Al-Khair University, Bhimber Jinnah and Cabinet Mission Plan 1946 WALEED AKRAM [email protected] The Cabinet Mission Plan Background As the provincial election campaigns heated up, reports of Hindu Muslim riots, and of “poisonous propaganda” especially in Punjab, increased. The failure of the Simla conference had created a dangerous stalemate in Indian politics. It might be said that the body politic in India almost died of a surfeit of conferences. Moreover, Pethick Lawrence had concluded by then that it would be useless to leave the another round of political negotiations to the viceroy alone, and 2 nothing less than a Cabinet Mission to India was required to break the Hindu Muslim “deadlock”.1 Mr. Attlee made it clear that the Cabinet Mission would not take any definite proposals with them as had sir Stafford Cripps in 1942 nor would have any share in the constitution making. ‘India herself must choose’. He made a remark which was most significant from the point of view of the Muslims. He observed, ‘we are very mindful of the rights of minorities and minorities should be able to live free from fear. This remark welcome to the Congress leader while Muhammad Ali Jinnah replied ‘Muslims are not a minority in India they are a nation and self determination is their birthright’. The British Ministers examined the Muslim demand for Pakistan and came to the conclusion that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign state of Pakistan would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem. They referred to what they termed as ‘weighty administrative, economic and military consideration’ against the idea of partitioning of India and the setting up of two sovereign states. The Cabinet Mission denounced ‘the Muslim demand for Pakistan in unqualified terms. The Cabinet Mission, however, admitted ‘the real Muslim apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might become submerged in a purely unitary India in which the Hindu with their greatly superior numbers must be dominating element.’ 2 The Secretary of State said that the Mission was here to explore the position. They were exploring the possibility of Pakistan and its viability both in peace and war. If Mr. Jinnah could not convince the Delegation of the defensibility of Pakistan he was rather driving the Mission into the solution of handing over authority to a United India. Mr. Jinnah said that if he had not convinced the Delegation he could not do so. He could not agree to anything which would derogate from the sovereignty of Pakistan. He was not there to persuade the Cabinet Mission or as a plaintiff. ‘India was neither united not divided-- it was a British possession.’ Great Britain proposed to transfer power; he had been asked to say how he thought this could be done. The only way in his opinion it could be done with safety was by division. On certain matters he could say that he would make agreements.3 Cabinet Mission 1 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 254. 2 G.W. Chaudhary, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (New York: Institute of Pacific Relation, 1969), 6, 9. 3 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2010), 179. 3 The cabinet decided in February to send Cripps and first lord of the admiralty, A.V. Alexander to India together with Pethick-Lawrence. Wavell was afraid Cripps would be the “operative element” among those magi and considered Cripps “sold to the Congress point of view” and not quite “straight” in his “methods”. Alexander was the weakest brother of this three-man team. It was a high powered mission. But it was in reality Sir Cripps who mattered most. He was at heart a votary of Mr. Gandhi, Lord Pethick Lawrence also held Mr. Gandhi in high esteem. He was a friend of Mr. Nehru and sympathetic toward the Hindu-Congress. In fact the whole Government of Mr. Attlee favoured the Congress.4 A month before the Cabinet Mission left for India, the parliamentary delegation led by Richards returned to 10 Downing Street to report what it had found. Most members agreed that some form of Pakistan would have to be conceded sooner the better. Mrs. Nichol, who admitted that she began her visit to India “impressed by strong necessity of maintaining the unity of India,” found the Punjab “explosive”. The Muslim population there was “all worked up in favour of Pakistan,” she concluded, and therefore, it “must be conceded.” She believed Jinnah would modify his demand, but only if the “principle” were granted “at an early stage.” Pethick Lawrence a brilliant private secretary, Francis Turnbull, then prepared a note on the “viability of Pakistan” which helped brief the Cabinet Mission prior to the start of negotiations.5 At arrival in Karachi Cabinet Mission asked about their opinion on Pakistan, Sir S. Cripps emphasized that they had come with an open mind. “We have not come with any set views” he declared. “We are here to investigate and enquire about that”. This indicates that the Muslim resolve to have at any cost sovereign, independent states in Mussalman majority areas is having its effect. The Britishers are after all a nation of shopkeepers. Mr. Jinnah having pointed out that ‘the Indian Muslims are the largest buyers of British goods and the Congress failure to contradict this assertion have evidently caused searching of the heart in England and now there is disposition not to by-pas the Muslims.’ The Cabinet Mission must base its final decisions on the special relations of the Indian situation and not be misled by Congress propaganda which proceeds from the wrong hypothesis that India is the home of a homogeneous nation.6 4 Muhammad Munawar Dimensions of Pakistan Movement (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1987), 237. 5 Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 254-5. 6 Ahmed Saeed, The Eastern Times On Quaid-I-Azam (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1983), 253. 4 Purpose and Proposal The Mission's task was to try to bring the leaders of the principle Indian political parties to agreement on two matters: 1. The method of framing a constitution for a self-governing, independent India 2. The setting up of a new Executive Council or interim government that would hold office while the constitution was being hammered out.7 The main problem was, as it always had been, the Hindu-Muslim partition. Congress wanted a unified India and the Muslim League wanted a separate, independent Pakistan. The Mission set to work at once, spending two weeks in lengthy discussions with representatives of all the principal political parties, the Indian States, the Sikhs, Scheduled Castes and other communities, and with Gandhi and several other prominent individuals. But at the end of these discussions there was still no prospect of an agreement between the parties and the mission decided to put forward the two possible solutions for consideration. 1. A truncated Pakistan, which Wavell had wanted to tell Jinnah, was all he would get if he kept insisting on a sovereign Pakistan. 2. A loose federation with a three-tier constitution - provinces, group of provinces and an all-India union embracing both British India and the Indian States, which Cripps had devised with the help of two Indian officials, V.P. Menon and Sir B.N. Rau. The Union would be limited to three subjects, foreign affairs, defence and communications, with powers to raise funds for all three; all other subjects would vest in the provinces, but the provinces would be free to form groups, with their own executives and legislatures that would deal with such subjects as the provinces within the group might assign them. In this way the Provinces that Jinnah claimed for Pakistan could form Groups or sub- federations and enjoy a large measure of autonomy thus approximating to Pakistan. Cabinet Delegation Meeting with Jinnah April 1946 7 Ishtiaq Hussian Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1987), 209. 5 Once the Cabinet had given the go-ahead, the way was clear to offer Jinnah the alternatives of a small Pakistan with sovereign rights and treaty relations with Hindustan, or a larger Pakistan (with some minor boundary adjustments and only excluding Assam) inside a federation with Hindustan. The great merit was that in such a federation 'Pakistan' would have equal status with Hindustan in those two matters over which a rather emasculated all-India centre was to be given authority. There was to be no union legislature and any question at the centre on which the two federal units failed to agree would be referred back to their respective group legislatures. Agreement would not be imposed by central dictate, but by agreement between two federated governments. To make this all-India federation even more attractive for Jinnah, it was clearly stated that the Muslim-majority areas would have complete control over all their affairs except those specifically given to the centre; and at the centre 'they would meet the Hindus on a level where it was States which counted and not the number of individuals in them.' This principle of equality, which was exactly what Jinnah had been fighting for all along was, he was now told, 'the essence of the proposal'. His Pakistan did not intend to throw the advantages of an undivided Punjab and Bengal to the winds, nor did it plan to leave the Muslims in Hindustan unprotected. Undivided provinces and protection for minority Muslims could only be achieved inside the framework of a union with an effective centre where the League had an equal say. So we must carefully assess why Jinnah did not jump more openly and more enthusiastically at what the Mission now offered in its Scheme A...It was only by pressing for even more than he had been offered that Jinnah hoped to persuade the Congress to accept the Mission's proposed all- India federal scheme as a lesser evil.