WHAT WENT WRONG AT DARLINGTON? The Darlington by- election of 24 March 1983 was a disaster for the SDP. After a campaign which had started with an opinion poll (taken just two days after the Alliance’s overwhelming victory in Bermondsey), showing the SDP in the lead, the outcome was a poor third place. ‘Dear, oh dear, e started as of the doubt. Vincent Hanna was The result dissipated it’s pitiful – I’m favour ites in in a different category, but his ag- the momentum gained afraid it’s time Darlington and gressive style at Darlington was for the old nag finished third. no different from his behaviour at Bermondsey and left to go to grass!’ We should have in by-elections elsewhere. (‘Guardian’, 28 Wwon. What went wrong and what 3. Andy Ellis made his usu- the Alliance entering February 1983) are the lessons? al constructive contribution and the 1983 election – what the First, we should eliminate the local Liberals played their full part campaign on the back press expected irrelevant. in the campaign, led by their Pres- to happen at 1. The organisation of ident, Ian Gale. They loyally sup- foot. Here we reprint, Darlington. the campaign was not at fault. ported the decision that the SDP for the time in the The headquarters worked ef- should fight Darlington and their ficiently, canvass arrangements members were always in evidence. public domain, the were first class and party workers Privately, several Liberals said that were deployed quickly and to the their own (displaced) candidate internal memo Bill right places. The great majority of was not strong and would have Rodgers wrote after voters were canvassed – many of done no better. As for the voters, them more than once – and a vast it was a mistake to assume that any the campaign, together quantity of literature delivered. previous Liberal vote automati- with a commentary 2. Although the Press were cally comes to the SDP (or even to play a part in the undermining stays Liberal). Two-thirds is a fair from the Liberal of our campaign, they were fair proportion to expect. Democrats’ current and conscientious. Correspond- Second, we should remind ents as different as Peter Riddell, ourselves of the nature of the Campaigns Director Peter Hetherington and Robin constituency. In its social com- Chris Rennard. Oakley reported faithfully, oc- position, it was attractive to us: casionally giving us the benefit apparently good SDP territory 12 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 WHAT WENT WRONG AT DARLINGTON? (although with a small and rather The Labour party fought a amined: our candidate; attitudes unrepresentative SDP member- skilful campaign with massive re- towards the Labour party; policy. ship which played no distinctive sources. Its canvass of the constit- 1. Tony Cook, a television part in the campaign). But it was uency was probably as thorough presenter with Tyne-Tees, won also the archetypal ‘squeeze’ seat, as ours. It equalled and overtook instant recognition on the streets with Labour and the Conserva- our display of posters which made and doorsteps. His folksy, friendly tives dividing the vote between a good initial impact but failed to manner was well liked. This was them in hard-fought marginal grow significantly. At times, it a positive asset. There is no doubt contests. In 1979, 10.2% for seemed as if every full-time trade that he is a decent man and de- the Liberals in Darlington was union official was in Darlington, serves the greatest credit for sur- well below the national average complete with a Granada 2.3. viving the immense personal bat- (14.9% in England). Our best There were more Labour people tering he received. He must not hope was always to push one of – respectable, in collar and tie It is dif- be a scapegoat. But his own fatal the old parties into third place – knocking-up on Polling Day flaw was fatal to the campaign. He and then collapse their vote. The than we had available. ficult to had very little knowledge of poli- need to achieve tactical voting The Labour party presented escape the tics and showed limited aptitude was inescapable. its acceptable face to the voters in for learning. His style and voice The course of the campaign the person of Jim Callaghan who conclusion marked him as a lightweight seems clear. Our initial canvass made two separate visits and was without positive ideas or passion. was optimistic with inexperienced well received. Healey and Hat- that he He was unable to hold his own canvassers giving us the benefit of tersley were both in evidence. at Press Conferences or with the the doubt. The assumption was Silkin made a brief, early, visit but was almost other candidates. For undecided too readily made that the Labour Tony Benn and the far left