HSBA HSBAFOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Issue BriefAvailable in Arabic Small Arms Survey Number 23 July 2014 Protective measures Local security arrangements in Greater Upper Nile ince erupting in December 2013, ity of official state security forces to conflict in Greater Upper Nile. The the South Sudanese civil conflict respond to the security needs of civil- tradition of LSAs in these areas was a has displaced nearly one million ians. Local security concerns include factor leading to the rapid mobiliza- S 1 people and left more than 10,000 dead. persistent cattle raiding and militia tion of armed youths at the outset of Much of the fighting has been con- group activity, as well as the effects of the recent crisis. centrated in the Greater Upper Nile the long-term proliferation of weapons In particular, this Issue Brief focuses region—including around the strate- and ammunition. on the complex ways in which LSAs gic state capitals of Bentiu (Unity state), This Issue Brief discusses the organi- reflect local security dynamics and Bor (Jonglei state), and Malakal (Upper zation of LSAs in Greater Upper Nile cultural norms surrounding the role Nile state). Rich in oil, Greater Upper and their impact on local security of youths in providing protection for Nile is home to the Nuer supporters of dynamics in the region, drawing on their own communities. It describes the the former vice president, Riek Machar, original research conducted in Mayom security environments in the case study who currently leads the opposition and county in Unity, Uror county in Jonglei, areas, LSA structures and functions, who hails from Unity. and Fashoda county in Upper Nile and the impacts of the LSAs on secu- The involvement of unofficial forces prior to the outbreak of widespread rity levels. In doing so, it considers in the conflict appears significant. Both sides have recruited armed youths to supplement their fighting forces.2 In Map 1. Greater Upper Nile, South Sudan WHITE SENNAR Jonglei, thousands of armed Lou Nuer NILE youths took control of Bor alongside SUDAN rebel forces loyal to Peter Gadet in ed Damazin late December. Meanwhile, President SOUTH e BLUE l i Salva Kiir authorized the recruitment N e t KORDOFAN i NILE and training of thousands of youths for h W a Juba-based auxiliary force under his Kadugli command, with many of the recruits drawn from the predominantly Dinka 3 Hejlij areas of Greater Bahr el Ghazal. The Abyei UPPER NILE Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Abyei azal has also taken on new recruits from town Kiir Bahr el Gh Malakal the Equatorias and Western Bahr el l Bentiu a n So a b C a Ghazal to fight on the front lines in i t e l g 4 n Unity and Upper Nile. o Kwajok UNITY J The rapid recruitment of armed youths into the conflict reflects a ETHIOPIA WARRAP Greater Upper Nile demand for fighting power and a AUHIP-proposed recognition of their roles as commu- border JONGLEI nity security providers, often where Ba International hr el boundary Je official state security is absent. Local be l State boundary LAKES (W h security arrangements (LSAs) are a i te Abyei N il long-time feature in rural South Sudan, SOUTH e SUDAN State capital ) Bor and they have a particularly strong 100km presence in Greater Upper Nile due to CENTRAL EQUATORIA EASTERN EQUATORIA the marked security gap—the inabil- www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 state security policies and practices— form to close this ‘security gap’. While Since the end of the civil war, the including civilian disarmament cam- some LSAs are officially recognized government’s emphasis on civilian paigns—that influence LSA formation, and sanctioned community forces that disarmament as its primary security as well some of the security dilemmas actively coordinate with state security policy in violence-affected rural areas associated with LSAs. providers, others are less formal arrange- of Greater Upper Nile has deeply influ- Key findings include: ments that exist beyond state control. enced the context for LSA activities. Yet, although they provide security Civilian disarmament is ostensibly While LSAs in Greater Upper Nile services, LSAs around the world have designed to reduce the number of provide protection to civilians, they also been shown to exacerbate inse- weapons available for cattle raiding, have also contributed to cycles of curity by engaging in human rights insurgency, and revenge attacks. But violence and revenge by commit- violations, revenge attacks, and extra- the SPLA has not carried out disarma- ting human rights abuses, armed judicial killings.5 ment in a balanced way, and has failed attacks on other communities, and In South Sudan, the army remains to provide protection in the wake of extrajudicial killings in the process the primary state security