Update Briefing Europe Briefing N°65 Tbilisi/Moscow/Istanbul/Brussels, 8 August 2011 Georgia-Russia: Learn to Live like Neighbours sia’s North Caucasus, but to avoid provocation, it should I. OVERVIEW do this in cooperation with, rather than in spite of, Mos- cow. The bilateral dispute is highly personalised, with Rus- Three years after their August 2008 war over the South Os- sia’s leadership saying it will not engage with President setia region, tension is growing again between Russia and Saakashvili. The effects are also felt in what should be un- Georgia, and talks are needed to restore stability and create related spheres. Georgia is blocking Russia’s bid to join the positive momentum in a situation that is fragile and po- WTO. Espionage arrests in Georgia are fostering a domes- tentially explosive. Diplomatic relations are suspended, and tic atmosphere of suspicion less than a year before 2012 the two have only started limited negotiations, with Swiss parliamentary elections. mediation, on Russia’s World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership. Yet, they share interests in improving regional The two sides communicate mainly through Swiss diplo- security, trade and transport and should start discussions mats. Bern already mediates talks on the WTO dispute and on these rather than continuing to exchange hostile rheto- is prepared to facilitate discussions on other issues, like ric that only makes renewed dialogue more difficult. trade, transport or security. Georgia and Russia have signed agreements on transport and energy since the war, so Lack of contact has increased distrust since the fighting there is a basis for cooperation on which to build even if ended. For Georgia, Russia is an occupier who is under- political willingness is limited. To take advantage of any mining its sovereignty and security. While almost the en- opportunities and begin the long process to normalise ties, tire international community regards South Ossetia and Moscow and Tbilisi should: Abkhazia as parts of sovereign Georgia, Russia recog- nised both as independent shortly after the war. Moscow engage in direct talks, without preconditions, on a range maintains an estimated 7,000 to 9,000 combat, security, of subjects, with mediation, if needed, by a mutually and border forces in those two territories and is building acceptable third party. This should complement, not sub- and refurbishing permanent military bases there, in violation stitute for, the existing Geneva process; and of the ceasefire brokered by the EU presidency in 2008. de-escalate rhetoric about bombings and support for Some 20,000 persons displaced that year have been pre- terrorism and agree to joint investigations or ones car- vented from returning home, and casualties still occur along ried out by third parties. the administrative border lines (ABLs). Meanwhile, to improve security in and around Abkhazia and The Geneva negotiations set up under the ceasefire to South Ossetia, the international community should: create a more productive security environment and ad- dress humanitarian issues, have made only modest head- continue to press Moscow to withdraw to positions way, including the setting up of an Incident Prevention held before the 2008 conflict, facilitate the return home and Response Mechanism (IPRM) between Georgia, Rus- of displaced persons and allow the EUMM full access sia, the de facto authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) for information exchange on security incidents. The sides encourage the parties to exchange information on their have been unable to agree, however, on the larger issues security forces and their movements in areas near the that the Geneva negotiations were intended to address, such ABLs. as the return of displaced persons, and could easily collapse in the present toxic atmosphere. Georgia says it has proof of Russian security services in- volvement in a series of bombings on its territory. Mos- cow denies this, while some politicians and officials accuse Georgia, with little evidence, of re-building its military to threaten Abkhazia and South Ossetia and aiding radical Islamist insurgents in Russia. The Georgian government has embarked on an effort to engage with people from Rus- Georgia-Russia: Learn to Live like Neighbours Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°65, 8 August 2011 Page 2 II. THE REALITY ON THE GROUND Georgia has lost much hope of EU intervention on its be- half. The EUMM was deployed quickly,6 but initial talk of suspending negotiations on a new EU-Russia Agreement A. TOTAL MUTUAL DISTRUST to replace the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agree- The August 2008 war, and Moscow’s subsequent recogni- ment (PCA) due to Russia’s role in the conflict quieted, tion of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence, is and Brussels is again seeking ways to develop a compre- the main source of dispute that sustains deep distrust be- hensive framework for its relations with Moscow. Even pre- tween Georgia and Russia. Although military clashes ended viously highly supportive member states like