US Nation-Building in Afghanistan Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghani­ stan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions. Dr Conor Keane has degrees in law and politics, and a doctorate on nation­ building in Afghanistan from Macquarie University. His research interests include counter terrorism, state building, bureaucratic politics and US foreign policy. He has published several articles on these topics in journals such as Armed Forces & Society and International Peacekeeping. US Nation-Building in Afghanistan Conor Keane Routledge MACQUARIE R Taylor & Francis Group UNIVERSITY LONDON AND NEW YORK LIBRARY First published 2016 Contents by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business ' © 2016 Conor Keane The right of Conor Keane to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or- utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now A c know I edgements Vlll known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. 1 Introduction Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation Current Literature on Nation-Building in Afghanistan 3 without intent to infringe. Nation-Building and Bureaucratic Politics in Afghanistan 8 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Method and Structure 11 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Keane, Conor. PARTI Title: US nation building in Afghanistan / by Conor Keane. Other titles: United States nation building in Afghanistan Background and Methodology 15 Description: Famham, Surrey, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015030413 | ISBN 9781472474841 (hardback: alk. 2 Nation-Buiiding and the Afghan State 17 paper) | ISBN 9781472474858 (ebook) | ISBN 9781472474865 (epub) What is Nation-Building? 18 Subjects: LCSH: Nation-building-Afghanistan. | Postwar reconstruction- Nation-Building Practice 24 Afghanistan. | Postwar reconstruction-Govemment policy- United States. | United States-Foreign relations-Decision making. | A History of the Afghan State 28 United States-Foreign relations-Afghanistan. | Afghanistan-Foreign Conclusion 34 relations-United States. Classification: LCC DS371.4 .K397 2016 | DDC 958.104/72-dc23 3 Bureaucratic Politics and Nation-Building 35 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015030413 The Rational Actor Model 36 ISBN: 9781472474841 (hbk) ISBN: 9781315548623 (ebk) The President and the Bureaucracy 41 Typeset in Times New Roman A New Bureaucratic Politics Model 44 by Apex Co Vantage, LLC Conclusion 51 PART II US Nation-Building in Afghanistan 53 The US Foreign Policy Bureaucracy and Nation-Building MIX in Afghanistan 55 Paper from ^ _ responsible sources The Military Establishment 56 n vSC Printed in the United Kingdom FSC* cot 3985 by Henry Ling Limited The State Department 63 r vi Contents Contents vii USAID 68 The Counter-Bureaucracy, USDA and PRTs 202 The Counter-Bureaucracy 71 ' Conclusion 203 Inter-Agency Problems 74 10 Conclusion 204 Conclusion 86 Bureaucratic Politics and Nation-Building in Afghanistan 205 5 Security 88 Collaborative Mechanisms 210 The International Security Assistance Force 88 US Efforts to Train the Afghan National Army 91 Bibliography 212 US Efforts to Train the Afghan National Police 94 Index 237 The CIA and Afghanistan’s Warlords 105 Conclusion 110 6 Infrastructure Development 111 The Military Establishment’s Programme 112 USAID’s Programme 116 Infrastructure Development Projects 122 Regulation and Oversight 132 Congress 135 Conclusion 136 7 Counter-Narcotics, Law and Governance 138 Counter-Narcotics Programme 139 The Legal System 151 Governance 158 Conclusion 165 PART III Avenues for Inter-Agency Cooperation 167 8 The Failure of Collaborative Mechanisms 169 Government-Based Mechanisms for Cooperation 169 Individuals as a Conduit for Cooperation 176 Non-Governmental Ideas on Inter-Agency Collaboration in Afghanistan 185 The Shortness of Staff Postings 189 Conclusion 191 9 Provincial Reconstruction Teams: A Microcosm of US Nation-Building in Afghanistan 193 Praise and Critique 194 The US Military 195 Civilian Agencies 199 Acknowledgements 1 Introduction In the course of researching and writing this book I have received assistance from On 11 September 2001 an event occurred that impacted significantly on the shape a number of parties. Professionally, I owe the most significant debt to Dr Lloyd and nature of US foreign policy. The destruction of the World Trade Center, dam­ Cox. I would also like to acknowledge Dr Ashley Lavelle, Dr Steve Wood and age to the Pentagon, and the deaths of almost 3,000 US citizens, could not go Associate Professor Morris Morley for taking the time to look at my chapters and unanswered. An overwhelming majority of a stunned US population looked to the offer advice and encouragement. I extend my gratitude to the senior US officials government and military for retribution. In this heated political climate, President who were willing to permit me to interview them at length. The insights they George W. Bush declared a ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT), a protracted conflict provided were invaluable. against an insubstantial enemy. Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs Personally, I would like to express my gratitude to my brother, for his empa­ of Staff, described it as ‘a different kind of conflict... unlike any other in recent thy, and my father, for his unfailing patience and understanding. But most of all American history’.' This would be a conflict without temporal and spatial hori­ I would like to thank my mother, who since I began undergraduate studies has zons, where non-state, terrorist actors were as much a target of US military action been an ever-willing listener and proofreader. She has pushed me beyond bounda­ as the states that harboured them. ries of self-doubt that I surely would not have conquered otherwise. Barely a month after 9/11, the first battleground in the GWOT became Afghani­ Mum, I dedicate this book to you. stan. Here the Taliban government was sheltering A1 Qaeda, the fundamentalist, Islamic terrorist group responsible for the attacks. Bush called for the Taliban to hand over A1 Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Laden, and their refusal to do so precipitated a US invasion. Rallying under the banner of national self-defence, the organs of the US government swiftly mobilized for a military strike aimed at regime change. Following a resounding military victory, however, the ties that bound the foreign policy machine together began to fray, as the realities of the political and military situation unfolded over the coming months and years. As the Taliban regime crumbled in the face of American military might, some educated Afghans and many more Americans hoped that a stable and repre­ sentative government could replace it. But a smooth transition to Western-style democracy was always an unlikely, if not altogether utopian, challenge, given Afghanistan’s economic underdevelopment, ethno-sectarian fissures, and institu­ tional fragility bom of decades of military conflict and authoritarian mle. From 2001 to 2003, the scale and complexity of this challenge was not something the Bush Administration seriously considered. On the one hand, the abstracted rheto­ ric of long-term political goals and ambitions envisaged the cultivation of a stable, pluralistic and representative Afghan government. On the other hand, the human 1 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 220. 2 Introduction Introduction 3 and material resources on which such an outcome would be premised were never and a practice, is mired in controversy and ambiguity. Some scholars regard its forthcoming. Consequently, US insouciance in the years immediately after the contemporary uses in places such as Afghanistan as little more than an ideological invasion, thinly disguised beneath the euphemistic language of having a ‘light veil for US imperial ambitions.’ For others who subscribe to the alleged benefits footprint’, contributed to the rise of a ferocious and destabilizing insurgency. This of nation-building,