Briefing Series – Issue 33 CHINA’S POLITICS IN 2007: POWER CONSOLIDATION, PERSONNEL CHANGE AND POLICY REORIENTATION Gang CHEN Liang Fook LYE Dali YANG Zhengxu WANG © Copyright China Policy Institute January 2008 China House University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0)115 846 7769 Fax: +44 (0)115 846 7900 Email: [email protected] Website: www.chinapolicyinstitute.org The China Policy Institute was set up to analyse critical policy challenges faced by China in its rapid development. Its goals are to help expand the knowledge and understanding of contemporary China in Britain, Europe and worldwide, to help build a more informed dialogue between China and the UK and Europe, and to contribute to government and business strategies. 1 Summary 1. The year 2007 witnessed the convening of the 17 th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). General Secretary Hu Jintao further consolidated his power by bringing his trusted officials into the Political Bureau and having his “Scientific Development” concept enshrined in the Party Constitution. 2. Nevertheless, the Party Congress was not a landslide victory for Hu, who reportedly made a compromise with the Shanghai Clique and the Princelings Group by making Xi Jinping the frontrunner to succeed him in five year’s time. 3. Li Keqiang, two years younger than Xi and favored by Hu, joined the Standing Political Bureau Committee. He is to become vice premier in March 2008 and expected to succeed Wen Jiabao as premier five years later. 4. Besides Xi and Li, several new Political Bureau members in their 50s, including Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, Bo Xilai and Wang Qishan, have the potential to stay in the core leadership for another ten years and may even stand a chance to become General Secretary or Premier. 5. Cabinet changes in 2007 included the appointments of Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Finance Minister Xie Xuren, and Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu. 6. As part of a strategy of political co­optation, the Chinese leadership also appointed non­CCP members Wan Gang and Chen Zhu as Minister for Science and Technology and Minister of Health respectively. 7. China continued its high­profile fight against corruption by executing Zheng Xiaoyu, the former chief of the State Food and Drug Administration. Worsening pollution and a scandal over slave labour drove the government to pay closer attention to environmental and labour issues, impose stricter green standards and formulate a new labour contract law. 8. Last year also saw another major effort by the Party to maintain its legitimacy. It promised to introduce more elements of democracy into the way it runs the country, in line with its overarching goal of “building political civilization” that is to be achieved through building a system of “socialist democracy”. 9. Maintaining social stability remained of paramount importance in 2007. With inflation at a 10­year­high and all eyes on the Beijing Olympic Games, the Chinese leadership is likely to step up vigilance toward any potential threats to stability in the coming months. 10. Rising prices of food items (pork, cooking oil, and rice) and energy have increased public dissatisfaction and generated complaints especially among the lower­income groups. Meanwhile, uneasiness is growing over steep gains in domestic property and stock markets. 11. The Party is trying to revamp its initial mindset which focused on increasing GDP to one based on a “scientific outlook of development.” Changes made to 2 the cadre evaluation system included the addition of environmental indicators to the assessment criteria of local officials. 12. Another significant political event in 2007 was the passage of a controversial law guaranteeing private property rights. Social conflicts and protests triggered by forced land requisitions continued to attract attention, reflected by the particularly prominent “Nailhouse” case in Chongqing in early 2007. 13. China had a strong year in foreign relations. It gained the support of the United States to maintain the status quo on the Taiwan issue, improved its relationship with Japan ­­ led by new Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda ­­ and worked with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish a Free Trade Area by 2010. 14. However, pressure from the EU increased as it raised the tone of its complaints about Chinese trade and currency behavior. Chinese­German relations grew especially frosty as Chancellor Angela Merkel put the issues of Tibet and human rights on centre stage. Beijing will also be watching the US election campaigns closely for signs of China­bashing. 15. China’s political agenda in 2008 will probably be dominated by the Olympic Games. Maintaining social stability will be top priority for the Chinese leaders. 