Poland are soon after the 12 August and 8 September 2008 ceasefire less eager to risk their economic ties. As an EU official told Crisis Group, “there is no dilemma when it comes to agreements were signed, and violent incidents and arrests 7 of civilians along the ABLs with South Ossetia and choosing between Russia and Georgia”. Abkhazia have fallen off considerably, casualties still occur. The U.S. also launched a “reset” policy with Moscow and On 8 April 2011, a Russian border guard and two Georgians has become less of a public defender of Tbilisi,8 though died in a shoot-out in Gali.1 On 18 May, two Georgian U.S. officials say that in private discussions with Moscow, civilians were wounded while straying across the ABL Georgia is as important an issue as ever. During her visit with South Ossetia.2 to Tbilisi in July 2010, Secretary of State Clinton called Significant parts of the ceasefire agreements, brokered by on Russia to end its “occupation” and expressed concern President Nicolas Sarkozy when France was in the EU about its military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 3 She said Georgia must resist being provoked by Moscow, Presidency, remain unfulfilled. Russia has not upheld its 9 commitments to reduce troops to the pre-8 August 2008 but reassured Tbilisi that it supports its territorial integrity. levels, withdraw from previously unoccupied areas and While in 2008 NATO was promising eventual membership, it is clear today if this occurs, it will be many years away, support regular access for international monitoring and hu- 10 manitarian assistance missions to South Ossetia and and Georgian officials say the process “will be gradual”. Abkhazia. It consistently answers international criticism Russia is highly sensitive to Georgian military ties to the by referring to “new realities”, yet it is practically alone U.S. and NATO. The foreign ministry criticised a U.S. war- in recognising the two entities as independent.4 It finances ship visit to Batumi in June 2011 as meddling in its “back- over 99 per cent of South Ossetia’s budget and more yard”, “in contravention of the current nature of Rus- than half of Abkhazia’s. More than 20,000 ethnic Geor- sian-American relations” and a threat to regional security gians displaced by the war have been prevented from re- turning to their homes in South Ossetia in what the Parlia- mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has characterised as ethnic cleansing.5 It recalls that, under international law, Russia bears responsibil- ity for violations of human rights and humanitarian law in those areas that fall under its de facto control”. “Report of the Com- 1 The Russians say the Georgians were working for the interior mittee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by ministry; Georgia says they were criminals. “Russian MFA: Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Commit- Tbilisi wants to destabilize Gali”, Civil Georgia, 11 April 2011. tee)”, PACE, document 12010, 29 September 2009; “Opinion 2 “Two civilians wounded at S. Ossetia administrative border”, of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population”, Civil Georgia, 18 May 2011. PACE document 12039, 29 September 2009. 3 See Crisis Group Europe Reports N°205, South Ossetia: The 6 The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), launched in October Burden of Recognition, 7 June 2010; N°202, Abkhazia: Deep- 2008, has some 200 monitors from 26 member states and a ening Dependence, 26 February 2010; and N°53, Georgia- mandate to monitor, analyse and report on the security situation Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous, 22 June 2009. Russian in the disputed regions, including on the conditions of those officials call the ceasefire agreements the “Sarkozy-Medvedev” forced out of their homes by the conflict. agreements. The Georgians call them the “EU-mediated Russia- 7 Crisis Group interview, EU official, Brussels, July 2011. Georgia” agreements, or the “Medvedev-Sarkozy-Saakashvili” 8 U.S.-Russia relations were strained during the Bush admini- agreements. stration. But Presidents Medvedev and Obama called for a 4 The others to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia were “fresh start” at the 2009 G20 summit, seeking common ground Venezuela, Nicaragua and the world’s tiniest country by popu- with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. In March 2009, Secre- lation, Nauru. On 12 July 2011, Vanuatu’s foreign minister re- tary of State Hillary Clinton and her Russian counterpart, Sergey confirmed his country’s recognition of Abkhazia. Lavrov, symbolically pressed a “reset” button. “New START”, 5 “The Assembly condemns Russia and the de facto authorities http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START of South Ossetia for not having brought resolutely to a halt and 9 “Armed Conflict Database: Georgia (Abkhazia) – Military & seriously investigated the ethnic cleansing of ethnic Georgians Security Developments”, The International Institute for Strate- that by all accounts took place in South Ossetia during and after gic Studies, April-May 2011.