provider. disarmament—at times leaving dis- of responding to local threats to But its expected transformation from armed communities at the mercy of the community. a rebel force into a nationally represent- their rivals. Disarmament itself has Local government officials and tra- ative and civilian-controlled security often been repressive and violent, and ditional leaders in Greater Upper provider is far from complete. While inadequate systems for the collection, Nile are not providing the over- the army continues to grapple with registration, and storage of weapons sight and accountability required command and control issues, ethically have reduced its effectiveness. For these to allow LSAs to operate effectively driven attacks on communities have reasons, chiefs and even some local and within the law. been a recurring phenomenon in government officials have claimed that While traditional authorities may Greater Upper Nile, where Murle, civilian disarmament should only be not have direct command and Nuer, and Shilluk communities are carried out on the condition that security control over LSAs, and while their based. The South Sudan National forces are able to provide a basic level authority vis-à-vis local govern- Police Service (SSNPS), envisioned of protection to their communities.10 ment officials has declined over as the local security provider over the In 2014, many communities in time, they still possess a great deal long term, remains a weak and under- Greater Upper Nile and elsewhere of local legitimacy to negotiate resourced presence, especially in rural have continued to rely on LSAs as between rival communities and areas. Nor is the SSNPS equipped to their only source of security against resolve disputes non-violently. respond to large-scale security threats cattle raiding and revenge attacks, In the absence of stable and effective such as insurgent militias. although these groups tend to partici- state security forces, forced disarma- LSAs are not a new phenomenon pate in activities that undermine their ment may exacerbate insecurity in South Sudan. From the colonial own long-term security. These cycles by increasing the vulnerability of period onwards, traditional leaders— of violence and revenge are likely to communities to armed attacks by chiefs, community elders, spiritual lead- intensify, even with the May ceasefire rival communities, and by increas- ers, and youth leaders—were often in place.11 Indeed, a strong urge for ing hostility to the army. engaged in the provision of security, revenge will persist among many Nuer Politically marginalized groups, justice, and local administration.6 They in Greater Upper Nile if serious efforts such as the Shilluk and Murle, often continue to provide these services are not made to address impunity for rely on LSAs to provide security, today, although their authority has been the killings that took place in December especially where state security undermined by the militarization of 2013, including the systematic killing forces have a record of repressive ethnic identities and their political of Nuer in Juba by Dinka forces loyal actions against them. marginalization by local government to Kiir at the outbreak of the conflict. The tradition of LSAs across the officials.7 The 2009 Local Government Greater Upper Nile region and the Act codifies the role of traditional proliferation of small arms have authorities in local administration at Unity state contributed to the rapid mobiliza- the county, payam, and boma levels, tion of armed youths on both sides Oil-rich Unity state shares a border but it also limits their autonomy and with Sudan and the contested region of the current conflict. political influence by placing them of Abyei. The state continues to host under the administrative control of thousands of refugees from the ongoing local government officials (GRSS, 2009).8 conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue LSAs in South Sudan This relegation has negatively influ- Nile; it also received people who were Local security arrangements are a enced their ability to advocate on displaced by the bombing of Bentiu feature of many conflict-prone areas behalf of their communities, especially by the Sudan Armed Forces in April where the state does not or cannot among ethnic minorities such as the 2012, although many have left since provide sufficient security. LSAs can Murle and Shilluk.9 conflict erupted in December 2013. 2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 23 July 2014 As of June 2014, the UN Refugee Agency in Mayom county, Unity state, was where cattle raiding takes place. As a was hosting more than 70,000 refugees suspended in June 2013, after an armed result, they are often unable to respond at Yida refugee camp, close to the bor- attack on the community by Dinka to the security