Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Knowledge and Thought in Heidegger and Foucault: Towards an Epistemology of Ruptures Arun Anantheeswaran Iyer Marquette University Recommended Citation Iyer, Arun Anantheeswaran, "Knowledge and Thought in Heidegger and Foucault: Towards an Epistemology of Ruptures" (2011). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 131. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/131 KNOWLEDGE AND THOUGHT IN HEIDEGGER AND FOUCAULT: TOWARDS AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RUPTURES by Arun Iyer, B. E., M. A. A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin August 2011 ABSTRACT KNOWLEDGE AND THOUGHT IN HEIDEGGER AND FOUCAULT: TOWARDS AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RUPTURES Arun Iyer, B.E., M.A. Marquette University, 2011 This dissertation shows how Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault, by questioning the very understanding of the subject-object relationship on which all epistemology is grounded, challenge two of its most cherished beliefs: 1. Thought and knowledge are essentially activities on the part of the subject understood anthropologically or transcendentally. 2. The history of knowledge exhibits teleological progress towards a better and more comprehensive account of its objects. In contrast to traditional epistemology, both Heidegger and Foucault show how thought and knowledge are not just acts, which can be attributed to the subject but also events which elude any such subjective characterization. They also show us how the history of knowledge exhibits ruptures when the very character of knowledge undergoes drastic transformation in the course of history. The dissertation concludes by hinting at how these new accounts of thought and knowledge have the potential to shake the very foundations of epistemology and lead us to a new framework for discussing the most basic questions of epistemology, towards an epistemology of ruptures. i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Arun Iyer, B.E., M.A. This dissertation would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the Arthur J. Schmidt Foundation for the academic year 2008-09 and the Smith Family Foundation for the academic year 2009-10. The financial support provided by the Smith Family Foundation made it possible for me to spend the whole of 2009-10 doing research at Bergische Universität, Wuppertal, Germany. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Laszlo Tengelyi of Bergische Universität for inviting me to Wuppertal and mentoring me for a whole year whilst discussing some of the difficult problems that the topic of my dissertation gave rise to. I benefitted immensely from his many seminars and reading groups at Wuppertal. I am also thankful to Dr. Dieter Lohmar of the Husserl Archives at Universität Köln for inviting me to present some of the work that I had done for my dissertation in the workshop held there and for the comments he gave me thereafter. I am truly indebted to my director Dr. Pol Vandevelde for standing with me every step of the way. He taught me how to frame a problem, ask a question and cut through verbiage and get to the heart of the matter. These are skills without which no kind of scholarship is possible. However, he has been much more to me than just a dissertation director. He has been a spiritual guide. I have relied on his advice and his guidance in all of my difficult times. No words can express the tremendous role he has played and continues to play in my overall intellectual and spiritual development. ii I express my sincerest thanks to my three readers, Dr Ibanez-Noe, Dr. Sebastian Luft and Dr. Andrew Cutrofello of Loyola University Chicago. My second reader, Dr. Ibanez-Noe read through the dissertation most carefully and his penetrating comments and precise questions were very valuable towards improving this dissertation as piece of scholarship and he was always ready to discuss my work with me. I shared several pleasant and enlightening conversations over my work and about the general nature of academic scholarship with Dr. Sebastian Luft in the United States and in Germany. His specific comments on my dissertation and general comments on the nature of scholarship were invaluable indeed. I am truly honored that Dr. Andrew Cutrofello of Loyola University, Chicago decided to become part of my dissertation committee. His comments and his perspective on the problems I was addressing were irreplaceable. He was very generous with his time and his detailed and insightful comments were instrumental in getting some portions of this dissertation published. I convey my gratitude to Dr. Kevin Gibson for introducing me to the rigors of academic life in the United States, guiding me through the process of my academic development and helping me find sources of financial support and Dr. John Pustejovsky for helping me with my German. I give my heartfelt thanks to Dr. S. S. Antarkar of the Philosophy Department at Mumbai University for showing me what it was to philosophize when I was just starting out with philosophy. Without his encouragement, I would not have dared to pursue a career a philosophy. I fondly remember the many hours in conversation I spent with him over philosophy. iii I would like to thank my friends without whom it would have been impossible to endure the long hours of hard work and my parents without whose unstinting support none of this could have been achieved. I am particularly thankful to Mrs. Maureen Kondrick for her unconditional help in times of real need. The company of my friends Chris Dorn, Pat Anderson and Matt Wion here in the United States and my friends Leiling Wang, Antonio Cimino, Inga Römer, Guillaume Fagniez and Yenny Djinga in Germany was truly indispensable. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………. i CHAPTER INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………….1 I. HEIDEGGER’S DISCOVERY OF NON-CONCEPTUAL THINKING: FROM THE TRANSCENDENTAL POWER OF THE IMAGINATION TO INCEPTUAL THINKING………………………………………………….13 1. Introduction………………………………………………............ 13 2. The Transcendental Power of the Imagination as Non-Conceptual Thinking in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics…………………………………………..14 2.1. Heidegger on the Relationship between Intuition and Thinking in Kant………………………….......14 2.2. The Ontological Synthesis of Intuition and Thinking in the Transcendental Power of the Imagination………………………………………..... 17 2.3. Schematization as the Key to the Role of Transcendental Power of the Imagination………………......20 2.4. The Transcendental Power of the Imagination as Thinking prior to Thinking……………………………........ 32 3. Inceptual Thinking as Non-Conceptual Thinking in the Beiträge…………………………………………………........ 36 3.1. From the Transcendental Power of the Imagination to Inceptual Thinking......................................... 36 3.2. The Characteristics of Inceptual Thinking...................... 49 3.3. Inceptual Thinking and the History of Be-ing................ 54 3.4. Thinking of the Event and the Event of Thinking.......... 65 4. Conclusion..................................................................................... 72 v II. THE OBJECT OF THOUGHT IN THE HISTORY OF BEING: FROM THE OBJECT OF EN-THINKING IN THE BEITRÄGE TO THE OBJECT OF THINKING IN WHAT IS CALLED THINKING?................................................................................... 79 1. Introduction.................................................................................... 79 2. Distinction between two kinds of thinking in the Beiträge........... 80 2.1. An Interpretation of Heidegger’s Notion of Seyn....................................................................... 80 2.2. The Delicate Task of Separating Thinking (1) from Thinking (2)............................................. 82 3. The Object of Thinking in the Beiträge......................................... 85 3.1. The Standard Understanding of the Being and History in Contemporary Epistemology................................ 85 3.2. Heidegger’s Challenge to the Standard Understanding........................................................................ 88 4. En-thinking of Be-ing and the One who Does the En-thinking......................................................................... 95 4.1. The Relationship between En-thinking and Be-ing.............................................................................. 95 4.2. Da-sein as En-thinker of Be-ing..................................... 97 5. Appraisal of the Epistemological Implications of Heidegger’s Ontological Framework in the Beiträge.............................................................................................. 100 6. The Distinction between Thinking and Science in What is Called Thinking?............................................................... 103 6.1. The Complex Relationship between Science and Thinking............................................................. 103 6.2. The Dual Object of Thinking: The Being of Beings and the Nature of the Human Being.......................... 114 vi 7. Elucidating the Object of Thought in What is Called Thinking?.................................................................. 115 7.1. The Call-Response Relationship between Thought and its Object........................................................... 115 7.2. Thinking as a Pre-Logical Activity in Parmenides........................................................................ 121 7.3. Being as the Object