Primary Source 1.3 CICERO, ON THE LAWS (C. 52 B.C.)1 Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.) was a Roman thinker, statesman, lawyer, and orator. His writings drew heavily upon Greek thought, and as a stylist he strongly influenced the development and later impact of the Latin language. The Renaissance humanists who returned to the sources of classical antiquity above all admired his rhetorical skills. His constitutionalist ideas inspired such Enlightenment-era thinkers as John Locke and Montequieu. A supporter of the Roman Republican ideals, he struggled against Julius Caesar and was executed for opposition to Mark Antony (83–30 B.C.). Cicero wrote two principle political treatises: “On the Republic” and “On the Laws,” both named after similar works by his model philosopher, Plato. Both books are also organized as dialogues, “On the Laws” as a conversation between Cicero, his brother Quintus, and their friend, Titus Pomponius Atticus (112/109–35/32 B.C.). Much of the dialogue has been lost. That which remains propounds the idea of natural law and delineates an ideal law code. The excerpt below concerns natural law, the concept that what is right and just has been infused into nature and reality such that they are universal and self-evident to human conscience. This concept, which derived ultimately from ancient and Hellenistic Greece and in particular from the Stoic philosophers, played an important role in European thought beginning in the Middle Ages, in part because it is highly compatible with the Christian faith. For the complete text online, click here. For a freely accessible audio recording, click here. BOOK I. V. Atticus.—But, if you ask what I expect, I should reply, that after having given us a treatise on the Commonwealth,2 it appears a natural consequence that you should also write one on the Laws. For this is what I see was done by your illustrious favourite Plato, the philosopher whom you admire and prefer to all others, and love with an especial affection. Marcus.—Do you wish, then, that, as he conversed at Crete with Clinias, and Megillus of Lacedsemon, on that summers day,3 as he describes it, in the cypress groves and sylvan avenues of Cnossus,4 often objecting to, and at times approving of, the established laws and customs of commonwealths, and discussed what were the best laws; so we also, walking beneath these lofty poplars, along these green and umbrageous banks, and sometimes sitting down, should investigate the same subjects somewhat more copiously than is required by the practice of the courts of law? 1 The Treatises of M. T. CICERO on the Nature of the Gods; On Divination; On Fate; On the Republic; On the Laws; and On Standing for the Consulship, trans. and ed. C. D. Yonge (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853), 405-6, 408-10, 415-18. 2 On the Republic. 3 As Plato describes in his Republic. 4 Knossos was an ancient city on the island of Crete. Atticus.— I should like to hear such a discussion. Marcus.—But what says Quintus? Quintus.—There is no subject which I would rather hear argued. Marcus.—And you are quite right. For, take my word for it, in no kind of discussion can it be more advantageously displayed how much has been bestowed upon man by nature, and how great a capacity for the noblest enterprises is implanted in the mind of man, for the sake of cultivating and perfecting which we were born and sent into the world, and what beautiful association, what natural fellowship, binds men together by reciprocal charities: and when we have explained these grand and universal principles of morals, then the true fountain of laws and rights can be discovered. Atticus.—In your opinion, then, it is not in the edict of the magistrate, as the majority of our modern lawyers pretend, nor in the Twelve Tables,5 as the ancients maintained, but in the sublimest doctrines of philosophy, that we must seek for the true source and obligation of jurisprudence. Marcus.—For in this discussion of ours, my Atticus, we are not inquiring how we may take proper caution in law, or what we are to answer in each consultation, that may indeed be an important affair, as in truth it is; and at one time it was supported by many great men, and is at present ex-pounded by one most eminent lawyer with admirable ability and skill. But the whole subject of universal law and jurisprudence must be comprehended in this discussion, in order that this which we call civil law, may be confined in some one small and narrow space of nature. For we shall have to explain the true nature of moral justice, which must be traced back from the nature of man. And laws will have to be considered by which all political states should be governed. And last of all, shall we have to speak of those laws and customs of nations, which are framed for the use and convenience of particular countries (in which even our own people will not be omitted) which are known by the title of civil laws. VI. Quintus.—You take a noble view of the subject, my brother, and go to the fountain-head, in order to throw light on the subject of our consideration; and those who treat civil law in any other manner, are not so much pointing out the paths of justice as those of litigation. Marcus.—That is not quite the case, my Quintus. It is not so much the science of law that produces litigation, as the ignorance of it. But more of this by-and-by. At present let us examine the first principles of Right. Marcus.—I will not detain you long. This is the bearing which they have on our subject. This animal—prescient, sagacious, complex, acute, full of memory, reason, and counsel, which we call man—has been generated by the supreme God in a most transcendent condition. For he is the only creature among all the races and descriptions of animated beings who is endued with superior reason and thought, in which the rest are deficient. And what is there, I do not say in man alone, but in all heaven and earth, more divine than reason, which, when it becomes right and perfect, is justly termed wisdom? 5 Fundamental laws of the Roman Republic. There exists, therefore, since nothing is better than reason, and since this is the common property of God and man, a certain aboriginal6 rational intercourse between divine and human natures. But where reason is common, there right reason must also be common to the same parties; and since this right reason is what we call law, God and men must be considered as associated by law. Again, there must also be a communion of right where there is a communion of law. And those who have law and right thus in common, must be considered members of the same commonwealth. And if they are obedient to the same rule and the same authority, they are even much more so to this one celestial regency, this divine mind and omnipotent deity. So that the entire universe may be looked upon as forming one vast commonwealth of gods and men. And, as in earthly states certain ranks are distinguished with reference to the relation ships of families, according to a certain principle which will be discussed in its proper place, that principle, in the nature of things, is far more magnificent and splendid by which men are connected with the Gods, as belonging to their kindred and nation. VIII. For when we are reasoning on universal nature, we are accustomed to argue (and indeed the truth is just as it is stated in that argument) that in the long course of ages, and the uninterrupted succession of celestial revolutions, there arrived a certain ripe time for the sowing of the human race; and when it was sown and scattered over the earth, it was animated by the divine gift of souls. And as men retained from their terrestrial origin those other particulars by which they cohere together, which are frail and perishable, their immortal spirits were ingenerated by the Deity. From which circumstance it may be truly said, that we possess a certain consanguinity, and kindred, and fellowship with the heavenly powers. And among all the varieties of animals, there is not one except man which retains any idea of the Divinity. And among men themselves, there is no nation so savage and ferocious as not to admit the necessity of believing in a God, however ignorant they may be what sort of God they ought to believe in. From whence we conclude that every man must recognise a Deity, who has any recollection and knowledge of his own origin. Now, the law of virtue is the same in God and man, and in no other disposition besides them. This virtue is nothing else than a nature perfect in itself, and wrought up to the most consummate excellence. There exists, therefore, a similitude between God and man. And as this is the case, what connexion can there be which concerns us more nearly, and is more certain? Therefore, nature has supplied such an abundance of supplies suited to the convenience and use of men, that the things which are thus produced appear to be designedly bestowed on us, and not fortuitous productions. Nor does this observation apply only to the fruits and vegetables which gush from the bosom of the earth, but likewise to cattle and the beasts of the field, some of which, it is clear, were intended for the use of mankind, others for propagation, and others for the food of man.