3 China’s Politics in 2007: Power Consolidation, Personnel Change and Policy Reorientation Gang Chen, Liang Fook Lye, Dali Yang, & Zhengxu Wang 1 Hu’s Power Enhanced in the 17 th Party Congress 1.1 The 17 th Party Congress dominated the political scene in China in 2007. Although the Congress convened in October for only one week, cadres had been jockeying intensely for positions and stiffly contesting the Party’s policy lines in the months leading up to it. The much­awaited Congress started on 15 th October in Beijing and closed on the 22 nd as the newly­ selected Political Bureau Standing Committee made its press debut. In summary, the Congress saw a further consolidation of Hu Jintao’s power. Hu, leader of the Party and the country, was able to appoint his trusted lieutenants to important positions. The Congress also incorporated his brainchild “Scientific Development” concept in the Party Constitution, making it a major ideological guideline.2 1.2 Still, not all the outcomes of the Party Congress were satisfactory to Hu, as he was only able to promote one of his protégés, Li Keqiang, to the Political Bureau Standing Committee ­­ the most powerful decision­making body in China. Li, the 52­year­old Party Secretary of Liaoning Province, had been seen as Hu’s favorite potential successor, but ultimately, Xi Jinping, the 54­ year­old Party Secretary of Shanghai, was promoted to a position above Li’s in the Political Bureau Standing Committee, becoming the front­runner to succeed Hu as general secretary. 1.3 Xi was believed to be preferred by the Taizidang, also known as the Princelings, which is a wide political network made up by the offsprings of veteran revolutionaries, as well as the Shanghai Clique. Both groups are currently led by the outgoing Vice President Zeng Qinghong. The choice of Xi as Hu’s potential successor suggested that Hu had to make a compromise with Zeng and his associated factions. While this development indicates the increasingly pluralistic nature of Chinese politics, such compromises do not necessarily mean Hu, who is halfway through his term, failed to consolidate his power halfway through his tenure. 1.4 Since Deng Xiaoping, the revolutionary leader and chief architect of China’s reform, passed away in 1997, China has lacked a charismatic leader who is able to achieve any political outcome unconditionally. Succession now 1 Gang Chen and Liang Fook Lye are Research Fellow and Senior Research Officer respectively, while Dali Yang is Professor and Director of the East Asian Institute, Singapore; and Zhengxu Wang is Senior Research Fellow at China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham. The authors would like to thank Professors John Wong and Yongnian Zheng for their valuable contributions throughout the preparation of this work. 2 For details of the 17 th Party Congress, please refer to “The Key Policy Outcomes of China's 17th Party Congress” by Zhengxu Wang and Yongnian Zheng, published 8 November 2007 by China Policy Institute. 4 operates under an institutionalized framework where gains are usually achieved through compromises made among different forces within the Party. 1.5 During the 17 th Party Congress, Hu successfully got the upper hand over his rivals by engineering the promotion of some of his colleagues from the Youth League to the Political Bureau and other important positions. Most of them will still be young enough to be elevated to higher­level posts by the time the selection for a new cohort of leaders starts in five years. Another of Hu’s political achievement came in the form of a recent amendment to the Party Constitution, which incorporated his brainchild concept of “Scientific Development” into the core guidelines of the CCP. Nevertheless, Hu had to give up his other brainchild concept ­­ “Harmonious Society” ­­ and stick to the phrase of “Well­Off Society” which embodied the Party’s policy goal. 1.6 In 2007, the CCP continued its struggle against corruption so as to safeguard its legitimacy. A National Corruption Prevention Bureau was established and a ministerial official, former chief of the State Food and Drug Administration Zheng Xiaoyu, was executed on corruption charges. The saga concerning former Shanghai Party Chief Chen Liangyu continued to unfold as other implicated officials were persecuted, while several ministerial officials, including former Minister of Finance Jin Renqing, were sacked on alleged charges of corruption. 1.7 Amidst the CCP’s efforts to achieve development in a “scientific” and “harmonious” way, the year 2007 witnessed a continued imbalanced expansion of the Chinese economy. While China’s GDP is expected to have expanded by 11.6 percent, awareness is growing of environmental degradation and the worsening income inequality in the country. Frequent reports of coal mine accidents as well as the revelation of a slave­labour scandal highlighted the costs of hyper­growth. In the meantime, the Chinese leaders started to push for a comprehensive welfare, educational and healthcare system that will cover all Chinese nationals. The Party is striving to build an effective government in response to challenges to its rule.