Theory in Behavior Analysis An Application to Child Development Henry D. Schlinger, Jr. Western New England College Theory in behavior analysis is described, and its appli- age at which certain behavioral changes emerge, but they cation to developmental psychology is illustrated using are not given the theoretical tools with which to under- examples from the literature on the development of infant stand or explain these changes within a unified frame- memory and perceptual size constancy. Traditional ap- work. In addition, those who work with children in ap- proaches to development are briefly described and jux- plied settings gain little practical knowledge that can be taposed with a behavioral approach. Behavior-analytic used to reliably change behavior. Behavior analysts who theory is evaluated according to several criteria of good are interested in development find this state of affairs scientific theories. It is concluded that modern behavior- troubling. analytic theory, which grew largely out of the work of Although the theoretical systems within develop- B. F. Skinner, succeeds well at explaining many of the mental psychology are largely unsatisfactory, at least for facts of infant memory and perceptual size constancy and behavior analysts, some of the research may be valuable may also succeed at explaining facts in other areas of and therefore worthy of consideration. However, we need developmental psychology. Behavior analysis may thus be not throw the baby out with the bath water. Behavior able to provide some theoretical uniformity in the field of analysts ought to ask whether it is possible to make sense developmental psychology. of this accumulation of apparently unrelated data without necessarily accepting the accompanying explanations and theories. Over the years, there have been some attempts by behavior analysts to apply behavior-analytic theory to The General Problem child development (e.g., Bijou, 1976; Bijou & Baer, 1978). However, behavior analysts by and large have not ad- In the past several decades, the field of developmental dressed the extensive research in the area conducted psychology has grown and generated a vast amount of largely by psychologists who are not behavior analysts research. Despite this growth, the field remains theoret- although there are some exceptions (e.g., Gewirtz, 1972a, ically fractionated, with very little of its research united 1972b; Gewirtz & Pelaez-Nogueras, 1990, 1991). Because by a common theoretical orientation. Not surprisingly, much of the existing research in developmental psychol- textbooks in the field reflect this state of affairs. Although ogy suggests a strong environmental component to be- many developmental textbooks are written from a gen- havioral development, behavior-analytic theory is in an erally cognitive perspective, none adopts a unitary theo- ideal position to interpret the behavioral changes that de- retical approach. Based simply on the amount of infor- fine this development. mation in the field, these textbooks give the impression that developmental psychologists know a lot about the Although it is possible to show that behavior-analytic behavioral changes that constitute development. On the theory succeeds as a theory of behavioral development, other hand, the amount of contrasting evidence for many its treatment in most developmental textbooks indicates phenomena and the numerous explanations and theories that it is regarded as being relatively unimportant for the seem to suggest that developmental psychologists are un- understanding of development. In some cases behavior- able to make much sense of this information. They may analytic theory is relegated to an almost historical place be able to tell us what children are likely to do and at in developmental psychology (e.g., Scarr, Weinberg, & approximately what age but not how or why they are able Levine, 1986). In other books, it is never credited with to do it. At the very least, developmental psychology is a being able to explain anything more than trivial behaviors field with the appearance of confusion. Unlike the natural (e.g., Collins & Kuczaj, 1991). Still other textbooks offer sciences, it seems to be accepted practice to assume that rather lengthy sections on learning (not explicitly behav- many different theories and explanations are needed to ior-analytic theory) in which the principles of respondent account for essentially the same subject matter, in this and operant conditioning are detailed; however, subse- case, the behavioral changes that are observed over time quent discussions of behavioral changes attributed to in the life of an individual. This general practice results in the existence of a large body of factual information The author is grateful to Edward K. Morris and David C. Palmer for but one lacking theoretical consistency or unity. Students their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to of developmental psychology may learn a lot of individual Henry D. Schlinger, Jr., Department of Psychology, Western New England facts, and they may be better able to predict the average College, 1215 Wilbraham Rd., Springfield, MA 01119. 1396 November 1992 • American Psychologist Copyright 1992 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/92/S2 00 Vol.47, No. II, 1396-1410 learning rarely refer back to these principles (e.g., Dwor- logical principles. Students often wonder what to make etzky, 1991). In many textbooks the discussion of learn- of this theoretical eclecticism, which is often presented ing, not to mention behavior-analytic theory, is almost in developmental psychology textbooks as if it were a nonexistent (e.g., Collins & Kuczaj, 1991; Santrock, strength. 1990). Finally, many standard textbooks in developmental The implications of a structural approach in devel- psychology omit the significant empirical and theoretical opmental psychology cannot be overstated. It assumes contributions of behavior analysts to the scientific un- that classes of behavior, distinguished primarily on the derstanding of child behavior. This sizable literature in- basis of structural properties, are separate functional cludes, but is not limited to, notable work by Donald M. classes requiring different explanatory mechanisms. Un- Baer, Sidney W. Bijou, Jacob L. Gewirtz, Lewis P. Lipsitt, fortunately, all too often, the theories and explanations and Carolyn Rovee-Collier and their respective colleagues. used to account for the development of these behaviors At the very least, this omission does a disservice to stu- are arrived at by way of logical error that is often circular dents of developmental psychology by depriving them of in nature. First, the behavioral class is given a name. The valuable empirical and theoretical analyses of behavioral name is then reified and itself becomes the object of study. development in children. Finally, the name is used as the explanation of the ob- In the present article, I clarify a behavior-analytic served behavior. Much of the Piagetian approach to de- position on scientific theory and then demonstrate how velopment illustrates this. For example, by about 24 behavior-analytic theory can be used to interpret certain months, infants are able to behave effectively toward ob- facts in developmental psychology. Throughout this jects under a wide range of conditions of their absence. article, a behavior-analytic theory of development is Piaget and other developmental psychologists have termed counterposed with traditional structural theoretical ap- these observed behavior-environment interactions object proaches. The purpose of the article is to show that in- permanence. When studying the development of the phe- terpreting developmental research according to behavior- nomenon, it is said that they are studying object per- analytic theory can provide theoretical cohesiveness to manence, or the emergence of the concept of object per- developmental psychology. manence, which implies that what is being studied is something other than the observed behavior-environment Conception of Behavior in Developmental relations. Then, when infants are finally able to behave Psychology appropriately with respect to objects that are out of sight, It has been standard practice in psychology in general, it is said they can do so because they now possess the and developmental psychology in particular, to differen- concept of object permanence or the mental capacity to tiate behavior largely according to its form. In develop- represent objects. Object permanence, which began as mental psychology, this practice has resulted in such pre- the name for certain observed behavioral relations, has sumably distinct categories as motor behavior, social be- become a thing (a structure or process) located inside the havior, emotional behavior (emotion), cognitive behavior child that is said to be responsible for the observed be- (cognition), perceptual behavior (perception), language havior. Although the logical errors in this type of theo- behavior, and so on. Even within these categories struc- rizing have been noted by psychologists who are not be- tural distinctions are made. For example, cognitive-de- havior analysts (e.g., Dworetzky, 1991; Flannagan, 1991), velopmental psychologists distinguish among imitation, it has done little to diminish such practices. conservation, and object constancy as if each of these In addition to the number of different theories, de- behavioral classes was a different