2010: while Medvedev was shown in Moscow issuing orders about the suppression of the fires, Putin was seen out in the field with the firefighters trying to do something practical about the crisis. This is the sort of image that Putin has projected since he became president in 2000, so it was not a change for him personally, but it has been a very different profile for the prime minister than that which had prevailed before. He does not appear as the subordinate of the president, but his equal. The spheres of responsibility also seem to have become less clear since 2008. Broadly speaking, constitutionally the president is responsible for foreign affairs and defence and the prime minister for the economy. This distinction has never been absolute; successive presidents became involved in economic matters whenever they felt the urge, but prime ministers rarely ventured onto the president’s turf. Under the tandem, the distinction seems virtually to have disappeared. Medvedev has been involved in economic matters; his part in shaping and publicly selling Russia’s response to the global financial crisis of 2008–09 is a case in point. But more importantly, Putin has been directly involved in issues of foreign affairs. He has travelled abroad more than his predecessors ever did, but perhaps the most striking instance of his playing a leading role was in the conduct of the war with Georgia in 2008. Putin clearly appeared as an active participant in relation to the conduct of the conflict and the whole relationship with Georgia. He has also been outspoken on questions of the relationship with the West in ways that his predecessors as prime minister generally were not. This blurring of lines of responsibility also had a personnel dimension, which had implications for any attempt by the new president to build up his own personal power base. Attention has been drawn to the way in which Putin brought to Moscow many people who were not only personally associated with him but who had served in the security services. These “siloviki” were said to 28 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 06:17 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203804490, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203804490.ch3 The Medvedev presidency occupy important positions throughout the upper reaches of the power structure in Moscow (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003; Rivera and Rivera 2006; Chapter 18 by Bettina Renz) and in particular in Putin’s own bailiwick, the presidential administration (see Chapter 7 by Pat Willerton). Many have imputed both a particular policy outlook to these people as well as a personal loyalty to Putin, both as the source of their promotion and as a former member of the security services (Putin’s “once a chekist, always a chekist” quip may be illustrative of this).