were the worst voters, needing a pretext for vote was crumbling when it had absent and there was very little supporting the SDP/Liberal Al- only become soft. But a fortnight even of Tribune. An ugly incident candidate liance, he provided an excuse for before Polling Day we were al- in the town centre, on the Satur- returning to their old loyalties. It most certainly in the lead. Labour day before polling, was isolated. we could is difficult to escape the conclu- then began to gain ground (Shil- The fact that something could be sion that he was almost the worst don, Jim Callaghan’s visit and a made of one member of Militant have cho- candidate we could have chosen massive doorstep operation) while seen in the streets of Darlington sen to fight to fight a crucial by-election un- the Conservatives stayed in third was a measure of their absence. der close scrutiny and in a town position without showing much The Conservative campaign a crucial which took its politics seriously. enthusiasm and were not helped is less easy to measure. Activ- The Press came from Ber- by the Budget. They provided a ity appeared to be subdued and by-elec- mondsey rather ashamed of their substantial pool of undecided vot- meetings were poorly attended. treatment of Peter Tatchell and ers. About a week before polling, We can assume that it was steady tion under anxious to redress the balance. Labour voters began returning to and efficient and made great play close scru- Darlington provided them with their traditional loyalties. There of loyalty to the Government. At the opportunity. Tony Cook’s was a short period when Con- one stage, Conservative manag- tiny and vulnerability was clear from his servatives might have turned to ers were resigned to third place. first Press Conference – and ear- the SDP to keep Labour out, but Conservative voters moved back in a town lier, to those newspapermen who the attraction was insufficient and as much because of our failure as had interviewed him. Early in the the Conservative vote stiffened of positive enthusiasm. which took first week of the campaign we over the final weekend. Victory So, to what was our failure its politics provided him with full-time re- was moving away from us rapidly due? search assistance (Alex de Mont, in the final three days. Three factors need to be ex- seriously. then Wendy Buckley) and John Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 13 WHAT WENT WRONG AT DARLINGTON? The ‘Social O’Brien emerged well from such Democrat’, 1 comparisons. October 1982 Nor did the Labour Council – the SDP present much of a target. Council rising above estates were in reasonable condi- sectarian tion and complaints were few. politics Several former councillors had left the Labour party (the most promi- nent being Ces Smith) and joined the SDP, but they tended to be in the O’Grady mould and uncertain quantities in our campaign. The fact remains that we failed to mount an effective anti-La- bour campaign either by attack- ing O’Brien as less moderate than he seemed or, alternatively (and with greater conviction), as a fig leaf. An early leaflet saying that Peter Tatchell and Ossie O’Brien were members of the same party – with Tatchell in the dominant position – might have made sense. There was criticism of Labour throughout our campaign but it was fierce only in the closing stages. We were too cautious in the period when we were run- ning ahead and too inhibited by Horam became his speechwriter. 2. The Labour vote did awareness of the weakness of our He was taken off canvassing for not crumble and the Labour own candidate. tutorials; given a driver so he candidate recaptured many of 3. The weakness of our might read the morning papers; those who initially preferred to candidate was also an impedi- and provided with an MP at come to us. The acceptable face ment to the positive presentation his right hand. In particular, Jim of the Labour party held its own. of SDP policies. Even when he Wellbeloved was an invaluable There are a number of reasons for could put them across, he was un- presence through most of the this. The Labour candidate, Ossie able to stand up to cross-exami- campaign. Tony Cook’s perform- O’Brien, was respectable, serious nation about them. It was easy to ance improved but it remained and a native of Darlington. He say that someone else had written unimpressive and the damage would have been a good candi- the script. Except on defence, he was done. In the last week of the date, although not an exciting one, was vulnerable on virtually eve- campaign, canvassers increasingly anywhere. The left was carefully rything, including routine issues reported that they had been told excluded from the campaign and like housing and education.